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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the question of what religious education should aim to 
achieve in the public sphere, and from that comes an interest in what is it that the 
teacher of religious education should aim to do. My enquiry is located, theoretically as 
well as conceptually, in the sphere of education. It is an educational study into religious 
education and situated in what can be termed a ‘Continental construction’ of 
educational research. I identify that since the inception of religious education in public 
schools in England, persistent assumptions have been made about both religion and 
education. I show how this has led, in my view, to conceptualisations of religious 
education which have been, and continue to be, incomplete. The central chapters of my 
thesis consider first religion and then education. This allows me to introduce my 
theoretical base, which is especially but not exclusively drawn from the work of 
Simone Weil and Hannah Arendt. I develop an argument suggesting that by also 
understanding religion existentially as faith, rather than as only belief or practice, will 
open new ways of considering the role of religious education in the public sphere. This 
is alongside an argument I develop with Arendt for education being conceptualised as 
bringing the child to action rather than to reason. This thesis argues for a broader 
understanding of religion, and therefore what it means to live a religious life, in 
religious education than has previously been considered. I bring this broader way of 
understanding what it means to live a religious life together with my argument for 
conceptualising education as bringing the child to action.  This enables me to make a 
new proposal for what religious education should aim to achieve in the public sphere. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
 
‘Those are the pearls that were his eyes 
Nothing of him that doth fade 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange’ 
 
Shakespeare. The Tempest, 1: 2. 
 
1.1 Aims and research questions: what this thesis intends to achieve 
The intention of this thesis is to make an original contribution to the development of 
new educational theory in religious education regarding its purpose, arguing a case for 
a new conceptualisation of what religious education should aim to achieve. In this 
chapter I introduce the scope of my investigation, place it within my professional 
context and explain the motivation for my enquiry. I describe what kind of an enquiry 
this is, and clarify my overarching research question and its origin, outlining three sub-
questions driving the research.  
The key question at the heart of my thesis is little changed from the question Cox 
(1983a) identified as ‘what is religious education essentially trying to do at this point in 
history?’ (p.115). Re-examining this question is a key part of my thesis and will enable 
me to bring something to the discussion, which I argue has not been sufficiently 
considered before.  That there are many weaknesses remaining in religious education is 
clear from observations made in several national reports (see for example the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Religious Education 2013,  Clarke & Woodhead 2015, 
Dinham & Shaw 2015 and the Report of the Commission on Religion and Belief in 
British Public Life 2015) and well discussed in religious education literature (see for 
example Arweck & Jackson 2012; Conroy, Lundie, Davis, Baumfield, Barnes, 
Gallagher, Lowden, Bourque & Wenell 2013  and  Baumfield, Cush, & Miller, 2014).  
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In my investigation I interrogate the concept of an educated person and develop an 
argument for what religious education should aim to achieve. There is therefore some 
resemblance between my approach and the one taken by Cox; however I take matters a 
step further when I discuss, in light of this, what is it that the teacher is required to do in 
order to achieve religious education’s purpose. This is in order to respond to a further 
concern I show in the religious education literature regarding the persistent ‘uncertainty 
among many teachers of RE about what they are trying to achieve in the subject’ 
(Ofsted 2010, p.6) and further ‘confusion about what they were trying to achieve in RE 
and how to translate this into effective planning, teaching and assessment’ (Ofsted 
2013, p.14). Cox’s (1983a) approach was to begin by seeing whether it would be 
possible to ‘arrive at a concept of a religiously educated person’ (p. 11).  
In order to discover what it is that religious education should aim to achieve, I identify 
three research sub questions which I investigate through the central chapters of the 
thesis. My first research sub-question is ‘what counts as religion in religious 
education?’ In this chapter I take up the need for a discussion about religion for those 
involved in religious education. However, rather than forming yet another definition of 
religion I discuss three different ways in which religion can be conceptualised,  and do 
this through presenting three structurally different answers to the question ‘what does it 
mean to be religious?’  My second research question is in relation to education and I 
frame the question as ‘what is it that education should do or aim to achieve?’ I 
approach this question first through an investigation into what it is that makes 
education educative as contrasted to other kinds of things such as instruction, coercion 
or indoctrination for example. My third research sub-question is in two closely linked 
parts which enable me to bring together the findings of my investigation into questions 
1 and 2. In my third question I ask first ‘how do these understandings of religion and 
education help clarify what it is that religious education should aim to achieve?’ and 
leading from that to investigate ‘what should the teacher of religious education do?’ 
that is in order for religious education to achieve what it aims to do. 
 
1.2   Motivation for this thesis  
This thesis has its beginning at least as far back as when I began to ask questions of 
philosophy itself during my London undergraduate philosophy degree. A small group 
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of us in the philosophy department at Bedford College (which subsequently relocated 
to Kings) requested lectures in existentialism and what we thought of as ‘European 
Philosophy’. This marked a small rebellion in the midst of the heavily analytic Anglo-
American climate of the traditional intercollegiate London philosophy BA degree of the 
late 1970s. A doctoral student in the department introduced us to the writings of 
Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Simone Weil. This news alerted me to the 
possibility that the study of matters of human existence and subjectivity was a 
legitimate area of intellectual activity; radically changing the course of my thinking 
from thence forward.  
Questions in relation to matters of human existence emerged again when I undertook a 
PGCE in religious education in the early 1980’s; this was followed immediately by an 
MA(ed), both courses undertaken at the London Institute of Education, in the religious 
education department and at that time led by Edwin Cox. Cox (1983a) had just 
published ‘Problems and Possibilities for Religious Education’ which was an 
investigation into the purpose of religious education. Significantly my PGCE also came 
just 6 years after the strongly phenomenological Birmingham Agreed Syllabus (1975) 
was published and 3 years after the Hampshire Agreed Syllabus of 1978. I say 
significantly, because both these syllabuses heralded a new way forward for religious 
education following a period of confessionalism. David Naylor, architect of the 
Hampshire Syllabus of 1978, was a guest at one of our weekly seminars and we were 
invited to compare the two syllabuses.  Robert Jackson’s work was establishing at 
Warwick and was celebrated in our course as an interesting challenge to the 
‘Phenomenological Approach’. My PGCE and MA gave me the opportunity to study 
the history of religious education in some detail, and to undertake courses in the 
philosophy of education. Paul Hirst and Richard Peters and others working at and 
connected to the London Institute of Education at the time, ensured my early teacher 
formation had a strongly philosophical perspective. The developing field of philosophy 
of education in England at that time was nevertheless much influenced by the analytic 
school. This analytic influence, because of its focus on reason and knowledge, was 
beginning to come to the attention of, and requiring a response from, those working in 
religious education.  
I was aware of potential areas of conflict emerging between an analytic philosophy of 
education and the existential dimensions of religion. My undergraduate course had 
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already interested me in a wider range of philosophical questions than analytic 
philosophy of education was exploring at that time, however finding guidance on this 
while writing my masters dissertation was tricky. So it was that in the main, the piece 
drew on psychological responses to questions in relation to being human rather than 
philosophical ones. In terms of education I found my own way to Dewey’s contribution 
to the philosophy of education. Nevertheless, this thesis left many questions still 
unanswered. 
There is undoubtedly a link between the questions I was asking in my 1983 Masters 
dissertation and my PhD; that is a continuing concern to bring clarity to what it is that 
religious education should aim to achieve. During the last 30 years I have had the 
opportunity to work in different educative contexts as head of a number of RE 
departments as well as in the voluntary youth sector with The Religious Society of 
Friends (Quakers) and as national education advisor to the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA). Returning to teaching in 1999, after a gap of seven years 
bringing up my children, I clearly recall reconsidering how I wanted to exist in the 
classroom as a teacher with the young people in front of me. What kind of a human 
being was I as a teacher? This brought my attention to the importance of the role of the 
teacher in general in the classroom, and whether there was something distinctive about 
the role of the religious education teacher. In addition to this I was surprized at the 
limited extent to which the horizon of those leading and influencing religious education 
had changed in the time I had been out of the classroom. Discussions regarding purpose 
and content of religious education I noticed were continuing in similar areas as before 
and interestingly the key discussants were much the same too. There was little new to 
help me think through what I was doing in the classroom. 
Now working as County Inspector/Adviser for religious education in Hampshire, I have 
inherited a legacy of 40 years cutting edge work in religious education. Beginning at 
least with David Naylor’s Hampshire Agreed Syllabus of 1978 continuing with the 
work of Alan Brine who succeeded David Naylor before going on to take up the role of 
Ofsted Lead for religious education. Right now I work closely with the vision of Clive 
Erricker in the form of the current Agreed Syllabus for religious education in 
Hampshire, Living Difference revised 2011. It is from this theoretical and practical 
position that I take up my enquiry and from which my thesis begins. 
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1.3 Preview of the steps taken in this thesis and explanation of the selection of 
informing scholarship 
In the remaining sections of chapter 1 I proceed to identify how my thesis sets out to 
address the key research questions, discuss methodology and demonstrate the validity 
of the approach taken and give a rationale for my engagement with particular scholars. 
In chapter 2 I begin my enquiry by re-examining a range of historic literature available 
in the field. I give an overview of the main influences on, and the kinds of thinking that 
have been present within religious education from 1870 until the present, in order to 
identify what has led to the current situation. In so doing I expose several key hidden 
assumptions that have underlain much thinking in religious education since its 
inception in public education in the 1870’s. In chapter 3 I undertake a critical 
discussion of each of three approaches to religious education: the interpretive, the 
critical realist and the conceptual enquiry approaches put forward by Jackson, Wright 
and Erricker respectively.  
These three approaches have had significant influence on religious education through 
the last three decades and continue to exert considerable influence at the present time. 
Furthermore each of these approaches has a breadth of scholarship and academic 
critique associated with them.  This level of scholarship as it has evolved has enabled 
each of the approaches to be influential in religious education practice in the classroom, 
to some different extents, over an extended period of time.  Therefore in selecting the 
interpretive approach (see for example Jackson 1982, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 
2006, 2008, 2011a & 2012), the critical realist approach (see for example Wright 1993, 
1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000a, 2001a, 2003, 2004, 2007a, 2007b & 
2013),  and the conceptual enquiry approach (see for example Erricker 1987, 1997, 
2000a, 2000b, 2001A, & 2010) I have not intended to leave other important writers in 
religious education out.  Rather the opposite is the case.  My intention is, through an 
examination of these three approaches, to also discuss other influential scholars in the 
field such as Grimmitt (1987a & 1987b) and Cooling (1993, 1994, 2000 & 2010) for 
example. In this part of my investigation, I reveal the ways in which the assumptions I 
note have, however, lain hidden in different ways in the work of many who have been 
and continue to be particularly influential in religious education at the present time. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 form the next key steps in the development of new theory, first in 
relation to religion and then in relation to education. I have designed my study in this 
way so as to be able to bring clarity and precision to my proposals for a new approach 
which is presented in chapter 6. This element of my research design marks this as a 
piece of work more situated in what Biesta (2011) has termed a ‘Continental 
construction of educational research’1 (p.183) and as distinct from an ‘Anglo-American 
construction’ (p.177). A ‘Continental construction’ is rooted in the idea that education 
is an autonomous discipline with ‘its own form of theorising’ (p.198). Emphasising 
such a distinction at this point in my introduction enables me to make clear that the 
moves made in chapter 5 are key and significant in terms of how I position my longer 
argument and therefore ultimately to my whole enquiry. This distinction also enables 
me in chapter 5, to emphasise the significance of an educational conceptualisation of 
education, and not a conceptualisation as philosophical or sociological. I take forward 
this conceptualisation of education (chapter 5) together with conceptualisations of what 
it means to be religious (chapter 4) into chapter 6. Here I frame a new proposal for 
what is to be achieved in religious education and what the teacher of religious 
education should aim to do also.  
My proposal is for an existential approach to religious education. This is an approach 
which emphasises the significance of an existential conceptualisation of religion; rather 
than one where religion is only conceptualised as propositional belief and as practice. 
Further I argue it is imperative that religious education is educative and in order to be 
so I show why it matters how freedom and plurality are conceptualised in education.  
Freedom is understood in relation to action in plurality, rather than in relation to reason 
alone. I conclude that an existential religious education will be a place of appearance. 
Following from this an existential religious education will have particular and 
significant contribution to make not only to education as whole, but also to the 
possibility of the existence of freedom and the existence of the public sphere. This 
leads me to be able to articulate a position where I can say that the role of the teacher of 
                                                          
1
 Biesta has delineated a ‘Continental construction’ of educational research as one ‘based on the idea 
that education  ... (is) an autonomous discipline with its own form of theorising’ (see for example Biesta 
(2011) p. 189). His point is that this makes a difference because ‘while other disciplines can study 
educational processes and practices from their own angles, they do not have the devices to capture the 
reality of education as an educational reality’ (p.190).  This is significant in my thesis, because I am 
arguing for educational purpose for religious education. It enables me to clarify that I am locating this 
thesis not for example in the domains of philosophy of education or sociology of education or sociology 
of religion but as an educational study with regard to religious education. 
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religious education is to bring the child to action and does this through first bringing the 
child to attend, to intellectual humility and then to discernment.  
Through chapters 2 and 3, which together form my extensive literature review, I reveal 
assumptions that have been made during the history of religious education regarding 
both religion and education. I show how these assumptions continue to lie underneath 
religious education theory and policy in the present time and therefore also continue to 
inform syllabus development.  In order to address this I take up discussions in relation 
to religion and education respectively in chapters 4 and 5.  In chapter 4 I present three 
conceptions of religion, as belief, as practice and as existential
2
. When discussing 
religion as existential I examine most significantly the work of Simone Weil. This is 
not only because of her explicit interest in both religion and education but also because 
there is a particular kind of relationship between her religious and educational 
observations and I take this into my enquiry in chapter 5. Most importantly I discuss 
her thesis regarding attention in relation to the way I conceptualise religion as 
existential in chapter 4, and later relate it to educational purpose in chapter 5. Further, I 
utilise my findings in her work extensively to formulate what it is that a teacher should 
do later in chapter 5, as well as in religious education in particular in chapter 6 with the 
intention of opening up new areas of discussion for religious education in the public 
sphere.  
I read Weil’s work as religious observations, not only as a philosophical analysis of 
religion. This makes an important difference to my longer argument when I proceed to 
draw links in chapter 6 between existential responses to the question ‘what does it 
mean to live a religious life’ and an idea of education’s significance for the world. It is 
then, Weil’s religious observations brought together with Arendt’s scholarship 
regarding human care for the world and in this the significance of unique human beings 
coming into a world of others that enables me to give articulation to my existential 
approach to religious education. Indeed Weil puts this into words well when in 
responding to her own question about where religious feelings come from, she responds 
                                                          
2
 In Chapter 4 I discuss three conceptions of religion, as propositional belief, as practice and as 
existential. Although the examples I give in this chapter are largely from those who could be considered 
as ‘western’ authors, I understand these three conceptions to be present in both western and non-
western religious traditions. Indeed my proposals open up new lines of enquiry regarding these 
matters, especially in relation to religion as existential. This can be seen as already existent in 
scholarship in relation to religion located in the Indian tradition and can be found in the educational 
writings of Rabindranath Tagore (see for example 1961 p.85).  
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by saying that this is from ‘the fact that there is a world’ (quoted in McCulloch, 2014 p. 
1) and the inescapable fact of finitude and death. For Weil the usefulness of religious 
concepts or feelings are tested by their usefulness in the world and the extent to which 
they are able to bring about a love for the world (see Weil 1964). 
My reading of both Weil and Arendt
3
 shows there are strong resonances between their 
respective works, in particular regarding their concern for human beings’ existence in 
the world. Arendt’s work is especially important for me because of her concern for how 
human beings come into the world and can take up their particular responsibility for it. 
This, taken together with Weil’s observation about attention enables me to draw 
particular conclusions for the purpose of religious education and for what religious 
education teachers should do. Arendt and Weil’s work is therefore strongly represented 
in my argument because of how they enable me to discuss human existence in the 
world, and articulate an embodied view of religious education which I term an 
existential approach.         
I begin my work on education with a detailed analysis of Peters (see for example 1968). 
I do this, as I point out in chapter 5, because of the systematic way in which he 
addresses the question ‘what is it that makes education educative?’  In addition to this, 
as Martin (1981) explains, also because it was Peters who first captured ‘our concept of 
the educated man’ (p.97).  My critique of Peters is not so much to disagree with him on 
the point that there should be a conception of an educated person at the heart of 
educative activity, but because of the particular way in which he conceptualises the 
educated person in relation to freedom and autonomy. Noting that this has had some 
negative consequences for religious education, I look to Arendt to bring a different 
conceptualisation of freedom which I show opens up new opportunities for education. 
Her work on freedom opens up a different way of conceptualising plurality in religious 
education and one which I show in my thesis, through my argument for a new way of 
conceptualising purpose for religious education, is likely to be highly significant.  
                                                          
3
  Although developing the feminist implications of my work is not within the scope of this thesis, I 
acknowledge that my argument for an existential approach to religious education as a place of 
appearance opens up important lines of investigation from a feminist perspective. In particular it is 
possible to reflect that some of the present problems in RE rest in an epistemic culture located in male 
normative concepts of knowledge characterised by abstraction and distance.  Whereas in contrast to 
this Weil and Arendt open up new, including feminist, possibilities to a much greater extent; for 
example regarding embodiment and the affective.    
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In addition to this and in light of the changing place of religion in public life as noted in 
recent reports and discussed in this thesis, as well as an increasing number of 
international conflicts resulting in the largest number of refugees and displaced people 
on the move since the ending of World War 2, Arendt’s extensive work in relation to 
totalitarianism brings a particularly timely relevance to my work. This enables me to 
me to make observations at the very end of my thesis regarding possible consequences 
to the world of persisting with a wholly epistemic focus to the purpose of religious 
education.  
 
1.4   Where this thesis is located intellectually 
In designing this study it has been necessary to consider the best way to undertake an 
enquiry aimed at forming a reconceptualisation of educational purpose for religious 
education. That there is a range of ways to carry out educational research has been well 
documented (see for example Wellington 2015) and, in addition to this, research in 
education is often  linked with other disciplines of ‘philosophy, history, psychology and 
sociology’ (Biesta 2011  p. 175). In light of this there are two broad points I want to 
make regarding where my thesis sits intellectually within the literature about religious 
education. The first is that my enquiry lies firmly in the sphere of education and is not a 
sociological or philosophical, psychological or historical piece about religion or 
religion in education. Rather this study is an educational study in the field of religious 
education. By emphasising the location of my study firmly in the sphere of education, 
theoretically as well as conceptually, I intend to make it clear that I start my enquiry 
from an interested position in relation to education, rather than anything else. The 
reason I do this is in order to gain some precision about what it is that religious 
education should do, and make it clear that I understand religious education to be a part 
of the bigger picture of education as a whole. The task before me in this thesis is 
therefore to undertake my enquiry in a way that is able to bring a response to persistent 
questions regarding both religion and education in religious education, as well as giving 
some pointers for further research.  
The second point I want to make is that the position I am taking is normative. By this I 
mean that through my study I seek to discover what ought to be done in religious 
education in the sense of what is to be achieved.  My approach takes in along its way 
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questions in relation to what it means to exist as human in the world. These are 
questions, I will argue, of educational concern.  I have found it helpful therefore to 
consider my thesis to be located in a ‘Continental construction’ of educational research 
rather than an ‘Anglo-American construction’. Although both constructions are 
normative in terms of discussing what ought to be the case, there are two critical 
distinctions to make in this respect; both of which are important to appreciate as I go on 
to introduce my study and demonstrate its validity. First, whereas the Anglo-American 
construction understands educational research to be some kind of multi-stranded 
‘interdisciplinary field’ (Biesta 2011, p. 188) the Continental construction of 
educational research has particular reliance on educational theory as a discipline in 
itself. Secondly my approach does not mean that the theory I am developing here is 
intended to entirely replace what has gone before. Rather I am seeking to discern from 
the past what is valuable and thus able, with a new proposal, to form a reliable way of 
resolving existing issues.  
 
1.5 What type of investigation is this? 
Questions of educational purpose lie at the heart of this study and have influenced the 
research design. The key point I want to make is that discussion regarding purpose for 
religious education has until now been based upon assumptions that have not been fully 
interrogated. My approach is first to clarify and then interrogate assumptions in 
chapters 2 and 3, before putting theory in place of assumptions in chapters 4 and 5. Out 
of this I frame my argument for new educational theory regarding the purpose of 
religious education in chapter 6.  I have chosen this approach to research because 
although a methodology based on qualitative or quantitative analysis of data intends to 
find reliable research evidence upon which to base a judgement about education, the 
view that this ‘can tell teachers what they should do’ (Biesta 2015, p. 80) itself is based 
upon ‘the assumption that particular forms of research can provide clear and 
unambiguous knowledge about ‘what works’. The issue here is that something never 
‘works’ in the abstract sense, but is itself ‘always in relation to a particular purpose or 
set of purposes’ (Biesta 2015, p. 80). I have concluded therefore that research into 
religious educational purpose has to be undertaken in a different kind of way. My 
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conclusion is that until now, because of unclear assumptions, much work in the field of 
religious education research has been incomplete and too narrowly focussed. 
In proceeding during my enquiry to identify what it is the teacher of religious education 
is to do, I am helped by Biesta’s observations (see for example 2009 & 2015) of the 
consequence of the rise in the use of the language of learning in educative contexts, 
where children and young people are referred to as ‘learners’ rather than pupils or 
students. This has become prevalent in religious education too, where the intention of 
the classroom activity is widely understood in terms of ‘learning’ and the child or 
young person often referred to a ‘learner’ (see for example Jackson 2004, Hella, & 
Wright, and Erricker 2001a). One of the implications of this shift from education to 
learning has been to restrict conversations in religious education to what is to be 
learned and methods through which the ‘what’ is actually to be learned. The latter 
focusses attention on the teaching of skills and processes, and the focus on learning 
then sets up a false debate between knowledge and skills. What is at stake here for 
teachers is that an emphasis on the language of learning, both what and how, has served 
to ensure that teachers’ attention has shifted and remained away from questions of 
purpose (see Biesta 2009 p. 39). I have found this an important factor to take into 
account when constructing my research. This is because the intention of my research is 
to help teachers become clear about what it is they should be aiming to achieve; that is 
to gain clarity regarding religious education’s purpose or aim. Thus, it will be essential 
that I work with research processes that will make this clarity possible.    
A further point about my investigation, is that my research design has built in to it 
openness to self-correction; hence allowing for modification during the process of 
writing. This aspect of my research has enabled me to take responsibility as a 
researcher for the outcomes, verifying and validating the approach through sound 
argumentation and building of precise educational theory, rather than relying on 
externally verified models of research. Hence my approach to designing this enquiry 
has been first to make sure there is adequate opportunity for discerning and then 
interrogating assumptions, which may have been preventing the identification of 
precise educative purpose for religious education. Further, difficulties with 
identification of such precise purpose may also have been impeding progress of 
coherent application of theory into practice and also development of religious education 
in the public sphere.  
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1.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in the course of this thesis I explain how my investigation reveals there 
are options for understanding RE that have so far not been articulated and explored. I 
make some of these further options visible and show that current thinkers in the field of 
religious education have not exhausted all possible ways of thinking about religious 
education. Although my approach will include a consideration of what the teacher 
should do in order to achieve religious education’s aims, it is not an approach that is 
going to tell teachers precisely what they should do from moment to moment in the 
classroom. Rather it aims to offer to teachers a way of understanding their professional 
responsibilities with children with regard to religious education. Through my study I 
find Cox’s way of responding to his own question, as well as approaches taken by 
many of those who have come since and who have turned their attention to a similar 
question, to have been incomplete. This is because no one has yet clarified with 
sufficient precision matters in relation to religion as well as, and at least as importantly, 
in relation to the purposes of education. Instead I have discovered broad and under 
examined assumptions about religion and even more especially about education. Thus 
conclusions have been reached on the basis of these assumptions, the implications of 
which have until now been unrecognised and therefore impossible to resolve.  
The intention of this thesis is thus to develop an argument for a reconceptualisation of 
religious education. I present this in chapter 6 and, working closely with Arendt and 
Weil, one which will have opened the way for a sea-change. Further there is an 
intention that this sea-change will render it possible to rescue what is valuable in order 
to richly transform the future of religious education and to have done this in two ways.  
One is to make it clear to teachers and others what it is that religious education should 
aim to achieve and the second is to have made it clear what it is that the teacher of 
religious education should do in order to achieve that. It is not the intention of this 
study to replace everything that has gone before, but rather in bringing more clarity and 
precision to the discussion to find a way to enhance previous thinking. My hope is that 
this may also serve to open up some previously unconsidered lines of research in 
religious education and that any significance there may be in my proposals can be 
further tested and taken forward. 
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Chapter 2:   An overview of religious education in England.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss the background and history of religious education in 
maintained schools in England, since the education acts of the late 19
th
 century.  I seek 
to discover the things religious education has been said to aim to achieve and identify 
assumptions that have underpinned this as well as clarify consequences of 
understanding religious education in a particular way.  Up until the Second World War 
proposals for religious education in the main came from the churches and there was 
limited engagement with wider educational developments of the period. I identify and 
examine several approaches that emerged and became prevalent following the 1944 
Education Act, specifically presenting and critiquing first confessional approaches to 
religious education and then in some detail the phenomenological approach to religious 
education. The exploration in this chapter enables me to identify several assumptions 
that have underlain theory as well as various approaches to religious education since 
the beginning. Furthermore I show these assumptions have continued to influence 
recent policy documents. Thus, these are assumptions which I assert have had 
significant and long standing implications for religious education and which persist 
until the present time.  
 
2.2 Religious education in maintained schools in England 1870 - 1966: origins and 
intentions  
Religious education in the public sphere in England took a new and significant turn as a 
consequence of 19
th
 century educational reforms. The Education Act of 1870, known as 
the ‘Forster Act’, ‘set out to fill the gaps in voluntary provision of schools’ (Matthews 
1968, p. 7) which,  until that time, had by and large been provided by religious 
agencies. Prior to the 1870 Act the largest provider of schools was the Church of 
England’s National Society established in 1811, which aimed to ensure a school in 
every parish; by 1851 there were 12,000 schools across England and Wales. Before this 
time although education in England had usually been associated with religion, by the 
late 18
th
 century it was in general only available to the elite. 19
th
 century educational 
reform must therefore be understood in the context of other social and economic 
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reforms taking place in the Victorian industrialised period. This is because these 
reforms were influential on the thinking of various Victorian Christian educationalists, 
for example Thomas Arnold.  Arnold’s assertion that ‘school was a factory in which 
men are made’ (Kinloch 1938, p. 129), articulated what was to become a prevailing and 
persistent association between character building, religion and educational 
achievement. The 1870 Act ensured the establishment of elementary education in 
England; attendance at school became both compulsory and free for all children, up to 
the age of 12, by the end of the 19
th
 Century.  
 
Religious education in the maintained education sector in England came about as a 
consequence of accommodations that successive governments made with different 
‘religious agencies’ (Cox 1983a, p. 3). This was in order to fulfil the intention to ensure 
elementary education for all; an intention with multiple motivations. The political 
accommodation with the various ‘religious agencies’ (Cox 1983a, p. 3) facilitated the 
use of existing buildings, for example belonging to the Christian denominations, to be 
used by the authorities in order to provide enough school places for all children. A 
special relationship was established at the very beginning between the ‘religious 
agencies’ in England and the government’s wider educational intentions. A dual system 
developed consisting of voluntary denominational schools, including Catholic and 
Jewish schools, and non-denominational board schools. The new schools were to be 
operated by school boards who ‘would levy a rate’ (Matthews 1968, p. 7) and provide 
for the building of new schools where there was need; especially in the rapidly 
expanding cities.  Although the new, ‘Board (that is non-denominational) Schools’ that 
followed the 1870 Act ‘generally included a religious element in their curriculum’ (Cox 
1983a, p.3), it is important to realise that at this point religious education was not 
compulsory in these schools. Concerns (see Matthews 1968, p. 7) that the Churches 
might seek to proselytise in these schools ‘ensured the 1870 Act included the Cowper-
Temple clause’ (Louden 2002, p. 13) which prohibited the use of distinctive religious 
formularies in non-denominational rate-supported school. In turn influences on late 19
th
 
Century educational reforms included those involved within the Christian Socialist 
Movement, such as Charles Kingsley and Frederick Maurice, who felt there was 
compatibility with socialist ideas and Christianity. An intention therefore of including 
religion in schools, right at the very beginning, was commonly understood as 
enshrining in some way a social and reforming vision of what religion could do for 
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society as well as in terms of the public sphere. There was general agreement regarding 
an anticipated positive influence of religion in education, upon the individual and 
beyond.  
 
Nevertheless, in the period leading up to the First World War, bitter theological 
controversy raged between Christian denominations about the nature of religious 
education (see Cox 1983a, p.3) or religious instruction (RI) as it was more commonly 
known at this time. At the same time there were other challenges to the power of the 
relationship that has been established between the government and the Churches 
regarding education. This came for example from emerging secular movements such as 
the Moral Instruction League (see Freathy 2008, p. 297). At this time new forms of 
moral education also began to be developed, but these were in reality ‘rarely outside a 
Christian moral framework’ (Freathy 2008, p. 297).  Strong theological disagreements 
existed between churchmen in many respects. Although there was agreement that 
Christianity had had a critical contribution to make to the moral fabric of public life, 
there was also awareness that other freethinking intellectuals from the new secular 
movements would have been happy, even at this time, for there to have been no 
religion at all taught in schools.  As Matthews (1968) notes, there was concern that the 
new board schools might fail to teach religion at all and because of this, compromises 
were struck. This can be exemplified by for example the London Board where in 
addition to the conscience clause, content was prescribed in such a way to ensure that 
simply ‘the Bible shall be read and there shall be given such explanations and such 
instruction therefrom in the principles of morality and religion as are suited to the 
capacity of the children’ (p.8).  
 
To be sure religious education in maintained education, from the earliest Education 
Acts in the late 19
th
 century up till 1944, was given a special position in the school 
curriculum because of the influence of the churches. Furthermore, and importantly, in 
order to satisfy the various factions, it was ‘artificially protected’ from agencies such as 
those involved in the new teacher training institutions who ‘could have done most to 
help it’ (Matthews 1968, p. 8). In addition to this, during the first quarter of the 20th 
century subsequent legislative opportunities added another layer of complexity. The 
various Education Acts designated a distinction between voluntary aided (VA) and 
voluntary controlled (VC) schools. In VA schools the partner body, in return for putting 
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more funding into the running of the school buildings, would have more control over 
the religious education the children received, leading to eventually all Catholic and 
Jewish state funded schools becoming VA schools and around half the Church of 
England schools adopting VA status. The first 60 years of compulsory elementary 
schooling in England made rapid progress in many respects, however religious 
education remained subject to a particular perception of the relationship between 
Church and home and school and the intentions of government.  
 
By 1944 a range of social factors and educational concerns had led to the political 
determination on the part of government to transform maintained education. The 
architects of the 1944 Education Act, building on several reports published in the 
preceding years, ensured religious education became compulsory in all schools 
receiving public funds. This Act also came at a point where there was recognition of 
the need for a broad education, broader than the elementary schools were able to 
provide, for all young people. Successive reports such as the several Hadow Reports 
(see for example 1931), Spens (1938) and Norwood (1943) reports, which included 
respected educationalists of the day, advocated a development and restructuring of state 
education in such a way that included providing secondary schools for all and 
extending the school leaving age to 15; the 1921 Education Act having already raised 
the leaving age to 14. These reports also gave an opportunity for rethinking the 
settlement between the churches and government and, particularly relevant here, for 
reviewing provision for religious education.  Religious Education in the 1944 Act was 
broken down into Religious Instruction (RI) and Collective Worship – both 
compulsory.  
 
However, despite making religious education compulsory, the act ‘never specifies what 
religion was to be taught’ (Cox 1983a, p. 5).  Instead, having legislated for religious 
education, ‘parliament handed over the definition of it to the representatives of the 
Churches and the educational administrators’ (Cox 1983a, p. 5). The process for a local 
authority adopting an ‘agreed syllabus’ for religious education in board schools was 
established and the wording of the Act extended the provision which allowed a parent 
to withdraw their child from religious education in voluntary and board schools alike.  
It is worth noting at this point that by and large educationalists were not engaged with 
defining religious education, but more concerned with determining its continued 
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presence in maintained schools. These various reports affirmed the presence of an 
assumed link between good character and religious instruction. This was even to the 
extent of asserting ‘that no boy or girl can be counted as properly educated unless he or 
she has been made aware of the fact of the existence of a religious interpretation of life’ 
(Spens Report 1938, p. 208 as quoted in the Norwood Report 1943, p. 85). Thus the 
link between religious education and the education of character can be seen as being in 
the heart of the political vision behind the inclusion of religious education in the 1944 
Act.   
 
Nevertheless, in terms of why the provision for religious education was strengthened in 
the 1944 Act, several additional factors also need to be taken into account. These 
include the development of an ecumenical movement which ensured that 
denominational rivalries had subsided considerably. This meant that there were instead 
reasons to work together to advance a shared vision for religious teaching in schools,  
and the foundations to make that possible in the terms of the 1944 Education Act were 
now in place. However the established Church remained the most influential partner. In 
addition to this there were also more practical reasons. The need to build schools fit for 
the purpose and able to meet the intention to provide secondary education for all meant 
that the stake the established Church had in existing buildings enabled it ‘to bargain for 
the presence of religious teaching in schools’ (Cox 1983a, p. 7). Far higher standards 
were prescribed in the 1944 Act for school buildings themselves, ‘the State offered to 
take over any ecclesiastical schools whose owners were prepared to relinquish them 
rather than face the expense of modernisation (Cox 1983a, p. 7). So it was then that for 
many reasons two elements were woven into the 1944 Education Bill under the sub 
(shoulder) title of ‘religious education’. The first was religious observance now 
understood as collective worship and the second was religious instruction, in other 
words what was to go on in the classroom. The wording of the act did not specify what 
religion was to be taught, but it was assumed that Christianity was intended and 
probably Protestant Christianity in particular (see Cox 1983a, p.5).   
 
2.3 The confessional approach to religious education and 1960’s challenges. 
As well as laying down requirements for the existence of religious education in  a 
unique way over any other school subject, the 1944 Act set out the vehicle for 
establishing religious education in the form of the ‘Agreed Syllabus’. The 1944 Act 
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required every Local Authority to adopt an agreed syllabus by an ‘Agreed Syllabus 
Conference’ (ASC) which the Local Authority must convene comprising of four 
interest groups with equal status. Group A representing ‘other denominations than The 
Church of England’, Group B representing The Church of England, Group C 
representing the Local Authority elected representatives and Group D to include 
teacher representatives.  These particular criteria made sure everything was in place for 
an approach to religious education that would ensure it was not like any other aspect of 
school life.  Furthermore the 1944 Act made it clear that religious education was 
intended to contribute to the life of the whole school in a particular and distinct kind of 
way.  However the politicians who had been involved in the construction of the 1944 
Act, such as Rab Butler and Winston Churchill as well as social reformers such as 
Archbishop William Temple,  having established religious education into the statute of 
The 1944 Education Act left determination over what should be taught to the Local 
Authorities and other ‘experts’ of the ASC’s. The position of the Church of England 
and other Christian denominations therefore made sure that any Local Authority agreed 
syllabus developed between 1944 and the 1960’s remained largely schemes of 
Christian study (Cox 1983a, p.6) 
 
Cooling defines this focus on Christian study and evangelistic intention as being a 
‘confessional’ approach (Cooling 2000, p. 154) to religious education. Cox (see 1983a, 
pp. 30-31) gives examples from several agreed syllabuses of this time to demonstrate 
this point. The Cambridgeshire Syllabus of 1949 (Cambridge 1949) aimed to ‘lead 
children to an experience of God, His Church, and His Word, an experience based 
upon worship, fellowship and service.’ and the Lincolnshire Syllabus of 1964 makes it 
clear that ‘(t)he syllabus is deliberately designed as an evangelistic influence … the aim 
is to lead pupils to a personal knowledge of Jesus Christ.’. However, although in the 
1966 The West Riding of Yorkshire Syllabus there are signs of an interest in 
educational matters emerging, assertions such as ‘(p)ersonal needs are religious needs 
which are only satisfied by the growing discovery that at the heart of the universe there 
is a God who cares’ nevertheless reveal a strong confessional approach to the 
curriculum. Cole notes that a ‘principle pioneered by the West Riding (was) to have 
given education precedence over theology’ (Cole 1976, p. 127). However although this 
syllabus was influenced by educational pioneers significant at the time and sought to 
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take these matters seriously, it remained predominantly orientated to the view that 
children should better understand Christianity. 
 
It is important to note that these confessional agreed syllabuses had been developed 
under the influence of the constituent members of the ASCs, revealing something of the 
influences at work in these ASCs. However, from the late 1950’s onwards confessional 
approaches to religious education were challenged and came under scrutiny as the 
religious and social composition of England underwent rapid transformation. I group 
these challenges into three broad areas, firstly cognitive or psychological challenges, 
secondly philosophical and thirdly theological challenges.  
 
Cognitive or psychological challenges can be seen for example in the work of Yeaxley 
for the Institute of Christian Education as well as from Harold Loukes (see Cox 1983a, 
p. 13). Although working separately, both Yeaxley and Loukes showed that children 
were remembering very little of what they had been taught and furthermore often 
misunderstood what they did remember. Loukes’ work also identified that teenagers 
were disenchanted with ‘a bible based religious education that assumed the truth of 
Christianity’ (Jackson 2004a, p.24). In addition to this Goldman (1964 and 1965) and 
Hyde (1965) drew for example on the developmental insights of Piaget. Piaget’s ideas 
had been inspiring wider curriculum reform in England during the 1960’s, and 
Goldman raised questions for religious education about children’s cognitive capabilities 
at different ages.  Discussions ensued regarding the appropriateness of certain religious 
material at particular ages. In terms of curriculum development, although not 
challenging the confessional approaches as directly as some other research of the 
period, it did influence the planning of schemes of work in some syllabuses. In 
particular Goldman’s influence led to agreed syllabus recommending for example that 
small children are taught more concrete aspects of religious teachings such as the New 
Testament parables, whilst leaving other elements such as the Gospel accounts of 
Jesus’ miracles until later. Goldman’s ideas, which had influence for more than a 
decade, were themselves subsequently contested (e.g. Slee 1986, and Cooling 2000, 
p.156) as Piaget’s work in education was more carefully reviewed.   
 
A second group of criticisms came from the newly emerging area of philosophy of 
education. Paul Hirst (see for example 1965, p.5) was amongst those who challenged 
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assumptions made about the role of religion in individuals’ lives as well as in society 
and the public sphere in terms of moral formation. His view was that if religious 
education were to have any place in maintained education, it could only be to impart 
facts about religion that are demonstrable and agreed. Building on writings of the 19th 
and early 20
th
 century from secularists and humanists (Cox 1983a, p.21), these 
arguments had a stronger voice in the 1960s as the analytic movement within 
philosophy at large had an increasingly powerful influence in philosophy departments 
of English universities during this time. In addition to this, analytic philosophy was also 
informing the newly emerging field of philosophy of education in England.  The work 
of those such as Hirst, who questioned the link between moral development and 
religion, was supported by research from other disciplines such as psychology and led 
to the emergence of a broad consensus regarding the need for change.  
 
A third critique came from new movements in theology (see for example Robinson 
1963) at this time. These new movements challenged old assumptions and 
consequently raised new questions regarding approaches to religious education. 
Christianity, across denominations, was facing up and responding to new questions for 
example about the nature of God and faith (see for example  Tillich 1962) leading to 
theological discussions within The Church itself about how the Christian faith could be 
passed on in a faith specific context. These developments allowed more careful 
thinking to take place about how religious education inside a faith context could or 
indeed should be defined as distinct from religious education the wider public 
educational context (see for example the work of Groome 1980). Furthermore, 
implications of conceptualising the two differently began to be discussed as further 
social transformations of the 1970s came about. 
 
These cognitive or psychological, philosophical and theological challenges to the 
confessional approach to religious education came to the fore in the context of the rapid 
transformation of the religious and cultural composition of England in light of 
migrations to Britain from the New Commonwealth. At this time, and taking theoretical 
criticisms together with the changing context, a broad agreement began to emerge 
among leading thinkers in religious education that the post second world war consensus 
defining religious education in maintained schools only in Christian terms could stand 
unquestioned no longer. Furthermore the role of religion in an individual’s life as well 
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as in the public sphere was changing significantly. What was actually to count as 
religion in religious education in the public sphere, formerly assumed to be 
synonymous with Christianity had to be reconsidered; however the way forward was 
not clear.  
 
Religious education was justified for inclusion in the curriculum of schools in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century alongside reading, writing and arithmetic, initially because of 
assumptions around what religion could do for people. With religion being equated in 
general with Christianity, it was assumed that knowing Christian principles would form 
better individuals who would bring about a better nation.  Therefore one of the things 
religious education was to do was to ensure children and young people knew about 
Christian principles. This idea was perpetuated in the 1944 Act, leading to religious 
education being defined as ‘a blueprint for the spiritual and moral rejuvenation of 
society’ (Wright 2000b) and ensured religious education continued to be understood as 
having a unique position in the life of the school, leading to assumptions that one of the 
things religious education in maintained schools would do was to positively mould 
children and young people for life in society.  
 
2.4  The phenomenological approach to religious education in the 1970s 
One particularly influential response to the psychological, philosophical, theological 
and social challenges made to the confessional approach to religious education came 
from the phenomenological approach to the study of religion. A particularly significant 
move came when the Schools Council Secondary Project appointed Ninian Smart to its 
directorship in 1969.  The Schools’ Council Working Paper 36 ‘Religious Education in 
Secondary Schools’ (W.P. 36) was published in 1971 to be followed in 1977 by ‘A 
Groundplan for the Study of Religion’.  Both drew heavily on arguments Smart had 
developed regarding the relationship between the phenomenological study of religion 
and non-denominational religious education.  Smart had established a department of 
Religious Studies at Lancaster University in 1967 and can be considered to have been 
one of the most influential figures in the development of the application of the 
phenomenological approach to the study of religion to religious education. 
Nevertheless the assumption persisted that religion was essentially good for people.  
The line of argument followed from here arguing that what was needed was a new 
approach to the study of religion in religious education, one capable of overcoming 
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challenges in relation to assumptions about religion which led to linking religious 
education with character development and Christian confessionalism (see Barnes 
2000). 
 
Smart’s proposal was that problems faced by religious education would be resolved if 
‘the different dimensions of religion’ (Barnes 2000, p. 321) were taught and he asserted 
that ‘religious education should transcend the informative’ (Barnes 2000, p. 321). The 
Chichester Project, which began in 1977, although distinct from Smart’s Lancaster 
work, broadly shared a commitment to applying a phenomenological method to the 
teaching of world religions (see Grimmitt 2000a, p. 28), and also applied the method to 
the teaching of Christianity. The idea was that this would resolve criticisms about the 
confessional teaching of Christianity. Christianity was to be seen on a level playing 
field alongside all other world religions.  The phenomenological approach to the study 
of religion was a method which began to be advocated by certain scholars of religion 
from the beginning of the 20
th
 Century (see Cox 2006, p. 26.). It was arguably linked to 
‘late nineteenth-century attempts to describe and categorise religious phenomena, free 
from church interference and uncoloured by confessional assumptions’ (see for 
example Chantepie de la Saussaye 1887 quoted  in Barnes 2000,  p. 321 and  Flood 
1999).  Chantepie de la Saussaye is sometimes considered the founder of this approach 
to the study of religion (see Allen 2005, p. 191) which has several branches and should 
not be considered to be a single theory. Scholarly approaches, although not all having 
the same emphasis in terms of category of interest, have tended to share certain 
characteristics which include being ‘highly normative, applying their standards to make 
disciplinary value judgments’ (Allen 2005, p. 188). In addition to this 
phenomenologists of religion try to respond to questions ‘involving the interpretation of 
religious meaning’ (Allen 2005, p. 188). Although phenomenologists of religion differ 
from philosophers of religion, who also ask normative questions, they share an interest 
in questions of human experience of religion such as ‘what are the meaning and 
significance of such experienced phenomena?’ (Allen 2005, p. 188).  
 
The phenomenological approach to the study of religion had taken a new turn in the 
1960’s in Britain when the new discipline of religious studies was forming; emerging 
into academic life as distinct from theology in universities in England. The British 
School (see Cox 2006) was informed by work in the Netherlands and was also 
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influenced from other original work in Africa from the 1950’s undertaken for example 
by Geoffrey Parrinder (see Cox 2006,  p. 6) and others. Parrinder took up a post at 
Kings College in London in 1958 and ultimately was promoted to a professorship at 
Kings in Comparative Religion. However there was a significant moment when the 
area of academic study which had formerly been called ‘comparative religion’ came to 
be more commonly known as ‘religious studies’. In England this can be understood as 
marking the time when the phenomenological approach to the study of religion took 
over as the most influential approach to the study of religion apart from theology.  Cox 
(2006) also identifies a North American strand of development during the 20
th
 century, 
although he concludes that the phenomenological approach to the study of religions, as 
figuring in current religious studies departments, may have a greater homogeneity than 
would possibly have been possible in the past (see p.6).   
 
The phenomenological approach to the study of religion itself, sought to enable a 
scientific exploration of religion (see Whaling 1999, p. 231) by stepping outside a 
theological-insider reflection on religion.  This was whilst still holding onto the 
possibility of a transcendent reality and assumed that there is a discrete area of human 
experience, human expression and ‘phenomena’, which could be called religious. 
Fitzgerald (2000) in his chapter on Smart’s Phenomenology of Religion notes that this 
way of conceptualising religion seeks to give religious phenomena a privileged position 
in the range of all other human activity. Fitzgerald also identifies what he considers to 
be a continuum of approaches to the study of religion. He observes how they seem to 
range between two poles, one being more theological and the other more sociological.  
The point I want to make here is that each extreme has potential difficulties. At one end 
there are approaches, broadly viewed as reductionist, that resemble liberal Christian 
ecumenical theology looking for similarities between religious traditions whilst also 
seeking to acknowledge the transcendent realities of each. At the other end, there are 
social and anthropological understandings of religion which do not particularly engage 
with conceptualisations of transcendence. Fitzgerald (2000) suggests that Smart’s 
intention was to locate his version of the phenomenological approach to the study of 
religion some way between the two. Smart hoped to argue both against accusations of 
essentialism and reductionism which some theological approaches may have led to, as 
well as against challenges of relativism, that cultural approaches to the study of religion 
entail.  By beginning to employ a phenomenological approach in his study of religion, 
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Smart was also signalling that he was stepping away from earlier comparative 
formulations of the study of religion and  aiming towards becoming a kind of 
philosophy of religion (see Smart 1973, p.3). He saw hope of resolving theological and 
confessional challenges to religion, and by inserting this method of the study of religion 
into religious education to the formation of an approach which could also respond to 
accusations of confessionalism and character formation in religious education. In fact 
the phenomenological approach as he configured things, was to bring a new way of 
approaching links asserted between religious education and moral development. 
 
To bring greater appreciation of the impact the phenomenological approach as 
proposed by Smart had on religious education into my discussion, I clarify the extent to 
which Smart was looking to philosophical phenomenology in developing his 
phenomenological approach to the study of religion. I make this point because of the 
potential for misunderstanding in religious education where insufficient distinction is 
made between the phrases ‘phenomenology of religion’ and ‘phenomena of religion’. 
Smart (1999) in ‘Dimensions of the Sacred’ makes it quite clear that in his view 
phenomenologists of religion do not usually use the term ‘phenomenology’ in the 
philosophical sense as developed by  Husserl (p.1) but instead understand 
phenomenology to be more of an ‘attitude of informed empathy’ (p.4). In other words 
phenomenologists of religion tend to take on the method of phenomenology, but do not 
seek to respond to the same questions that philosophical phenomenologists have tended 
to concern themselves with.  Recalling that Husserl’s initial interest in phenomena grew 
out of his reflections first on the relationship between the subject and the object, 
Hermberg (2006) points out that Husserl’s main concern was with the ‘evidentiary 
relationship between the subject and the object’ (p. 8); that is how objects ‘related to 
the subject in experience’ (p. 8). My point is that losing sight of the original concerns 
which engaged Husserl, and which had grown out of his interest in the phenomenology 
of religion, may have contributed to what has now become a focus on phenomena of 
religion in religious education. 
 
2.5 Critique of the phenomenological approach to religious education  
In this section I consider two areas of concern in relation to the phenomenological 
approach to religious education and discussed since its emergence until the present time 
(see Cox 1983a, p.25;  Jackson 1997 and  2004a,  p. 24; Barnes 2000 & 2001 and 
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Erricker 2010, p. 45). The first is from a theological perspective and second 
philosophical.  Examination of these concerns enables me to raise questions in relation 
to the preferential epistemological and social status of religious knowledge that has 
been implied by this approach and show that this has had a powerful impact on the way 
religious knowledge has been prioritised in many approaches to religious education. 
My intention in continuing to engage in the debate, regarding the phenomenological 
approach to religious education, is to reveal that certain assumptions have remained 
underexposed.  Following this, in chapter 3, I go on to show how these assumptions 
have continued to cause problems for current approaches to religious education. 
 
The first area of concern I discuss here arises from the theological positioning of the 
phenomenological approach to the study of religion. At the time when this approach to 
the study of religion was forming, late 19
th
 Century liberal protestant theology was 
looking also to religious experience as a means of countering continuing rationalistic 
challenges to traditional theistic beliefs.  New theological approaches were growing at 
this time. Liberal protestant theology was not only motivated by the same interests and 
concerns as the phenomenological study of religion, but also seems to have shared 
similar assumptions about religion, for example that there were ‘common features’ 
(Flood 1999, p. 98) or essences shared by all religions. Indeed it seems possible that 
phenomenologists of religion at the time were inspired by the same liberal protestant 
and ecumenical motivations. In addition to this, both liberal protestant theologians and 
phenomenologists of religion held that religious knowledge is a privileged kind of 
knowledge, separate from other rationally accessed knowledge (see Flood 1999, p. 
115). This led to the conclusion that not only would an impartial study of religious 
phenomena be possible no matter which religion is being studied, but also that the 
student of religious phenomena may be able to access something of the special essential 
vision of the religious adherent. This particular point was also taken up by 20
th
 century 
anthropologists such as Geertz (see for example 1960, 1973), and became evident in 
Jackson’s work in the 1980s and beyond. My point here is that the hope which the 
phenomenological approach to the study of religions seemed to offer, in terms of an 
objective approach to the study of religion and one suitable for religious education in 
the public sphere, cannot be relied upon. This is because the shared motivations of both 
liberal protestant theology and those working with a phenomenological approach to the 
study of religion give grounds from which to challenge the objectivity of the 
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phenomenological approach. Thus significant theological questions, regarding the 
objectivity of the phenomenological approach to the study of religion and the approach 
as applied to religious education, remain.  
 
Nevertheless there was a strong attraction to this approach from those in religious 
education. This was because the phenomenological approach to the study of religion 
seemed to establish, in a scientific manner through reasoned arguments, religious 
experience as a significant area of human life. This appeal to reason apparently offered 
a defence, particularly against philosophical challenges to religious education. Chater 
and Erricker (2013) go even further to suggest that it was precisely because the 
phenomenological approach to religious education became such a powerful influence in 
classroom practice that the criticisms were poorly attended to. They also note that in 
addition to this, religious education had been in the hands of those who ‘continue to 
give sympathetic representation to religion and religions’ (p. 87). The attraction for a 
proposal which held a special significance and status for religious experience was 
strong; problems although identified in academic literature of the day, were largely 
overlooked in practice. It is important to realise that until this point in the history of 
religious education, it was in the main those who were outside religion who had most 
difficulty with religious education (e.g. White 2004). Indeed until this point it was only 
those outside religion and religious education who questioned any such privileging of 
religious knowledge.  
 
Since challenges to religious education had come from those proposing alternatives, 
particularly in the area of moral or character development, defence of religious 
education had by and large focused on what in fact amounted to a defence of religion 
itself. The phenomenological approach to the study of religion seemed to offer a new 
defence of religion that could appeal to those who were until then critical of it. The 
influence of Smart’s work, seen for example in the Schools’ Council Working paper 36 
(1971), also ensured a particular articulation of religion was adopted into national 
documents of the decade. By the mid 1970’s it was exemplified in the Birmingham 
Syllabus of 1975, and influencing many other agreed syllabuses. Cox (1983a) was one 
person involved in teacher education at the time who recognised problems raised by the 
phenomenological approach, arguing that ‘(d)isagreement about the status and 
credibility of religion renders it impossible to achieve the necessary consensus as long 
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as we confine the subject to the study of religion or religions. … the justification of 
religious education may have to be found outside religion all together’ (Cox 1983a, 
p.133).  
 
The second area of concern I explore here is broadly philosophical and arises from the 
fact that the phenomenological approach to the study of religion stepped away from 
Husserl’s initial interests. The point I want to make is that this matters and that it 
mattered especially when the phenomenological approach to the study of religion was 
aligned with an approach to religious education. Smart (1999) noted that when Husserl 
became interested in religion, he sought to try ‘to bring out what religious acts means to 
the actors’ (Smart 1999, p.2) and that furthermore his intention was to ‘delineate the 
various manifestations of religions in complex ways’ (Smart 1999, p.2). Nevertheless, 
Smart’s move to look to the phenomena of religion through phenomenological 
approach to its study had the consequence of ensuring he began to look at a rather 
different set of questions than had engaged Husserl. Smart’s orientation moved from 
the subject to the object of religion and because of this, although initially looking 
positive as an approach to religious education, something important was lost. This 
approach, because of its focus on the phenomena as object, became less able to be open 
to the one experiencing the phenomena; that is the subject. Schools’ Council Working 
Paper 36 (1971) notes that ‘(i)f religion cannot be properly understood apart from 
subjectivity, then any satisfactory concept of objective study must somehow include 
that subjectivity (p. 22). However the authors of this paper instead of going to Husserl’s 
questions, claim that ‘(s)uch objectivity is actually possible because of the 
characteristic human capacity for self-transcendence’ (p. 22) which is ‘the basis for all 
objective scholarship’ (p. 22). The issue of subjectivity is dealt with in such a way so as 
to ensure the questions Smart interrogates at the core of the phenomenological 
approach to religious education are very different from the questions Husserl was 
seeking to respond to in developing his phenomenological methods.  
 
My point is that this has led to attention resting on the matters of religious education 
rather than on the child, who is the subject of religious education. Smart’s approach to 
religious education utilised a method of studying religion but left assumptions 
regarding its suitability for religious education underexposed. Husserl’s questions were 
in a large part in relation to transcendence, to a sense of otherness, and he was 
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following a stream of philosophical concern raised first by Descartes in the modern 
period and again for example by Kant during the opening of the enlightenment. 
Husserl’s particular conceptual and philosophical understandings of these questions 
were also in response and relation to the inner experience and the intentionality of 
experience. Turning Husserl’s concept of for example ‘bracketing’ into a scientific tool, 
as Smart seems to do, for the objective study of religion has led to the emphasis coming 
to be on the phenomena itself and not with the subject, in which Husserl was at least 
equally interested.  
 
Not engaging in the questions of interest to Husserl served to narrow the range of 
possibilities for the phenomenological approach to religious education.  This is 
because, rather than enabling Smart to find shared elements in human existence as he 
had hoped, the focus came principally to be on the external observable phenomena of 
religions. Despite his best efforts, this focus on the shared externals of religion made 
Smart’s work vulnerable both to the challenge of essentialism, that is of reducing all 
religious phenomena to common denominators, and in equal measure to the challenge 
of relativism where all claims about the nature of reality are considered entirely equal 
in relation to each other.  
 
In his later work Smart (see for example 1999), recognising some of the problems 
which earlier formulations of phenomenological approaches had regarding accusations 
of essentialism, looked to resolve these problems by reference to a ‘dialectical 
phenomenology’. Dialectical phenomenology, he tells us, ‘has to do with the 
relationship between various aspects of religions and world views’ (p.7). However, my 
point is that a simple appreciation or recognition of the complexities in relationships 
between religious manifestations is an insufficient response to accusations of 
essentialism.  This is because Smart continues to assume that religion is in some way a 
distinctive category of phenomena that can be separated from other, for example 
cultural, aspects of life. In brief, the assumptions lead Smart, rather than looking deep 
into phenomenology itself in formulating his approach to religious education, only to 
draw the terminology into the phenomenological approach to religious education, and 
which unfortunately has been open to considerable misinterpretation. The questions 
from which Husserl had begun his exploration were by and large entirely forgotten and 
‘there has been little continued discussion of him’ (Flood 1999, p. 16).  
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The theological and philosophical concerns discussed here make it clear that the 
phenomenological approach, as adapted to be an approach to religious education,  was 
not after all as objective or scientific an approach as hoped; rather it had an inescapable 
Christian theological bias (see Barnes 2000, p. 325). From this questions arise 
regarding the possibility that the phenomenological approach to religious education, as 
Smart developed it, maps not objective categories or ‘dimensions’ (Smart 1971, p.6) of 
religious expression, but categories resembling categories of the Christian religious 
tradition. Although these ‘dimensions’ may work for Christianity, they are not assured 
to be capable of recognising the plurality of ways  it means to live  a religious life or 
indeed what it means to be religious at all in other traditions.  If successful, this 
challenge would not necessarily undermine the phenomenological approach as a means 
of studying religion, but it would render it untenable as a method for embarking on a 
non-confessional religious education in schools (see Barnes 2000). Furthermore, 
influenced by liberal Christian theology of the period, phenomenological approaches to 
the study of religion looked to religious experience as the source of religious 
knowledge therefore avoiding questions of ultimate truth of religious propositions. The 
heart of the problem is that recourse to a theological pre-eminence of the authority of 
religious experience taken together with allocating a privileged status to this kind of 
knowledge, avoids subjecting religion to the same rational analysis as other forms of 
knowledge. Further problems with this approach have, as a consequence, been 
recognised later for example it failing to respond adequately to epistemological 
problems constructivism raises for religious belief itself (see Cooling 2010).  
 
2.5 Responding to critiques of the confessional and phenomenological approaches 
to religious education and the impact of the 1988 Education Reform Act. 
In the wake of criticisms of the phenomenological approach to religious education a 
number of alternative approaches emerged in the 1980’s and 1990’s. I consider three of 
these briefly in this section, before analysing three other influential proposals in detail 
in Chapter 3. New approaches emerged when the curriculum came under renewed 
scrutiny whilst new legislation regarding the English school curriculum was laid down 
in the 1988 Education Reform Act. Britain until 1988 had no defined national 
curriculum for its schools and one of the reforms intended by this Act was to initiate 
closer control of the curriculum at a national level (see Cox 1989, p. 23).  However 
religious education was not drawn into the national curriculum for all children, but set 
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outside the ‘requirement to conform to nationally prescribed attainment targets, 
programmes of study and assessment arrangements’ (quoted in Cox 1989, p.24). 
Nevertheless, that religious education was officially considered to have similar status to 
other school subjects was made ‘explicit in DES Circular 3/89’ (Cox 1989, p. 24). 
Religious education in all maintained schools should continue to be taught according to 
an agreed syllabus as set down in the 1944 Education Act and the rules for drawing up 
such syllabus were reinforced in the new act with some notable modifications. Such 
modifications acknowledged the changing social context within which religious 
education was being taught. One of these was the inclusion of representatives of non-
Christian religions into the SACREs. Another modification was that agreed syllabuses 
were to now ‘reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main 
Christian, whilst taking into account the teaching and practices of the other principle 
traditions represented in Great Britain’ (Education Reform Act 1988, Section 8, 3. 
quoted in Cox 1989, p.27).   
 
The first alternative approach considered here, and referred to as the experiential 
approach, has been described as ‘being based upon the phenomenological approach’ 
(Hammond and Hay 1990, p.198). However, the experiential approach attempted to 
give a different weight to the phenomena studied by putting more emphasis on the 
accounts of experiences.  This approach was not without critics (see for example 
Thatcher 1991). A problem for the experiential approach, which persisted from the 
phenomenological approach, lay around the likelihood of it also privileging religious 
experience as a special way of knowing. This was because its roots lay in the same 
protestant liberal theology of the late 19
th
 Century as the phenomenological approach to 
the study of religion. A further and different problem, recognised earlier in this chapter 
and inherent in both phenomenological and experiential approaches to religious 
education, emerged from the link between the phenomenology of religion and liberal 
Christian theology. This problem is in relation to the proposal that there is some kind of 
an essence common to all religion (see Barnes 2001, p.453) and that this ‘essential’ 
element can be approached through a kind of experience that all human beings have 
access to.   
 
The experiential approach also claimed that religious experience as expressed in 
language has a special kind of status or authority, not only internally but also over 
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propositions about other areas of experience. Proponents of the experiential approach to 
religious education asserting it had the capacity to enable children to access some kind 
of important non-conceptual knowledge. However, this leads to the accusation that 
religious education defined experientially seeks to escape conceptual criticality.   
Barnes engages with this discussion by proposing that it is questionable whether 
religious experience can have meaning apart from the conceptual framework of 
language (Barnes 2000, p.454). However there is another concern which suggests this 
approach will establish a problematic dualism between religious experience and 
religious language. Citing Wittgenstein, Barnes (2000) asserts that ‘(n)o direct 
experience of the Sacred or of anything else enjoys any privileged epistemic status over 
discursive reason and conceptual thought’(p.326); his point being that without a 
conceptual framework there could indeed be no articulated religious experience (see 
p.326). Such disagreements regarding phenomenological as well as experiential 
approaches to religious education are consequently in general understood in relation to 
epistemology and ontology (Jackson 2004a, p.85); serving to reposition discussion 
about approaches to religious education into the area of epistemology and ontology and 
a focus on knowledge. 
 
A second approach to religious education during the 1980’s and still prevalent today, 
attempts to make a connection between religious education and ‘spirituality’. This has 
attracted particular support from those working in the faith and faith school context (see 
for example Nye 2009 & Court 2013). This approach begins from recognising a 
confessional approach is no longer tenable even in faith contexts, asserting instead that 
‘all human beings are spiritual people’ (Nye 2009, p. vii), and emerged at the same 
time as research into religious experience in a secular context (see for example 
Robinson 1977, Hardy 1978 and Hay 1982) came to the fore. In addition to this, the 
approach bears some resemblance to aspects of work undertaken by another group of 
scholars who are generally regarded as a sub-group among phenomenologists of 
religion. Notable examples being  Otto (1959) and Eliade (1959), both of whom 
emphasised the phenomena of religious experience. Some distinction between 
researchers into religious experience of the 1980s and phenomenologists of religion 
interested in religious experience may be useful, if not absolutely binding. Whereas 
research into religious experience in the 1970’s and 1980s was based on collections of 
individual people’s accounts of their own experience of the transcendent without a 
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particular philosophical position on the validity or otherwise of that experience; those 
working in the phenomenology of religion were more often advocating a particular 
philosophical approach to the study of religion.  
 
Since the 1988 Education Reform Act, schools have been required to promote the 
spiritual development of children and young people. In the early days this was often 
seen as a preserve of religious education since a spiritual approach to religious 
education was understood by some as less contentious than confessional approaches in 
particular. Subsequent work seeking to explore the relationship between ‘spirituality’ 
and religious education in maintained non-denominational schools has been 
considerable (see for example Hannam, 1992; Wright, 1997; 
Erricker, Erricker, Ota, Sullivan, and Fletcher, 1997). As Priestly (1997) notes spiritual 
was placed in the Preamble to the 1944 Education Act because ‘it is a wider concept 
than the religious’ (p.29). Priestly also acknowledges that ‘much of the thought behind 
the concept in the 1944 Education Act actually came out of a 1928 conference’ (p.24) 
indicating a long realisation of some of the issues surrounding religion in education. 
Recent Ofsted frameworks for school inspections in England have ensured a renewed 
interest in this area since the promotion of children’s spiritual development has been 
reemphasised in latest Ofsted handbooks (Ofsted 2012 and 2015). Although in the 
present time spiritual development of children and young people is explicitly 
understood as not being the preserve of religious education but an element of the whole 
school curriculum, most recent iterations of this (see Ofsted 2015) have nonetheless 
identified a close relationship between spiritual development and religion. Spiritual is 
defined by Ofsted and hence having a great influence on schools in terms of children’s 
‘ability to be reflective about their own beliefs, religious or otherwise, that inform their 
perspective on life and their interest in and respect for different people’s faiths, feelings 
and values’ (Ofsted 2015, p. 36). The potential for increasing confusion regarding the 
relationship of religion to the wellbeing of children and the societies within which they 
live therefore remains.  
 
The third approach to religious education I consider in this chapter focussed on how 
children learn.  Following Goldman in the 1960s this approach looked to psychology 
and sought to bring insight from research on learning to the various developing 
approaches to religious education. This has influenced most other approaches to 
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religious education following since this time, leading to most contemporary approaches 
to religious education being regarded as broadly ‘constructivist’ (Grimmitt 2000). Such 
approaches are often characterised by starting from the position of valuing each child’s 
current understanding; the purpose of teaching understood as enabling the students to 
learn through ‘building on or reconstructing’ (Stern 2006, p.68) that learning.  Grimmitt 
(1987a) identified two different kinds of learning going on in religious education and 
hoped so doing would help to find a common basis and draw together different 
approaches to religious education. Firstly in suggesting that religious education needed 
to include ‘learning about’ religious practice, Grimmitt was responding to those coming 
from the analytic and phenomenological positions. Secondly in arguing that there is 
another important aspect of religious education where children are enabled to ‘learn 
from’ religion, he was responding to proponents of experiential or spiritual approaches 
to the subject. From this point it is possible to trace the emergence of the language of 
‘learning’ (see Chater and Erricker 2013) in religious education.  
 
From this point, the concept of ‘learner’ and ‘learning’ began to be widely used in the 
religious education literature. The learner’s learning is to be ‘facilitated’ by the 
‘teacher’ and teaching in religious education in the past 30 years has become 
increasingly and sometimes only associated with or equated to ‘learning’. Approaches 
which have been influenced by this kind of thinking have tended to be referred to as 
‘postmodern’ models (Jackson 2004a, p. 9) of religious education, as distinct from 
instructional ones. This language appears in the non-statutory framework for religious 
education of 2004 where two purposes of religious education are identified as ‘learning 
about religion’ and ‘learning from religion’.  The same language of learning and the 
same two purposes for religious education persist into the Religious Education 
Council’s (2013b) Curriculum Framework for Religious Education where again the 
subject of religious education is referred to as ‘the learner’. Other more recent reports 
designed to influence national religious education policy continue with a focus on the 
language of learning in relation to religious education in particular and where the child 
is referred to as ‘the learner’ (see Dinham & Shaw 2015, p.1) revealing underlying with 
assumptions. 
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2.7 Identifying assumptions and observing their impact. 
Grimmitt (see for example 1987a and 1987b) had already recognised ‘an amalgam’ of 
assumptions underlying religious education. In this section I identify and highlight two 
particular areas of assumption present for religious education since the late 19
th
 century 
making some comments regarding their impact here and which I take forward to 
consider in a detailed and contextual way in the chapter 3. The first is in relation to 
religion and second in relation to education. With regard to religion, there is an 
assumption that religion is something positive, identifiable and discreet and essentially 
good for children to encounter. The various challenges to confessional approaches to 
religious education in the 1960’s revealed that a confessional encounter with religion in 
schools did not bring about the desired consequences and that this was not a sufficient 
basis upon which to formulate an approach to religious education in a plural context. 
However the phenomenological approach to religious education and those which have 
followed it, also sought to give a privileged position to religion and religious 
knowledge. My point is that the same assumptions about religion have lain underneath 
all approaches. Furthermore, especially since the idea of dimensions of religion (see 
Smart 1968) became influential in religious education and because these dimensions 
are strongly related to Christianity, there has also been a privileging of particular views 
about religion which are in fact related largely to Christianity. This in turn has led to a 
view that what it means to be religious is to believe or to know certain things in certain 
kinds of ways and to behave in certain ways principally because of those beliefs.  
 
Such a consideration of religion through the lens of Christianity Barnes (2000) suggests 
has led religious education in fact to be formed too frequently around a kind of neo-
confessionalism. Barnes’ work enables me to observe a further point, and this is that 
the central questions for religious education have come to be thought of as ontological 
and epistemological (Barnes 2000 & 2001). This in turn has ensured that under 
identified assumptions about religion in religious education have led to emphasis being 
placed on what counts as knowledge in religious education (ontology) as well as how 
this knowledge is to be acquired (epistemology). Following on from this, such 
assumptions lead to the view that curriculum development will focus on mechanisms 
for enabling children to ‘know and understand’ particular aspects of religion (see 
Religious Education Council, 2013). My point is that not only has this led to an 
overemphasis on learning in religious education, but also to an objectification of 
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religious knowledge. Objectified matters of religion and knowledge risk being 
separated from considering what it actually means to live a religious life. 
  
The second broad area of assumption I consider here, is regarding what is understood to 
be educative about religious education. Theory about religious education has had 
limited engagement with educational theory, since the central focus has been on 
religion in discussions about religious education. This has been further complicated by 
positive assumptions made regarding religion and together these things have led to a 
focus on ideas about learning. Further, assumptions regarding religion have sometimes 
led to ‘learning’ understood as synonymous with education. This can be observed in 
some contemporary discussions in the literature (see for example Weisse 2003 and 
Gearon 2013) but is also observable in documents published recently intended to 
influence policy. For example the Religious Education Council’s (2013a) review of 
religious education tends to use the word ‘education’ to refer to the structures of 
maintained system where for example it notes that ‘large-scale changes in education 
made by the Coalition government’ have created challenges for religious education 
(p.7). The Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life (2015) report uses 
the word in a number of ways including to refer to systems but also to a more general 
activity in schools with the repeated phrase ‘education about religion and belief’ (p. 35) 
noting that there was a ‘widespread need for religion and belief literacy’ (p.29). This 
could lead the reader to equate literacy with education, especially when taken together 
with the emphasis on religious literacy in the work of Dinham and Shaw (2015). 
However, none of the recent policy documents problematize the concept of education. 
This taken together with the fact that the child as the subject of religious education has 
also being objectified, referred to ‘the learner’ (see for example Chater and Erricker 
2013 and Holt 2014),  it is clear that assumptions continue to be made around what it is 
that religious education is aiming to achieve educatively. 
 
It has already been noted that religious education before the 1960s took little account of 
the educational movements that were emerging in the country during through the first 
half of the 20
th
 century. The 1970’s were, as well as a time of religious transformation 
in English cities, also a time where discussion about education was significantly taking 
place in the public sphere. James Callaghan’s Ruskin Speech in 1976 came at a point 
when those interested in religious education were also considering many new 
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possibilities. The speech put education itself high on public agenda and opened a 
renewed consideration of what counted as ‘good education’ in the public sphere. 
Callaghan in this speech spoke of education ‘for all’ not only in terms of personal and 
intellectual growth, but also in terms of preparation for work and opened the way for 
others to look at the contribution of education to public life. This period of 
development culminated in The Education Reform Act of 1988 and the introduction of 
The National Curriculum (Kay, Frances and Watson, 2003 p. 113; Wright 1999, p.6). 
However, because there had been no examination of education itself in relation to 
religious education, the 1988 Education Reform act, instead of opening up new 
possibilities for rethinking these matters culminated instead with laying down content 
for religious education. Teaching about Christianity and other world faiths was made a 
legal requirement, stating that religious education agreed syllabuses ‘must reflect the 
fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian, whilst taking 
account of the principle religions represented in Great Britain’ (Clause 8/3). Religious 
education remained in the unique position of being outside the national curriculum, but 
still a statutory part of the whole school curriculum; its special status reaffirmed but its 
distinctiveness educatively continues largely unexamined.  This is a point I note recent 
reports and policy recommendations have done nothing to challenge. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
An examination of religious education in the maintained sector in England since its 
inception following the late 19
th
 century education acts,  has enabled me to identify two 
particular areas of assumption that have underlain  religious education. That religion 
had a role in the public sphere was taken for granted in the late 19
th
 century. This was 
assumed by both conservative elements in the established Church who sought to 
maintain the existing political and economic order, as well as by emerging reforming 
elements at the time which spanned across denominations; as exemplified by the work 
of the Christian Socialists. A reason for the inclusion of religious education in the 1944 
Education Act was based on assumptions about what religion can do both for 
individuals and for whole societies.  However, as English society has begun to manifest 
increasing religious plurality, expectations of religious education have changed 
surprisingly little. Assumptions about religion have pertained. Confessional approaches 
were superseded in the 1960’s and 1970’s by approaches influenced by the 
phenomenological approach to the study of religion and this had huge impact on what 
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has followed in religious education. A critical point I have sought to argue in this 
chapter, especially through examination of theological and philosophical concerns 
about phenomenological approaches, is that religious education since this time has 
focussed on a particular way of conceptualising religion as belief and practice. My 
point is that this has led to discussions about religious education being based upon 
under exposed assumptions about religion. Furthermore I have shown that religious 
education theory in the period discussed in this chapter, right up until the present time, 
has not given much attention to education theory. Assumptions have been made and 
opportunities for reflecting on what is educative about religious education therefore 
missed. 
 
My critique of the hugely influential phenomenological approach to the study of 
religion, and in particular the influence of Ninian Smart, has enabled me to expose a 
theological bias present in religious education. Furthermore my philosophical critique 
has revealed a loss of focus on the educational subject (that is the child) in religious 
education. Assumptions about the centrality and privileged position of religious 
knowledge and religious experience as a means of knowing, as well as aligned defences 
and justifications of religion and its place in schools have further exacerbated this. My 
view is that the resultant focus on knowledge in religious education has led to attention 
being given to ontological and epistemological questions rather than questions about 
education. The curriculum has been dominated by things to be known and understood, 
and proposals for mechanisms to enable such knowing and understanding have taken 
centre stage. Learning has been conflated with education and the educational subject 
objectified; referred to in abstract terms as ‘the learner’.  
 
In the chapter that follows, I proceed by giving further examination to two areas of 
assumption that have emerged in this chapter, first in relation to religion and secondly 
in relation to education.  I present in-depth case studies of three approaches to religious 
education influential today and which developed in response to critiques of both 
confessional and phenomenological approaches to religious education. Through first 
presenting and then offering a critique of the approaches and their theoretical positions, 
my intention is to clarify pressing questions for religious education and which are 
addressed through the rest of my thesis. 
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Chapter 3:  Contemporary developments in the religious education curriculum  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a critical discussion of three approaches to religious education 
that emerged in England, during the latter part of the 20
th
 century. Each continues to 
have an influence on religious education in England today, as well as internationally. 
This chapter takes forward the findings of chapter 2. Assumptions underlying religious 
education were identified, the first regarding religion and secondly education.  Whereas 
chapter 2 gave an overview of approaches to religious education since the earliest 
education acts of the late 19
th
 century and identified assumptions prevalent through the 
period, chapter 3 takes another look at these assumptions through examining the work 
of three specific thinkers in detail.  The examination of each of the three approaches 
follows a similar pattern. Each begins with a presentation of the approach through an 
investigation of their theological, philosophical and educational positions, as well as a 
consideration of how each has emerged into practice in the classroom.  The critical 
discussion which follows, through reference to the wider literature, identifies particular 
and distinctive problems in each case. The findings of the discussion enable me to 
clarify two pressing questions facing religious education which I address in chapters 4 
and 5. The first of the three contemporary positions examined is the interpretive 
approach as developed by Robert Jackson and colleagues at The University of Warwick 
University. The second is the critical realist approach as developed by Andrew Wright 
formerly at Kings College, London and thirdly the conceptual enquiry approach 
developed by Clive Erricker most recently until 2009, County Inspector/Adviser for 
religious education in Hampshire.  
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Chapter 3.2:  The interpretive approach  
 
3.2.1 Introduction  
In this section I present the interpretive approach to religious education as developed by 
Robert Jackson and his associates at the Warwick Religious Education Research Unit 
(WRERU) and sometimes referred to as a ‘socio-cultural’ approach (Gearon 2013, p. 
126). I consider some practical developments in respect of the interpretive approach to 
religious education before proceeding to identify and critically discussing three areas of 
difficulty this approach faces. I identify that these difficulties are as a consequence of 
the fact that the work began with what were initially anthropological studies of religion. 
I argue that this has led to some particular assumptions being made about religion and 
raises questions therefore regarding the extent to which this approach is able to 
represent the range of ways in which it is possible to live a religious life.  
 
3.2.2 What is the interpretive approach to religious education? 
The interpretive approach to religious education developed to a large extent in response 
to criticisms of the phenomenological approach to the study of religion (see Jackson 
1997, p. 8), which influenced RE from 1960’s but with increasing pace after the 
publishing of Schools Council Working Paper 36 (see Jackson 1997 p.10 ff). The 
phenomenological approach to religious education had already led to world religions 
being studied increasingly in religious education in maintained schools (Jackson 1982, 
p.53).  One consequence of this was for Christianity also to be looked at afresh and ‘as 
a world religion in its own right’ (Jackson 1982, p. vii). Problems in the 
phenomenological approach to religious education became apparent to Jackson as he 
observed the lived experience of newly settled families in Coventry and Birmingham 
during the 1970’s. These families were arriving from East Africa following expulsions 
from Uganda and Kenya, alongside migration to the area already taking place from 
India, Pakistan and other areas of the New Commonwealth.  Jackson identified that the 
phenomenological study of religion itself, as developing at the time at for example 
Lancaster University, had significant problems which would limit its application to 
religious education. Jackson saw these problems as theological, philosophical as well as 
educational (see Jackson 1997, p.14-24). For example as well as there being a Christian 
theological starting point from which many phenomenologists of the period with a 
‘liberal agenda’ began their work, as previously discussed in chapter 2, the 
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phenomenological framework imposed upon non-Christian religious traditions was one 
drawn from Christianity itself.  
 
In addition to this, Jackson argued that philosophically the particular constructivist 
interpretation of knowledge in the phenomenological study of religion was subjective 
in a way that took no account of truth. Jackson (1997) saw further difficulties in 
assumptions implied by the ‘notion of ‘épochè, of distancing or putting into parenthesis 
one’s presupposition, as a methodological tool’ (p. 21). Identifying an educational 
concern, in terms of whether children are actually able to undertake such distancing, 
Jackson notes the phenomenologists of religion don’t explore much how they could 
achieve épochè either and that may be ‘they could not go much beyond the intention to 
achieve it’ (p. 21). Nevertheless fascinated by the new ways of living and believing he 
saw around him in the locality of the university, the ethnographic studies which 
Jackson and his colleagues undertook at this time (see Jackson and Nesbitt 1993) led to 
an appreciation of the need for religious education to look at religion not just as a 
‘phenomenon’ but as a lived experience. This is as one where the inner plurality within 
a faith was also taken seriously. Such awareness, led Jackson to look for an approach 
that would enable religious education to take full account of social and cultural 
differences which existed for people within a particular faith tradition. Although the 
interpretive approach does not ‘claim to be a total method’ (Jackson 2006, p.400), it is 
strongly influenced by the social sciences in particular social anthropology. It can be 
‘supplemented fruitfully by other methods and approaches’ (Jackson 2006, p.400) 
nevertheless the interpretive approach is understood by Jackson to be both an approach 
and a method for religious education which would allow for a more accurate 
representation of religion, an open exploration (see for example Jackson 2008, p. 23) 
and enable children and young people to respond to and interpret these representations. 
 
The interpretive approach to religious education ‘aims to help children and young 
people find their own positions within the key debates about religious plurality’ 
(Jackson 1997, 2004 and 2005). Theoretically it drew, at least at the beginning, from 
branches of social anthropology and especially from the work of anthropologists and 
ethnographers such as Geertz (1973) and other scholars such as Said (1978). A 
particular view emerged regarding the content of religious education in light of 
ethnographic research undertaken at the University of Warwick from the 1970’s 
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onwards (Jackson 2000, p.131). The early ethnographic work (Jackson and Nesbitt 
1992 and 1993) was, and continues to be, highly significant to the development of this 
approach.  This is because these ethnographies led Jackson to identify early on in his 
work problems existing for religious education in relation to the representation of 
religion in the classroom, especially in relation to how inner as well as outer plurality 
of religious traditions could be taken seriously. As a consequence of this, a clear 
understanding about the representation of religion was established and which 
subsequently became a distinctive element of Jackson’s interpretive approach. Two 
other significant theoretical and practical issues arose and influenced this approach 
forming together ‘three related strands of work’ (Jackson 2000, p. 130). These were 
first with regard to clarifying a precise relationship between the field research and 
secondly ‘issues of method in relation to theory and practice’ (Jackson 2000, p. 130) of 
religious education. However initial classroom studies of this new approach raised 
further questions regarding the representation of the inner plurality of religions. 
 
In order to address concerns regarding the representation of religion in the classroom, 
three further issues were recognised. These were in relation first to how materials in the 
class room would be interpreted, secondly how they would be reflected upon and 
thirdly recognition of the inseparability of reflection and understanding.  The issues 
were summed up as (i) representation, (ii) interpretation (iii) reflexivity linked with (iv) 
edification. Together these came to be understood as elements underpinning all 
theoretical work, developed initially during an ESRC funded study (Jackson 1997, 
2004a), and continue in the present time to define this approach to religious education. 
Jackson states that the interpretive approach belongs to the tradition of hermeneutical 
learning (see for example Ipgrave, Jackson & O’Grady 2009, p. 166). The 
hermeneutical nature of the interpretive approach was developed through engagement 
with the work of Geertz, who himself was influenced by the work of Paul Ricoeur (see 
Geertz 1973, p. 19). Jackson discusses how the interpretive approach utilises aspects of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics; especially the concepts of participation and distanciation (see 
Jackson 1997, p. 129 and Ricoeur 1973 in Jackson 2011, p. 192). Jackson wanted to 
ensure he had responded not only to the critique of the phenomenological approach to 
the study of religion in the way religions would be represented in the classroom, but 
also that the anticipated ways in which children and young people would engage with 
the material presented would be congruent in terms of both aims and practice.  
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3.2.3 Representation, interpretation, reflexivity and edification. 
The first key principle of the interpretive approach ‘Representation’, signals an 
appreciation of there being many significant issues in relation to representing religion 
in the classroom. Jackson draws on Said (1978) and Smith (1991) to ‘deconstruct(s) 
Western, post-Enlightenment models of representing ‘world religions’ as schematic 
belief systems, whose essence can be expressed through a series of propositional or 
doctrinal statements’ (Jackson 2000, p.133 and 2004b p.3). However Jackson also 
insists the approach is not relativistic with regard to truth, acknowledging varying and 
often competing truth claims (Jackson 1997, pp. 122-126, Jackson 2000, p.133 and 
2004b p.5). The model Jackson proposes overall (see 2004b p. 5), encourages religions 
to be represented in ways in the classroom which acknowledges their complexity, 
internal diversity and different relationships with culture.  
 
With regard to the key principle of ‘Interpretation’, Jackson rejected the assumption of 
the phenomenological approach to religious education which suggested that the ‘skills 
of empathy were unproblematic’ (Jackson 2000, p. 133).  Jackson (2004b) recognises 
that this work has some features in common with Jacques Waardenburg’s new style 
phenomenology, but most closely relates his work to contemporary interpretive 
anthropology (see p. 5). Jackson developed an approach which ‘requires an oscillating 
movement between the learner’s and the insider’s concepts and experiences’ (p. 5). 
This approach Jackson says embodies hermeneutical understandings in the way it 
applies this concept of representation to the relationships between individuals. This 
approach neither ‘privileges the individual nor the religion, but is concerned with the 
hermeneutical relationship between the two’ (Jackson 2011a, p. 192) where Jackson 
cites Geertz’ development of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. There is a need for a high level 
of teacher sensitivity to the relationships within the classroom as well as the 
relationships to the people being represented in the classroom materials. Furthermore, 
going back to the work of Geertz (1973 and 1983) and Rorty (1980), the interpretation 
principle aims to enable the child or young person in the classroom to interpret the 
particular representation of a religious tradition presented to them. Jackson (1997) 
suggests ‘the method looks for areas of overlap to be used as a basis for discussing 
similarity and difference’ (p. 111), so enabling children to interpret the material 
presented to them. Here Jackson connects the interpretive approach with Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics mentioned above. Books for children were produced, with the intention 
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of drawing on the ethnographers experiences to facilitate classroom embedding of this 
principle into the classroom, although in actual fact there has been little systematic 
embedding of this work into classroom practice. 
 
The third principle of ‘Reflexivity’ (Jackson 1997, p.111) is ‘concerned with helping 
pupils reflect on their studies of ways of life that are different in some respects from 
their own’ (Jackson 1997, p.112). Students should be able to consider the relationship 
between their own experience and that of those who they have been studying. There are 
three aspects of this principle Jackson (2004b) says he would want to encourage, the 
first of which is ‘the learner re-assessing her or his understanding of her or his own way 
of life (edification) (p.6). Second that they make ‘a constructive critique of the material 
studied at a distance’ (p.6) and third that they are ‘developing a running critique of the 
interpretive process by reviewing methods of study’ (p.6).  It was anticipated that a 
level of self-understanding would emerge from this, and in this sense ‘Reflexivity’ also 
relates to another concept at work in this approach, that of ‘Edification’ (e.g. Jackson 
2011a, p. 5).  Edification, Jackson notes, is close to the way some ethnographers 
reported their investigations had ‘promoted some reassessment of their understanding 
of their own way of life, or some insight into the human condition in general’ (Jackson 
1997, p.112). This Jackson (see for example 2004a) has written about at length and 
describes it as being close to what he means by ‘learning from religion’ (p. 95).  
  
Edification relates to being able to interpret another’s world view, which Jackson 
(2007a) suggests is a ‘basic aim of religious education’ (p. 130). However it is more 
than this for it also relates to a transformation and means ‘to be taken out of oneself’ 
(p.130). Jackson likens edification to ‘learning from religion’ as discussed by Grimmitt; 
however it is distinctive in three important ways. First Jackson emphasises the 
importance of the use of ethnographic studies being brought to children and emphasises 
that he has not been considering religion in ‘abstraction or “religions” as 
straightforwardly definable belief systems’ (p. 132).  Secondly Jackson insists the 
interpretive approach aims to give attention to internal diversity and finally he notes a 
distinction in educational goals. Whereas Jackson suggests Grimmitt’s approach 
assumes ‘all learners … should become fully autonomous individuals, making their 
own choices and decisions’, Jackson says that the interpretive approach sees ‘schooling 
as but one key influence on socialisation’ (p. 132). Nevertheless, ‘pupils may be 
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changed through taking part in the interpretive process’ (p. 133) recognising the 
‘personal nature of edification’ (p.134). This means that the teacher of religious 
education working with this approach has a particular role in providing opportunities 
for reflection on the material being studied. 
 
3.2.4 Practical developments 
Jackson (1997) discusses various ‘experiments’ in putting ‘the interpretive approach 
into operation’ (p. 112) including the development of a series of text books for school 
aged children and young people planned as part of the Warwick RE Project (see p. 
105). There was a direct connection between the development of the interpretive 
approach and the desire to formulate materials for classroom use from the ethnographic 
studies undertaken. This process led to the development of further theory; for example 
to reconsider the character of religions and especially to recognise ‘religions’ and 
‘cultures’ as dynamic and changing’ (p. 109). Therefore rather than making use of the 
categories or dimensions of religion that had characterised the phenomenological 
approach to religious education, the researchers in Warwick sought to ‘make use of 
categories … within the traditions which were suggested by (the) source material’ (p. 
109) and tried to avoid making generalisations. An example of these materials was 
‘The Buddha’s Birthday’ (Barratt 1994) which aimed to teach primary-school pupils 
through a study of the family and religious traditions of a Buddhist child in Britain. 
More recently the REDCo project ‘addressed the question of how study of religions and 
values in schools could contribute to either dialogue or tension in Europe’ (Weisse 
2011, p.111). The REDCo project was undertaken 2006 – 2009, and ‘key concepts of 
the interpretive approach were used in field research in both methods and data analysis 
as well as in pedagogy’ (Weisse 2011, p.117). The work of the REDCo Project has 
been extended into various action research studies in different combinations. 
Furthermore the key process concepts of the interpretive approach are now beginning 
to influence European Policy (Weisse 2011, p.121) with the overall ‘goal’ of the work 
being ‘to contribute to intercultural understanding, the respect for otherness and 
coexistence with the help of interreligious dialogue in the public schools of Europe’ 
(Weisse 2011,  p. 122). This work has until now been focused in Europe, whilst being 
aware ‘of the fact that the new discussion on religion in education has world-wide 
dimensions’ (Weisse 2011, p. 123). 
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3.2.5 Critical discussion 
I develop my critique of the interpretive approach through a consideration of three 
broad and interconnected areas of concern. The first area I discuss here is in relation to 
the way the relationship between religion and culture is presented, the second in 
relation to philosophical concerns and the third educational concerns. Although 
intending to give recognition to the ‘dangers of generalizing about cultural or religious 
‘wholes’ (Jackson 1997, p. 49), I assert there is insufficient clarity between religion and 
culture in this approach largely because of the emphasis on ethnography. The second 
area of concern is broadly philosophical where despite aiming to take a ‘critical stance 
towards Western, post-Enlightenment models of representing ‘world religions’ as 
homogeneous belief systems’ (Jackson 2011, p.191), it seems to me that Jackson does 
not spell out clearly enough what he means by certain terminology and that this leads to 
an insufficient response to the challenge of relativism. The third area of concern is 
broadly educational and these three concerns taken together lead me to infer that 
assumptions are being made in this approach regarding religion as well as education.   
 
Some confusion about precise distinction between what is meant in the interpretive 
approach by religion and culture respectively is, I assert, possible because of the extent 
to which Jackson draws upon interpretive anthropology.  It is apparent both in 
Jackson’s original configuration of the interpretive approach and continues to be the 
case in more recent writings as for example where the interpretive approach is being 
used as a research tool (see Jackson 2011). An example of this can be seen also in the 
work of Wolfram Weisse, a collaborator with Jackson on the interpretive approach as a 
research tool in the REDCo Project. Citing Council of Europe recommendations from 
2008 (Council of Europe 2008), Weisse (2011) suggests that there is ‘great importance 
and relevance of learning about religions as part of intercultural education and of 
interreligious dialogue’ (Weisse 2011, p.122). However, the lack of clear distinction 
between the two reveals how assumptions are being made about their precise 
relationship. From this arises a related question with regard to how children are to 
distinguish between what is religion and religious expression, and what is culture and 
cultural expression. There is potential for misunderstandings where distinctions are not 
made clear between matters of religious expression and matters of cultural expression. 
Perhaps equally as concerning is the limited discussion in the body of Jackson’s work 
and that of his collaborators’ as to how these distinctions, were they to be identified, 
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actually could be represented and explored in the classroom. Erricker (see Chater and 
Erricker 2013 and especially chapter 5) concludes that this approach rather than being 
religious education is really offering an anthropological exploration of religion in the 
classroom, which ‘pedagogically is totally insufficient and confused’ (p. 76). 
 
The relationship between culture and religion as in the interpretive approach has been 
critiqued by others working in the field of religious education, including Wright (2008) 
who expresses concerns about the ways in which religions are to be represented to 
children in the classroom. Jackson responds by saying that although he thinks it is 
possible ‘to give general descriptions of religions … but that such descriptions should 
not be regarded as final or uncontested’ (Jackson 2008, p. 14). Jackson and Wright 
have disagreed about the relationship between culture and religion in religious 
education, however Jackson (2008) defends his approach as being able to make 
distinctions between religious education and cultural education, giving several 
examples from Russia, Northern Ireland and Japan where this would be particularly 
important ( see p. 18).  Furthermore, he identifies situations where ‘an avowedly non-
confessional programme can, in reality, be politically loaded’ (p. 18). Jackson’s view is 
that the attention he gives to issues of power, which can be perceived as coming from 
Asad’s criticisms of Geertz, ‘in the interpretive approach is intended to provide checks 
and balances against such loaded representations, not imply that traditions are ‘arbitrary 
constructions’ devoid of descriptive content’ (p. 18).  The point Jackson is trying to 
make is that there are not clear boundaries between culture and religion, but that his 
approach is robust enough to ensure no power or other undue influence is possible in 
the way religions are represented in the classroom. 
 
There are however further concerns which arise from an insufficient  clarity between 
culture and religion which can be revealed by taking an example from Geertz’s (1973) 
‘Interpretive Theory of Religion’ itself. As a starting point for the interpretive approach 
to religious education, Geertz’s work seemed at first to offer a means of moving away 
from criticisms faced by the phenomenological approach to the study of religion in 
religious education, and in particular the close association the phenomenological 
approach had with Christianity. Geertz’s starting point had instead been with Indic and 
tribal religions (Asad 1983, p. 238) and not Christianity. In particular, Geertz’s seminal 
chapter ‘Religion as a cultural system’ (1973, Ch. 4) is appealing since it looked for a 
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deeper account of religion than, up to that point, had been afforded by anthropologists 
or sociologists which Geertz says were ‘stagnant’ (Geertz 1973, p.87). Although 
Jackson (1997 and 2004) considers Asad’s (1983) critique of Geertz in relation to 
conceptions of power and history, other problems raised by Geertz’s work in the 
relationship between religion and culture have not been addressed by Jackson. To 
illustrate my point I take the particular example of the way Geertz approaches the 
matter of symbol in religion. Geertz’s anthropological work opens up a discussion 
around the interpretation of the place of symbol in religion but only from a cultural 
point of view; my question is whether this is sufficient an account of symbol for those 
living a religious life.  Tillich (1964) however brings something else to the discussion 
regarding symbol from a theological point of view.  Tillich’s approach to the study of 
symbol in religion ensures that religion is positioned rather differently in relation to 
culture, and thus illustrates my point well. Tillich is concerned that there is a ‘fateful 
separation of religion and culture’ (p. 29) but that this separation comes largely from 
differences in approaches to philosophy of religion. 
 
In Tillich’s work symbols are not regarded as being ‘a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed in symbolic forms by which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes towards life’ (Geertz 1973, p. 89). Indeed Tillich (1964) 
says that when symbols are regarded in this way they ‘become signs pointing to a 
meaning which is defined’ (p.56) he regards symbols in such a way as to say they are 
able to ‘stand for a reality in the power of which they participate’ (p.56). So whereas 
Geertz’s understanding of symbols in religion seems indistinguishable from a cultural 
understanding, Tillich asserts a more existential role. Symbols for men and women 
living a religious life, according to Tillich (2000), have a different and perhaps more 
profound role in each person’s day by day existence than can be perceived through 
ethnography alone. He asserts ‘the means by which the relation of man to the ground of 
his being must be expressed in symbols taken from the structure of being, the polarity 
of participation and individualization determines the special character of this relation as 
it determines the special character of the courage to be’ (p.156). Tillich’s proposals aim 
to bring a particular appreciation of how symbols offer humanity this sense of ‘courage 
to be’. Tillich seeks to do this by explaining how symbols are an attempt to 
communicate a reality in ‘which the ontological side of courage is taken into faith 
(including hope), while the ethical side of courage is taken into love or the principle of 
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ethics’ (p. 8). The existential nature of symbols, as Tillich explains, penetrates deep 
below the surface of daily life into faith and faith he says is ‘the state of being 
ultimately concerned’ (Tillich 2001, p.1). Therefore my critique of an anthropological 
approach to understanding religious symbols in religious education is that it is not able 
to express fully what they actually do for those to whom they matter. Further I assert 
that this distinction is highly significant and enables me to illuminate the distinction 
between an anthropological interpretation of the role of symbols in religion, which is 
more or less indistinguishable from a cultural one, and a religious understanding. The 
point I want to make here is that it seems likely that Jackson’s appeal to anthropology 
is not able to bring a sufficient religious understanding of religion into religious 
education. 
 
To be sure, this enables me to shed light on a further problem for the interpretive 
approach that arises when examining culture, ethnicity and national identity through the 
lens of contemporary anthropology. The problem is the possibility that distinctions as 
well as similarities are blurred. And a possible consequence of this is that the 
distinctive aspects, particularly in relation to the public sphere, are not taken seriously 
enough. Jackson (1997) has discussed the changing nature of religion understood as 
part and parcel of a multicultural society p.83ff). Although Jackson notes that ‘religious 
educators need to be critical of their assumptions regarding the nature of ‘cultures’ and 
to develop new methods of representation’ (p.91). Jackson emphasises both the 
personal and social experience of religion in the cultural context. From this I want to 
question whether the attempt to bring the experience of ‘the other’ close to the students, 
whilst acknowledging that it is never possible to actually experience the experience of 
‘the other’, was actually successful. Geertz’ interpretive method offered an alternative 
to the problematic ‘eidetic vision’ of phenomenology, developing a similar but 
different conceptualisation of ‘experience near’.  However I suggest that unfortunately 
this approach in fact can only serve to emphasise cultural and social interpretations of 
religion and religious expression, meaning that issues of plurality are wholly in relation 
to cultural plurality. Further and although questions of both inner and outer religious 
plurality are recognized, informed by extensive ethnographic research (Jackson 2003, 
p.3), the interpretive approach rather than broadening an understanding of religion as is 
intended (Jackson 1997, p. 58), in fact serves to reaffirm confusion between culture and 
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religion. Thus it is possible to conclude it fails to acknowledge the difference religion 
means existentially, that is day to day for those who live a religious life.  
 
A further area of concern is demonstrated by for example Jackson’s use of phrases such 
as ‘post enlightenment’ (Jackson 2007, p. 401) and ‘postmodern’ (Jackson 2004a, p. 
11). Jackson (2003) indicates that by these kinds of phrases he means very broadly the 
kind of thinking that has followed the European Enlightenment (see p. 7). Jackson goes 
on to say however that the ‘assumptions, ideas and values that characterised the 
European Enlightenment have led to a plurality in contemporary thought that is often 
pictured as a move from modernity to late modernity to ‘High Modernity’ (citing 
Giddens 1990) or from modernity to ‘post-modernity’ (citing e.g. Lyotard 1984)’. 
Through Jackson’s body of work however, distinctions made between these terms 
remain underdeveloped, leading to possible generalisations and underexposed 
philosophical assumptions about for example the meaning of and conditions for 
knowledge. It could be argued instead for example that the Enlightenment, since it had 
no clear beginning and ending, is rather a stream of thought or way of thinking about 
knowledge and humanity which is still prevalent now. Jackson’s point, that there is 
some significant time in the past when plurality became viewed in a different way, is 
thus a weak one. 
 
A question that may help make distinctions between the terms would be to ask  whether 
the influence of new ways of thinking, which emerged in and around the 17
th
 century, 
are having a different kind of impact now compared to another moment in history.  The 
assumption made by Jackson is however that the Enlightenment has had a negative 
impact, particularly on religion and religious knowing, and that the ‘post-
enlightenment’ or ‘postmodern’ period being lived at the moment is somehow the 
worse for that impact. Jackson makes it quite clear that his work is ‘critical of Western, 
post-Enlightenment models of representing “world religions” ’ (Jackson 2007, p. 410). 
However apart from placing in a vague chronological order, the a lack of distinction 
between the ‘modern’ and the ‘Enlightenment’ periods brings the possibility of an 
uncritical conflation between for example the dualism and doubt of Descartes’ thought 
and notions of autonomy for example from Kant. Lack of detailed engagement with 
what the terminology means precisely has led to his understanding of the 
Enlightenment also not engaging with the political transformations that took place 
57 
 
during this period. Instead the lack of attention to certain philosophical assumptions, 
taken together with an anthropological and cultural focus of Jackson’s position, ensures 
his approach to religious education remains centred on observable aspects of religion 
rather   than existential. This means the discussion remains, just as it does for the 
phenomenological approach, at the level of knowledge; both in terms of what there is to 
know and ways of knowing. This leads me to my discussion of the third area of concern 
which in relation to the educative possibilities of the interpretive approach. 
 
The interpretive approach has faced charges both of reductionism and relativism 
(Jackson 2007, p.6) in its approach to both inner and outer religious plurality.  Jackson 
(1997) meets the challenge of reductionism by saying that those working on the 
interpretive approach ‘ do not deny the existence of religious ‘wholes’’ … but that they 
do ‘take the view that such wholes are constructions and that one insider’s view of the 
nature and scope of the religion will be different from another’s’ (p. 126). Linked with 
this, when meeting the charge of relativism Jackson (1997) does not deny that there are 
implications for maintaining that ‘some aspects of knowledge are socially constructed’ 
(p.126), however he insists that it does not follow ‘that the notion of ‘ultimate truth’ has 
no meaning’ (p.126). Elsewhere he insists that the interpretive approach takes an 
epistemological position which is neither anti-realist (Jackson 2008, p.22) nor naïve 
realist when dealing with religious plurality; preferring instead a position somewhere in 
between (Jackson 2007). He frequently refers to the ‘epistemological openness’ of the 
approach (e.g. Jackson 1997, p. 126, 2004c p.8, 2006 p.402 and 2012a, p.3), however 
the meaning of this is never precisely explored.  Instead he mentions that it is 
reasonable for different people working with the interpretive approach to have different 
epistemological positions. The implications of the lack of critical engagement with his 
own position in this respect are not fully considered, although Jackson tells us that the 
intention has been to ‘find a pragmatic way of dealing with epistemological difference 
that is inclusive of conservative as well as liberal religious views’ (Jackson 1997, 
p.126). Jacksons’ use of the word ‘pragmatic’ here is in a general and not precise 
philosophical sense; the pragmatist philosophical tradition is not referenced at all. The 
possible consequence of unexplored assumptions implicit in the lack of a developed 
position in relation to epistemological matters is important as he moves into discussing 
constructivism in relation to religious education. This is highly significant in relation to 
ontological concerns, since without such clarity it is hard to see how coherence can be 
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found between his position on religion and what it is that religious education should 
aim to achieve. 
 
Jackson (2000) acknowledges that what he calls the main pedagogical principles of the 
interpretive approach are associated with theory from ‘an eclectic range of sources’ 
(p131), including the humanities, social sciences and especially hermeneutics. By 
hermeneutics Jackson means to include into the practise of his approach ‘methodology 
from the social sciences influenced by hermeneutics’ (p.131). The intention is therefore 
to ‘encourage pupils to engage in a hermeneutical activity similar to that of the 
religious believer in order to gain further insights into their way of life’ (Grimmitt 
2000a, p. 39). However the main point I want to make is that it remains hard for this 
approach to religious education to settle a position in relation to what is particularly 
educative about religious education. This is in large part because the interpretive 
approach does not exactly spell out the purposes of education in the public sphere.  
 
Because the interpretive approach does not spell out the role of education in the public 
sphere, assumptions are made about the role of religious plurality in religious 
education. Aligned with this I want to note three areas of difficulty that are associated 
with the particular way the interpretive approach considers religious plurality. The first 
relates to the way the interpretive approach seeks to resolve ontological and 
epistemological concerns. Taking the desired epistemological openness of this 
approach together with an inconclusive engagement with the political implications of 
the Enlightenment, means that discussion regarding the significance of religious 
plurality in the public sphere is barely begun.  Secondly further questions are raised by 
other elements of the interpretive approach; in particular discussions of reflexivity and 
interpretation. It is not well explained how the capacity to interpret text is distinctive in 
religious education, that is what for example would be its distinguishing features 
compared to an English literature lesson or one undertaking  historical textual analysis. 
The precise existential significance of different interpretations of a religious text for 
those living a religious life seems possible to be missed. And finally Jackson assumes 
that one of the key aims of religious education is concerned with helping pupils to 
reflect on their studies of ways of life that are different in some respects from their 
own, but in light of the insufficient distinction between religion and culture questions 
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remain over whether the overlaps between cultural learning and religious education can 
so easily be made. 
 
To be sure Jackson does make the point that each act of reflection is personal to each 
student, and that teachers therefore have a responsibility in each moment to be alert to 
that as well as providing structured opportunities for reflection. Jackson also suggests 
that as well as the need for reflection there should also be a place for constructive 
criticism. The interpretive approach Jackson (2011) claims ‘… builds upon a positive 
attitude towards diversity, recognising the encounter of people with different beliefs 
and cultural practices as enriching in principle, and seeing individual identity as 
potentially developing through meeting the ‘other’ ’ (p. 6). Furthermore, ‘(r)eflexivity 
also involves the learner (or researcher) being able to engage critically with material 
studied. The management of such critical work is a sensitive pedagogical issue, 
especially in pluralistic classrooms’ (p. 6). Jackson looks back to the ethnographic 
studies he and his colleagues had earlier undertaken in order to convert some of this 
earlier data into curriculum material, trying all the while to use the information of 
‘insiders’ to the religion in order to represent the tradition authentically to ‘outsiders’. 
However, if the interpretive approach becomes only a way of approaching objective 
knowledge of the religious aspect of culture, it may be an approach that has neither the 
capacity to engage with the inner as well as outer plurality of religion nor to 
acknowledge the uniqueness of each individual as he intends.  
 
3.2.6 Conclusion 
Through my analysis of these three broad areas of concern I note that the interpretive 
approach, in taking the route it does to move away from both confessional and 
phenomenological approaches to religious education, may actually be closer to being a 
kind of cultural education. This is to a large extent because Jackson’s work is 
underpinned predominantly by theory and practice emerging from 20
th
 century 
anthropologists; drawing especially upon social and ethnographic theory. The lack of 
clear distinction between religion and culture means that assumptions are made about 
religion and issues of religious plurality are resolved through recourse to an open 
approach to epistemology.  Further the close connection to anthropology has allowed 
assumptions that ‘reflexivity’ and ‘edification’ are not only possible but also good 
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things in education, to remain underexposed. This is because questions about the role of 
education in the public sphere are not asked or fully addressed.   Indeed as Erricker 
(2013) notes we ‘need to be clear then that this approach to religious education is not 
about the representation of religion, per se. It is about encouraging participation 
towards to common good in pluralist environments and societies’ (p. 78).  However on 
observing that cultures change over time, Jackson notes that ‘(h)uman beings actively 
make and remake ways of life’ (Jackson 1997, p.81).  The point Jackson is wanting to 
make is that the fluidity of the ways in which human beings remake their ways of life in 
his view  serves to emphasise the importance of reflexivity and especially edification 
not only in people’s lives in general but also as an aim for religious education ( see 
Jackson 2004b, p. 7).  
The strength of the interpretive approach is its intention to ensure that young people are 
given an authentic experience of a particular religious tradition because of its intention 
to allow for the acknowledgment of inner plurality within particular traditions.  The 
approach seeks to enable young people to interpret religion, in part in the manner of an 
anthropologist, and to make understandings which are their own, which are meaningful 
and in some way life enhancing, building on theory around the concept of ‘edification’. 
A significant problem for Jackson however, is his insistent claim to be 
‘epistemologically open’ (Jackson 2012a, p.3). He avoids engaging with problems of 
‘truth’ preferring the distancing moves of the anthropologist. However, the model 
which emerges is neither instructional nor constructivist operating in an unidentified 
educative place theoretically.  Since curriculum materials were limited in scope and 
founded on underexplored educative assumptions, although widely applied to civic 
situations in both the UK and Europe, there remain questions about whether this work 
is educational rather than instructional. The political context within which Jackson sets 
his approach is a broadly liberal, democratic and multi-cultural and having significant 
influence on civic social policy in Europe, but the lack of critical engagement with 
what is really intended in terms of post-enlightenment, means the distinction between 
the political vision of the enlightenment and conceptualisation of humanism is missed. 
Finally, the focus on an anthropological approach to religious education leaves this 
approach with unresolved theological and philosophical questions about precisely how 
the interpretive approach is distinctive from cultural education; can it be termed 
religious education at all?  
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3.3   The critical realist approach 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In this section I present a second approach to religious education that has come to be 
known as ‘critical religious education’ or the ‘critical realist approach’. This is as 
developed by Andrew Wright and his associates, in particular Philip Barnes, whilst at 
Kings College, London. I then also look at some practical applications before 
proceeding to identify and discuss three critical challenges the approach faces. I argue 
that these challenges come as a consequence of assumptions about religion that have 
led to an emphasis on epistemological problems, in relation to religious plurality, as 
being the most significant issue facing religious education. This approach, seeks 
resolution to these perceived epistemological problems through developing theory for 
religious education based on the social philosophical theory of critical realism. The 
critical realist approach to religious education does not make close reference to theory 
in relation to education but to learning theory. As a consequence, I argue this approach 
is not able to be sufficiently educative.  
 
3.3.2 What is the critical realist approach to religious education? 
The critical realist approach to religious education developed as a body of theory over 
the past 25 years. Wright’s proposal begins with the view that at its heart, religious 
education should be capable of ‘empowering children to learn to be responsible and 
wise as they encounter the vitally important, although extremely dangerous, horizon of 
religion’ (2000a, p.186). In order to do this Wright (2007) suggests that religious 
education ‘should enable students to engage with questions of ultimate truth, and attend 
to the task of living truthful lives in an informed and critical and literate manner’ (p.3). 
His assertion of the centrality of truth within religions per se, enables Wright to develop 
an argument for truth as the central concern of religious education itself. This is 
significant as it points to the philosophical position of this approach. Insisting ‘there is 
a real world existing largely independently of our knowledge of it’ (p18) this view 
forms the basis upon which the proposal is built. Recognising that a distinctive problem 
for religious education is how to uphold the integrity of many different claims to the 
absolute correctness of truth, Wright identifies particular philosophical theory through 
which to develop his approach to religious education.  The theory he aligns his work to 
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is ‘critical realism’ (see for example Wright 1996, 2004 and 2007). This is in order to 
find a way to resolve problems emerging in relation to competing religious ‘truths’, the 
impossibility of all truths being ‘true’ and also, as he insists, the untenable possibility 
of anti-realism (Wright 2004a, p.45). His further point is that while noting that religious 
education must overcome the problem of how to represent and engage students in an 
authentic encounter with the views of ‘the other’ who may hold quite different things to 
be true, his intention is to develop theory which can at one in the same time respect 
competing claims. In Religion Education and Post-modernity, Wright (see 2004a) sets 
out to develop his theoretical argument for critical realism and extracts the concept of 
‘critical’ to formulate what he terms a ‘Critical Religious Education’.  
 
This proposal for critical religious education grew out of Wright’s work on the ‘The 
Spiritual Education Project’ based at Kings College London and operating between 
1996 and 2000 (Wright 2000a, p.170). The essence of the Kings project had been 
outlined earlier by Wright (1993) in ‘Religious Education in the Secondary School: 
Prospects for Religious Literacy’. This work is best understood as part of a stream of 
theory which developed as religious education responded to the challenge which the 
charge of confessionalism brought in the 1960’s, rather than a response to the 
phenomenological approach. ‘The Spiritual Education Project’ had three aims: first to 
analyse and evaluate the nature of contemporary spiritual education in England and 
Wales, second to develop an alternative critical rationale and thirdly to present 
proposals for a new critical pedagogy (Wright 2000a, p.170). Wright (2000a) explains 
his attempt to construct a ‘critical theory for religious education has been developing in 
two directions. The first is in relationship with the hermeneutical tradition running from 
Schleiermacher through Dilthey, Husserl and Gadamer to Habermas. The second is 
through the Spiritual Education Project itself’ (p.173). Wright asserts that from the The 
Spiritual Education Project’s report it was possible to identify five pedagogical 
principles. 1. Critical religious education seeks to do justice to the horizons of religion. 
2. Critical religious education must do justice to the horizon of the pupil. 3. Critical 
religious education seeks to equip pupils to recognise and respond appropriately to 
power structures inherent in religious and educational discourse. 4. Critical religious 
education seeks to enable a critical dialogue between the horizon of the child and the 
horizon of religion. 5. Critical religious education seeks to develop in pupils a religious 
63 
 
literacy rooted in attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility (see 
Wright 2000a, pp.177-180).   
 
A further strand of thinking informing the development of the critical religious 
education approach, is in relation to questions emerging from the ‘extent to which 
‘modern’ religious  education reflects and has been shaped by Enlightenment 
commitments and post-Enlightenment Romantic reinterpretations of religion that locate 
its essence in the private sphere of immediate experience’ (Barnes and Wright  2006,  
p.65). This is not only regarding the moves religious education made away from 1960’s 
confessionalism, but also significantly to questions emerging from complexities 
surrounding the concept of truth and truth claims. This has come to the fore especially 
given the increasing religious plurality in Britain during the second half of the 20
th
 
Century. Wright’s initial exposition of what he means by the terms ‘modernism’ and 
the ‘enlightenment’ can be found  in his earlier writing where he sometimes conflates 
‘modernism’ with the ‘enlightenment’ (see for example Wright 1997a, p. 10).  
Asserting that, ‘Descartes’ trust in the power of reason became the cornerstone’ 
(Wright 2000b, p.12) of the enlightenment, Wright goes on to say that this emphasis on 
reason brought with it an ‘emancipation’ from primitive medieval religious 
superstition. However, his view is that this led to an ‘optimistic humanism later linked 
up with nineteenth century evolutionary theory to create the modern myth of the 
inevitable intellectual moral and spiritual progress of humanity’ (Wright 2000b, p.12).  
 
Wright concludes that the chief legacy of the enlightenment was a set of assumptions 
and principles which have become the ‘mind-set’ of modernity (see Wright 2000b, 
p.16). He lists these as including, individual autonomy, reason as a foundation of 
knowledge and understanding, a distinction between objective knowledge and 
subjective belief, priority of science and technology over religion, liberal values of 
freedom and tolerance and democratic politics (see Wright 2000b, p.17).  In this book 
‘Spirituality and Education’, Wright (2005) continues this line of thinking by 
presenting what he calls four ‘major’ philosophic traditions that have ‘been 
instrumental in shaping contemporary spirituality’ (p. 16). These he suggests are 
Materialism, Romanticism, Post-modernism and Critical Realism. Romanticism, 
Wright sees as a 19
th
 Century response to the materialism of the Enlightenment period, 
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and coming for example from the work of theologians such as Schleiermacher. This he 
argues, led to a shift towards emphasizing significance of individual religious 
experience as a source of religious knowledge (see Barnes and Wright, 2006).  
Wright’s (2007a)  point is that this in turn later had a strong influence in developing 
what he calls ‘experiential’ (p.88) and uncritical approaches to religious education of 
the 1980’s in for example the work of David Hay (see pp.92-93).    
 
Wright suggests that the problems which have come to the present moment from the 
enlightenment, have led to a distinction being made between reason and experience. 
Religious education in responding to this has reacted by entering into a period of neo-
confessionalism influenced by liberal protestant theology, heavily influenced by a 
romantic attitude to religion and a romantic hermeneutic. In addition to this a particular 
‘reading of Wittgenstein has been evoked in support of a postmodern hermeneutic 
which affirms relativity and denies the possibility of attaining objective truth’ (Wright 
1997b, p.204). In order to bring greater criticality to religious education as well as 
avoid the romantic hermeneutical thread running from Schleiermacher to Husserl 
(Wright 1997b, p. 205), Wright looks to Gadamer because ‘(w)here romantic 
hermeneutics has been concerned with the explication of existential meaning, 
Gadamer’s focus is on questions of ontology, realism and truth’ (Wright 1998a, p. 60). 
It is in part through an engagement with the hermeneutical tradition, which he 
understands to be ‘a set of presuppositions regarding the nature of the process of 
understanding’ (Wright 2006 p. 176 and Wright 2007 p.181), that Wright opens a 
discussion regarding the relationship between the nature of truth, truth claims and 
truthful living. His intention is to develop theory on how religious education, when 
moving beyond confessionalism, can retain the integrity of religious truth claims; an 
integrity which he regards as having been lost in approaches to religious education 
influenced by 19
th
 Century romanticism. In this category of approaches Wright 
included the phenomenological approach (see Erricker and Erricker 2000b p. 44).  
 
Wright’s key concern to avoid either a return to confessionalism or a resort to 
relativism leads him to propose theory for religious education, which while facing up to 
the paradox of working in situations where truth is much contested, can also ensure it is 
possible to keep central the ‘pursuit of truth and cultivation of truthfulness’ (Wright 
2007, p 103).  In addition to this Wright (2008) seeks to resolve questions which he 
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considers to have emerged from the Enlightenment’s emphasis on individualism noting 
that the ‘dislocation of fact from value is largely a product of the Enlightenment’ 
(Wright 2013, p. 296).  Since, as he also notes, conceptualizations of truth manifest 
themselves into some ones’ life, questions of truthful living cannot be separated from 
questions of ultimate truth.  His argument proceeds by saying that as religion is 
interested in the pursuit of ultimate truth therefore religious education should be 
‘orientated towards the pursuit of truth and truthful living with relation to the ultimate 
order of things’ (Wright 2013, p. 296).  
 
The critical religious education approach, in contrast to experiential approaches to 
religious education emerging in the 1980’s as well as phenomenological or 
anthropological approaches, can be understood as being ‘critical’ in at least two ways. 
The first, in seeking to resolve problems associated with competing ‘truth claims’, is in 
relation to ontology, semantics and epistemology (Wright 2007, p.177), and seeks to 
utilise a critical realist epistemology. Critical realism according to Wright (2007) 
‘enables us to avoid the traps of either reducing reality to merely the sum of atomistic 
facts, or to embracing a thoroughgoing scepticism about our ability to know anything 
of the actual order-of-things’ (p.177). Furthermore ‘critical realism makes it possible to 
discern meaning, purpose and intention by asking crucial questions about truth’ 
(p.177). A second way in which the critical religious education approach can be 
understood as critical is through particular engagement with the critical hermeneutics of 
Gadamer and Habermas. Gadamer’s concern with realistic truth, and his ‘insistence that 
interpretation requires dialogue between the horizon of the text and the interpreter’ 
(Wright 1998a, p.61), enables him to bring together findings of the Spiritual Education 
Project and hermeneutical theory. However Wright has some difficulty still with 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic as he argues it does not sufficiently take into account the 
possibility of the ‘horizon of the text being false’ (Wright 1998a, p. 64). For this reason 
Wright looks to Habermas’ interpretation of Marxist critical theory as a development of 
Gadamer’s thinking, which Wright understands to draw into itself  understandings of 
the communal and social context of language and a commitment to the notion of 
‘contingent rationality’ (Wright 1998a,  p. 66).  Such an engagement with the social 
and political context of religious education is something Wright and more recently his 
close collaborators have opened a discussion, especially in relation to what they see as 
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the impact of Enlightenment liberalism (see for example Barnes 2010, p.26), on 
religious education.  
 
Wright asserts that a problem for religious education, following the demise of a 
confessional approach to the subject, is that religious education has taken the principles 
of the liberal education tradition too much to heart. He develops his thinking, 
concerning the political implications of this for religious education, through an 
exploration of liberalism over a long period (see Wright 2000, 2001b, 2007 and 2010). 
A consequence of the influence of liberalism Wright maintains, has resulted in religious 
education having uncritically passed on ‘the liberal values of freedom and tolerance’ 
(Wright 1998a, p. 65) and that this has given a tacit message to children that ‘it does 
not matter what you believe’ (Wright 2007, p.81). Problems liberalism presents for 
religious believers have been explored elsewhere (see for example Wolf 1968, pp12-
15). Wright (2004) in revisiting the questions looks for a resolution (see p.191) to such 
difficulties through drawing a distinction between comprehensive and political 
liberalism (see Wright 2007, p. 31 and Wright 2010, p. 134).  Setting this distinction 
within a context where, ‘(l)iberalism, at its most basic, embraces the virtues of 
generosity, tolerance, benevolence, broadmindedness and a certain laissez-faire 
permissiveness’ (Wright 2004a, p.31), he further advances the point that the ‘notion of 
liberalism as a virtuous disposition has a long relationship with education’ (Wright 
2004a, p.31).  Political Liberalism he says ‘is concerned to provide a pragmatic 
solution to the challenge of ordering a plural society in which there is no consensus 
about the ultimate nature of reality of the meaning of life, and as such functions 
‘independently of any wider comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine’’  
(Wright 2004a, p. 32 and citing Rawls 1993, p. 223). Comprehensive Liberalism, 
Wright sees as constituting ‘a total world view that offers an all-encompassing account 
of the place of humanity in the world’ (Wright 2004a, p.33) and will lead to an 
ideological position within education where ‘(a)utonomy would be presented as the 
highest good, and alternative religious and non-religious visions … relegated to the 
private sphere of optional belief …’ (Wright 2010, p. 135).  A school based upon the 
principles of political liberalism, which Wright advocates, such as those of Locke (e.g. 
Wright 2007, p.43ff, & 2010, p.135) or John Rawls (Wright 2009, p 45) on the other 
hand, would ‘embrace the principles of freedom and tolerance as a non-absolute interim 
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ethic designed to enable all faith traditions, … to engage in conversations designed to 
pursue truth and cultivate truthful living’ (Wright 2010, p. 136).  
 
Wright’s political and contextual understanding of religion and religious education is 
consequently linked to an examination of the situation of religion in what he terms 
‘post enlightenment societies’ (see for example Wright 2000, p. 41). He proposes that 
the enlightenment challenge to religion led, at least in Protestantism, to a 
‘reinterpretation of religion in terms of inner subjectivity and commitment.’ (Wright 
2006, p. 67) and according to Wright this forced an unnatural division between the 
natural and moral universes. Wright’s formation of the critical religious education 
approach is an attempt to make sense of these two universes in the context of religious 
education.  Wright’s (2003) means to a resolution of this divide is to bring to centre 
stage an idea for the ‘cultivation of wisdom’ (p. 285). He takes this from the classical 
notion of paideia and which he understands to mean ‘a complex cognitive stance that 
includes apprehension and appreciation as well as critical refection and an orientation 
to practice based on life experience’ (Hodgeson 1999, p.7 quoted in Wright 2003, p. 
285). Ultimately Wright is looking for a new approach to religious education that can 
weave back together the divisions between reason and experience he sees as being 
opened up at the enlightenment, and place this within a contextual understanding of 
education in a liberal democracy.  
 
3.3.3 Practical developments 
Wright’s proposals for a critical religious education were intended (see Wright 2000) to 
be developed into classroom practice.  Nevertheless, there has been limited attention 
given so far to what the critical religious education approach would actually look like 
in the classroom (see Teece, 2004), supporting Wrights early contention that ‘spiritual 
education has yet to make the fundamental educational move from education-as-
advocacy to education-as-critical-understanding’ (see Wright 1997). Aware that the 
transfer of theory into classroom practice is as least as complex as the development of 
theory itself, Wright none the less asserts that the ‘pedagogy of teaching needs to be 
proceeded by a focus on the pedagogy of learning’ (Wright 2007a, p. 237). Wright 
(2007a) has begun to develop work based upon the Variation Theory of Learning and 
phenomenography (p. 237).  Variation Theory of Learning is an approach to pedagogy 
that developed within the phenomenographic research tradition (see Hella and Wright 
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2009, p. 59). Further, it is suggested that variation theory addresses key principles of 
learning that are ‘more fundamental than understanding contested interpretations of an 
object of learning’ (Hella and Wright 2009, p. 59). In addition to this there is the 
assertion that ‘learning cannot be reduced to mere self-expression; on the contrary, 
there is always an ‘object of learning’ because learning is always learning of 
something’ (Hella and Wright 2009, p. 59).  The variation theory of learning Wright 
suggests is particularly suited to the critical religious education approach because it  
assumes that ‘learning is an on-going dialogue between the horizon of meaning of the 
students and of the aspect of religion being taught’ (Hella and Wright 2009, p. 60). In 
addition to this Wright’s point is that the linking of the two theoretical positions will 
enable ‘religious educators to recognise the essential unity of learning about and 
learning from religion’ (Hella and Wright 2009, p. 60) and resolve the problems 
presented for engagement with the plurality of religions through a critical religious 
education in a liberal context (see Hella and Wright 2009, p. 62).   
 
3.3.4 Critical discussion 
In taking forward my critique of the critical religious education approach I consider 
three interconnected areas of concern, theological, philosophical and educational. The 
first area of concern arises from the way in which religion is defined. I discuss two 
closely linked points here; the first is in relation to whether Wright can avoid the 
accusation of confessionalism as he hopes, the second a response to his critique and 
resolution of the issues pluralism raises for religious education. Ultimately this leads 
me to question whether Wright’s account of religion is itself sufficient. Critical 
religious education emerged to a large part in direct response to the collapse of 
Christian confessionalism and to what Barnes has called confessionalism in another 
form, namely ‘the pluralist doctrine that all religions are valid public expressions of 
private encounters with the divine’ (Barnes 2009, p. 9). The theological problem which 
the key proponents of critical religious education identify in this kind of pluralism, is 
that such a view itself is informed by liberal protestant doctrine of the possibility of a 
universal encounter with the transcendent. Wright’s difficulty with this possibility is 
that since it grants all religions equal validity, it fails to acknowledge seriously enough 
their different claims to truth.  Wright wants to maintain a realist view of truth, albeit a 
critical realist view, while at the same time wanting to avoid the accusation of 
confessionalism. My assertion is that in this respect he fails, and rather than avoiding 
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confessionalism, because of his insistence that religion is constructed as a matter of true 
versus false claims about knowledge he cannot step aside from a ‘compliance with  the 
affirmation of the inherent universal value of religion’ (Wright 1997, p.212). This is 
itself, I would assert, a form of religious confessionalism.  Furthermore, despite hoping 
that his move away from romantic hermeneutics will enable him to bring a greater 
criticality to the study of religion, it seems to me that this either/or notion of ‘ultimate 
truth’ is far more aligned with models of truth seen in traditional forms of Judeao 
Christian theology, and hence neo-confessionalist, than he gives credence to. My point 
is that this limits his perspective and capacity to interpret elements of religious 
significance in other ways of human existence. 
 
Wright’s critique of pluralism arises in part from his criticism of the romantic 
hermeneutic as discussed by John Hick. Teece (see for example 2005) suggests that 
Wright’s criticisms of Hick are unfounded for two reasons. The first is that Hick is not 
a theological romantic and secondly that it would be mistaken to think that romanticism 
underpins pluralism in general. It is this second point I wish to pursue here in order to 
demonstrate that Wright’s rejection of pluralism is unfounded. Further, through this, I 
want to expose what seems to me to be his incomplete vision of what defines religion. 
Wright places himself into an either/or situation, as I have shown above, not only in 
relation to truth but also in relation to his insistence that the growth of religious 
pluralism has ‘placed the issue of religious truth in an ambiguous position’ (Wright 
2007 p. 79). Further he suggests that this has led to traditional assumptions about 
religion being increasingly questioned. Wright, in discussing the two attainment targets 
found in many Agreed Syllabuses through the Non -Statutory Framework for RE, 
suggests that ‘learning about’ religion although has some engagement with ‘ultimate 
truth’ is insufficient. However, the ‘learning from’ element in his view exemplifies 
disengagement with the pursuit of truth ‘as an end in itself, and a path to personal and 
social well-being’ (Wright 2007, p.71). Thus pluralism for Wright as advanced by Hick 
will not do. Instead Wright opens a discussion of the slave boy dialogue in Plato’s 
Meno, a method of questioning and recollection he leads his readers to believe he 
would embed into religious education. This he does to emphasise further his view that a 
‘concern for ultimate truth, an acceptance of the intimate connection between 
knowledge and virtue, and an acknowledgement that the pursuit of truth and the 
practice of truthfulness require strenuous effort guided by appropriate education’ 
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(Wright 2007, p. 72). In other words both learning from religion (the pursuit of truth 
within religion) and reflecting on and learning from religion should be understood 
equally in relation to ultimate truth and truth claims.  
 
Wright’s approach here, although termed critical religious education, seems to imply a 
view of religion which has an uncritical acceptance of the essential goodness of 
religion.  In my view this leads to a poorly reflected and far too optimistic attitude to 
and confidence in the capacity of religion alone to guide human beings to ways of 
‘truthful living’.  Nevertheless, and responding to the challenges presented as he sees it 
by both modernism and post modernism, Wright (2004) is seeking a path by which he 
wants to be able to move beyond ‘the tyranny of objective knowledge ‘and ‘the tyranny 
of subjective opinion’ (p.36), arguing that critical realism ‘enhanced by a non-dogmatic 
post-modern commitment to alterity’ can tread round ‘the quasi-totalitarian claims of 
post-modern anti-realism’ (p.65).  Significant to his argument is the centrality of the 
exploration of truth, and herein lays my key criticism of his position. This is that 
although an engagement with truth is arguably an important element of religious 
education, I am not at all clear he is convincing in his insistence that the exploration of 
ultimate truth is the only significant element of religion itself. Therefore my point is 
that Wright’s interpretation of religion is not a sufficient account of religion.  Wright’s 
suggestion that collective intentionality comes before the intentionality of the 
individual adherents, sets his position clearly, and forms the basis of what could be 
considered his theological positioning of critical religious education.  
 
Moreover there seems to be a weak link between the way truth is conceptualised and 
the idea of truthfulness, and also with and the idea of ‘truthful living’ as currently 
formulated. The key problem here I would see lying in the limited account of religion 
itself. By contrast in Hick’s thesis, which Wright critiques, personal transformation is at 
the heart of religion (see for example Hick 1989, 1999). This, taken with Teece’s 
assertion that Hick does offer us a way forward when considering pluralism albeit in a 
‘soft’ way ( see Teece 2005, p. 37), Teece (2005) suggests would enable students to 
study religion ‘critically and develop their understanding of what it means to be human 
in a religiously ambiguous world’ (p. 37) and thus merits further examination.  Wright 
makes the point  that ‘a subjectively committed and objectively rational search for 
religious truth rests on the cultivation of academic freedom in the classroom …’ ( p.86)  
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and further that the students should ‘develop appropriate levels of religious literacy 
through which they can explore issues of ultimate truth and truthfulness in a critical and 
potential life changing manner’ (p. 260). So although Wright (2007) claims that a study 
of religion must transcend the merely informative, his theological assumptions about 
the relationship between religion and truth as well as his philosophical assumptions 
about truth give limited indication of an education proposal for a religious education. 
However it is to a critique of his philosophical position that I turn next. 
 
Several philosophical dimensions can be identified in Wright’s (2007a) strategy for 
resolving the problems plurality brings for religious education. The philosophical areas 
he sees involved are related to progression towards understanding the ultimate nature of 
reality (ontology), the way language is used to express this ultimate reality (semantics), 
the process of understanding different truth claims (hermeneutics) and the ability to 
judge between conflicting truth claims (epistemology) (see p. 12). Despite identifying 
these significant philosophical areas Wright does not bring an entirely philosophical 
account of religious truth, but returns instead to Christian theological assumptions 
about the nature of authority and salvation (see Wright 2007a, Part III). This creates 
problems for Wright when later he wants to develop these ideas in relation to religious 
education, since he has a limited philosophical position to draw from. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether Wright discusses critically enough his decision to rely upon 
critical realism to resolve questions raised by the plurality of religion.  In addition to 
this, Wright’s incomplete theological exposition of the nature of religion adds another 
problematic layer of assumption to his interpretation of the philosophical questions 
rising through the enlightenment. The kinds of questions his work raises can be 
understood as being in terms of the relationship between reason and experience on the 
one hand and to truth and plurality on the other. Wright (2000), building on the 
Spiritual Education project as discussed above, asserts that an effective spiritual 
education will combine a ‘hermeneutic of nurture with a hermeneutic of criticism’ (p. 
176) and further that critical religious education has a commitment to enabling children 
‘achieve the appropriate levels of spiritual and religious literacy’ (p. 186). Furthermore, 
Wright’s claim that ‘(C)ritical realism questions Descartes dualistic distinction between 
the material and mental as separate substances’ (Wright 2007b, p. 341). In my view this 
distinction is insufficient to be able to explain what he wants his approach to be able to 
do with children, since the emphasis in critical realism remains on the observed rather 
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than the observer. This seems to me to retain the dualism of Plato and Descartes rather 
than weaving the alternative perspective he is looking for.  
 
There is no doubt that Wright has given his proposal, regarding critical realism’s 
resolution of the matters of plurality in relation to religious truth, extended 
consideration. He states that he does not want to allow the ‘conflict between idealism 
and nominalism to set the parameters of the debate’ (Wright 2007a, p. 153) instead 
asserting that critical realism can answer questions of whether religion reveals realist 
expressions of reality or is comprised of social constructs; furthermore he identifies the 
need to ‘penetrate beyond the experiential to identify the forces and structures that 
make reality what it is’ (Bhaskar, quoted in Wright 2007a, p. 154). Nevertheless, 
another concern is that no alternative to critical realism is examined, for example he 
does not consider James’ more challenging explorations of idealism and how the 
‘pragmatic method’ enables him to question the very assumptions made about the 
‘rationality of the hypothesis of the absolute’ (Woell 2012, p. 128). Even if the issues 
presented by religious plurality were best resolved through finding a fitting 
epistemological theory, there should be a more careful examination of alternatives to 
both absolutist and relativist assumptions about the absolute order. Such an exploration 
would have strengthened Wright’s position and possibly opened alternative avenues for 
bridging between his philosophical and theological assumptions.  
 
I move now to offer critiques of Wright’s educative proposals in relation to the critical 
religion education approach. My main point is that Wright’s focus on truth as being at 
the heart of religion and his resolution of religious plurality through recourse to a social 
philosophical theory has had an impact on the capacity of critical religious education to 
translate into educational practice. In addition to this, and even though the larger part of 
my critical analysis of Wright’s approach to religious education lies in the way he 
attempts to resolve problems related to religious plurality, I have another and perhaps 
greater concern in terms of his practical proposal for religious education in the 
classroom. Here my concern lies in the fact that there is insufficient examination of 
questions regarding the purpose of education within a plural democracy.  Although 
Wright does look at the relationship between liberalism and religion in society when it 
comes to considering education, his first move is to look back to the Judaeo, Platonic 
and Christian traditions rather than to contemporary educational theory. He draws 
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instead on theological understandings of education in order to bring critique to the post-
confessional liberal religious education which has developed in England since the 
1960’s. His argument for this is that religious education in the liberal tradition has 
turned its back on that which  classical religious education traditions in faith contexts 
value most – exploration of questions of matters of ultimate truth and measuring 
success by standards of self-realisation rather than some other external standard (see for 
example Wright 2007). Wright accepts the two objectives for religious education that 
emerged from Grimmitt’s work (see Hella and Wright 2009, p.54) and the related 
educational tasks. However, the notion of ‘educational tasks’ and the assumptions 
underlying this idea is not fully examined bringing yet further problems into the 
discussion and, for example, leading to the view that education can be equated with the 
child’s completion of particular tasks,  possibly  allowing it to fall back into the very 
trap of advancing individualism that Wright seeks to counter.  The fact that there is a 
lack of coherence between Wright’s theory about religion and the variation theory of 
learning, as I have already mentioned, establishes a critical fault line in his work in 
relation to educational purpose. Further there is no exploration of how religious 
education can handle either external or inner plurality of religion in an educative 
context, independently from a Christian one.  
 
In moving to the close of this section,  to be sure  the phenomenological movement of 
the 1960’s led in some areas to a narrow transmission of factual material about religion. 
As Grimmitt (2000a) put this there was ‘a narrow descriptive and content-centred 
approach to teaching RE’ (p.28). One response to this was an identification of a more 
affective dimension of religious education. At the same time there was a growing 
awareness that religion had the capacity to respond to the existential questions of 
human living and that this would be hugely relevant to the living of young people, this 
led to a divide between the knowledge transmission element of religious education and 
the personal or affective dimension.  Edwin Cox identified useful distinctions for 
religious education in his work (1971, 1983a and 1983b) and opened the way for 
others, including Wright not to follow the phenomenological route. The Critical Realist 
approach to religious education should therefore be understood instead to be a response 
to critiques of the confessional approaches to religious education. This approach 
recognises Cox’s concern that there was a different way of understanding religion for 
the religious believer compared the non-believer (see Cox 1983b) and further that this 
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raises questions regarding what kind of understanding should be cultivated in the 
classroom. It is from here that Wright’s religious and philosophical positioning has its 
origin.  In addition, Wright identifies another problem in England, that of a separation 
between the tradition of the university system and that of the school, appealing for an 
‘academic rejuvenation of religious education’ (Wright 2003, p 282).  Nevertheless 
although he discusses how University education is generally aligned to a higher level of 
study than schooling, which is associated more with enabling a young person to fit into 
society, Wright does not address Cox’s concern ‘ that religious education has perhaps 
more than any other subject to show that it is a worthwhile educational activity’ (Cox 
1971, p.3). The lack of development of educational theory, as opposed to the linking of 
the critical realist approach to religious education with a theory of learning, as well as 
limited practical exemplification of how this is actually going to exist in the classroom . 
This is sufficient to lead me to have serious concerns about the educative possibilities 
of his work. The recourse to the variation theory of learning highlights the limits to the 
‘educational worthwhileness’ (Cox 1971, p.3) of religious education so configured.  
 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
Wright’s approach to religious education is underpinned by a view that a religion is 
essentially a collection of propositional statements (truth claims) which refer to some 
kind of actual reality (truth). However these truth claims also impact on the way an 
adherent lives and in this way contribute to what he calls ‘truthful living’. His work 
was in part a response to the religious education of the  1970’s where there was a 
difficult tension between older confessional approaches to RE and newer 
phenomenological approaches. Wright seeks to maintain an authentic exploration of 
truth, truthfulness and truthful-living. However his approach, in looking to critical 
realism in order to resolve epistemological and ontological complexities related to the 
plurality of religious belief, in fact raises other questions.  This particular attempt at a 
philosophical resolution to the problem he sees of competing truth claims, without 
sufficient engagement with educational theory, I argue leads an incomplete exposition 
of what religious education should aim to achieve. The broad aim of his approach is 
that religious education should engage young people with religious truth claims in a 
way that can contribute to their own exploration of truthful living. Nevertheless, since 
the educational dimension of the critical realist approach to religious education is 
weakly formulated, there is a limited basis for the development of proposals regarding 
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what is actually to take place in public educational contexts. Theory, especially in 
relation to religion, remains separate from educative practice. 
 
A strength in this approach is that some political considerations have been examined. 
For example Wright makes distinctions between comprehensive and political 
liberalism. Nevertheless, in relation to religious education there remain serious 
questions about the capacity of liberalism as configured by Wright to deal with the 
question of plurality at all. The conception of freedom in relation to his approach to 
religious education has been rooted in an epistemological or ontological understanding 
rather than one in relation to education in the public sphere, and so has limitations. I 
argue that the limited exploration of the educative implications of different 
conceptualisations of liberalism within a plural democracy has weakened his proposal. 
This is because the lack of critical engagement with the practical shortcomings of his 
approach in relation to education means the educative consequences of the critical 
realist approach remain underexplored. His reliance on critical realism as an 
epistemological theory capable of resolving the problems raised by religious plurality 
brings with it a particular view of knowledge and knowing, which places that which is 
to be known at the centre of the locus of concern. Taken together this has led to an over 
emphasis on content, on the externals of religion in his proposal. Discussion of the 
relationship between the child and her teacher is absent and the accusation of neo 
confessionalism has not been answered. This is despite extensive hermeneutical 
explorations, and is as a consequence of both the under exploration of educational 
theory as well as overreliance on the philosophical theory of critical realism. I remain 
concerned regarding the extent to which his proposals for religious education can 
actually be educative.   
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Chapter 3.4:  The conceptual enquiry approach  
 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, I present a third approach to religious education that has come to be 
known as the conceptual enquiry approach, and as developed principally by Clive 
Erricker County Inspector/Adviser for religious education in Hampshire until 2009.  I 
then give an account of how this has worked out in practice before moving to a critical 
discussion of the religious, philosophical and educative aspects of this approach. I raise 
concerns with regard to whether assumptions regarding religion and education ensure 
there are some unforeseen limitations of this approach, especially as developed into the 
Hampshire Agreed Syllabus in 2004 and revised in 2009. In particular, whether the 
approach has the capacity to respond to the challenge of relativism and whether this in 
turn may raise questions about its educative possibilities. 
 
3.4.2 What is the Conceptual enquiry approach to religious education? 
Erricker’s explorations in religious education began with the earliest publications 
linked to The Chichester Project. This sought a process for teaching Christianity in the 
English secondary school, one capable of placing the teaching of Christianity firmly 
‘within the context of a world religions approach’ (Brown 2000, p. 68). It was a 
research project with wide practical and theoretical support and its’ aims evolved 
initially from a paper written in 1976 by Edward Hulmes and Ninian Smart 
  
(see 
Brown 2000, p. 53). Hulmes along with Cox and Smart had already been instrumental 
in discussing the need for a new kind of religious education in the public sphere, 
following the ‘discrediting of confessionalism’ (Barnes and Kay 2000, p.5).  As part of 
the Chichester Project, Erricker was interested to develop an approach to the teaching 
of Christianity where children and young people could realise and respond to the 
diversity within Christianity, both theologically as well as anthropologically. Observing 
that children were aware that not all Christians’ ‘faith is acted out in the world’ 
(Erricker 1987, p.30) in the same way, he wanted religious education to be able to 
acknowledge both the internal theological diversity of particular religious traditions  as 
well as the differences which are present in the way religious people live. Later, during 
his time as County Inspector/Adviser, Erricker had an opportunity to develop an agreed 
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syllabus for Hampshire as in Living Difference (2004) and later Living Difference 
revised 2011 (2011) that aimed to develop the capacity to be aware of diversity in the 
way envisaged in his earliest work. The approach to religious education,  that came to 
be known as the conceptual enquiry approach and embedded into Living Difference 
and Living Difference revised 2011, should be understood to be drawing on the entire 
body of Erricker’s work developed since the 1980’s, including the findings of the 
Children and World Views Project (Erricker, Erricker, Ota and Sullivan, 1997).  
 
The report of the Children and World Views Project published in 1997 (see Erricker, 
Erricker, Ota, Sullivan, and Fletcher, 1997) was initially prompted and continued to be 
influenced by several observations, including that religious education had become too 
content led and that it paid insufficient attention to the capabilities and experiences of 
children and young people.  Key observations made by the report raised concerns that 
fell into three broad areas and which Erricker has taken up in the conceptual enquiry 
approach. First there was concern in response to the phenomenological approach to 
religious education which was felt to pay ‘insufficient attention to the experiences of 
the learner as part of the model of enquiry’ (Erricker, C. and Erricker J. 2000a p. 188). 
Secondly concerns arising from developments in educational thinking and policy at the 
time and in particular a desire to show ‘what children are capable of by drawing on 
their own experience and seeking to make sense of it’ (Erricker 2010, p. 72). Thirdly, 
and in relation to the second, Erricker sought to advance a particular view of the 
teacher child relationship considered necessary for ‘good curriculum learning’ (Erricker 
and Erricker 2005, p.189). Erricker was at pains to learn from other subject areas, for 
example history (Erricker 2010, p. 99 quoting Stern 2006, p.8), in order to clarify the 
domain of subject knowledge as well as enabling a focus on pedagogy over specific 
knowledge.   
 
The ‘pedagogical process’ (Erricker 2010, p. 94) of the conceptual enquiry approach, as 
exemplified in the Hampshire Agreed Syllabus for religious education (2004 and 
2011), also intends to be ‘an approach to effective learning in religious education’ 
(Erricker 2010, p. 71). In outlining what he means by ‘effective learning’ Erricker 
(2010) suggests that ‘we must pay careful attention to the learning processes and its 
progression and particular techniques for learning (p.94).  The idea of concepts having 
a significant place in structuring the content of religious education was not original to 
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Erricker. Cooling (1994) had also advocated such an approach to religious education, 
where the unpacking of the meaning of the Christian concept for Christians was the 
starting point of the process. However there was a difference as to why they looked to 
the unpacking of the meaning of concepts; whereas Erricker was motivated by an 
interest to engage with children’s learning,  Cooling’s (1994) motivation was to 
‘develop a strategy which wins the confidence of both’ (p. 14) educationalists and faith 
communities. Nevertheless, a further agreement between Cooling and Erricker was that 
teaching through concepts was a good idea since ‘most subjects are comprised of 
concepts’ (p.6). Both Erricker and Cooling were taking into account a Westhill report 
which found that ‘concepts are the main focal point of any educational programme, 
concepts helps us to make sense of what we observe and encounter in particular 
religions’ (Rudge 1991, p.23). However Erricker saw himself at variance with both 
Cooling and Wright (Erricker 2010, p. 61) in their focus on epistemological questions 
regarding truth, and their intention to place theological perspectives more centrally. 
Erricker wanted to place the life of the child at the centre of concern for religious 
education and the conceptual approach he developed, through an enquiry into concepts, 
sought to articulate this intention in a practical way. 
 
The concepts which are to be the focus for student’s enquiry, were initially classified 
into three broad types: Type A concepts, used by religious and non-religious people 
alike (e.g. love, community, celebration, belonging), Type B concepts used by religious 
people across several different traditions (e.g. god, worship, prayer, karma) and Type C 
concepts distinct to particular religions (e.g. Umma, Sanga, The Body of Christ). The 
notion of a typology of concepts was modified into a looser idea of ‘groups of 
concepts’ in the 2011 revision of Living Difference. In addition to clarifying 
methodology Erricker (2010) attempts to deal with what he sees as two important 
aspects which have emerged for him from his own analysis of the history of religious 
education: narrative and hermeneutics (see p. 71). By narrative he means an approach 
that gives attention to young people’s personal narrative and by hermeneutics he is 
referring as he puts it to ‘how the connection between the learner and the subject 
material can best be established’ (p. 71). His approach to narrative leads him to what he 
sees as a radical reassessment of traditional ideas in education, including those of 
knowledge and learning. Erricker’s intention is to ‘articulate a clear response’ (p.20) to 
questions regarding the purpose of religious education where there is emphasis on the 
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‘narrative of the child’ rather than the ‘grand narratives’ (see Erricker and Erricker 
2000b). In particular a perspective that is ‘concerned with human narratives rather than 
doxic truths or the teaching of ‘world religions’ (Erricker and Erricker 2000b p. 131).  
 
In developing his account of ‘narrative’ Erricker draws from among others Lyotard 
(Erricker and Erricker, 2000a, p. 108 and 2000b, pp. 66-69) and identifies his 
theoretical position as being part of a particular post-modern understanding of 
knowledge. By specifically introducing the dilemmas and criticisms of postmodernity 
he means the ‘critics of the project of modernity itself with its over-arching grand 
narrative’ (Erricker 2010, p. 5).  From this he concludes that a constructivist position 
regarding knowledge acquisition is needed, which he says ‘is not dissimilar to 
Grimmitt’s constructivist method in approach’ (Erricker 2010 p.65, from Grimmitt, M. 
1987b). Erricker (see 2010) sees the model advanced in Living Difference as having a 
‘conceptual nature’ in its progression and by this he means that the conceptual 
investigations in the classroom provide the framework for the construction of 
knowledge and understanding. Erricker alerts us to contemporary tensions in RE which 
have arisen from the legacy of the unique relation religious education has to the 
Christian Churches since the formation of a national education system. Quoting 
Grimmitt, Erricker reminds his readers that ‘religious educators are essentially ‘secular’ 
educators concerned with the educational value of studying religion and religions’ 
(Grimmitt 1987b, p. 258 quoted in Erricker 2010, p. 63). Erricker seeks to make a 
contrast between his work and the dilemmas faced by other religious educators who are 
entangled in the problematic of the religious material itself because of their focus on 
the subject matter of religious education. Erricker on the other hand sees his purpose in 
a different way in terms of framing a clear pedagogy which can rectify inadequacies in 
other theories of religious education.  However, despite interest in knowledge 
acquisition remaining in the methodology, he proposes the view that knowledge is best 
acquired through an enquiry into concepts. It is clear that this is intended to be an 
approach that is focused on the child and can therefore be ‘wholly relevant to the 
development of young people as its foremost aim’ (Erricker 2010, p. xii).  
 
A further intended outcome of the Children and Worldviews Project (1997) was the 
development of a line of argument for ‘putting the spiritual education of the learner, 
from a ‘heretical’ point of view, at the centre of what we seek to achieve’ (Erricker 
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2000b, p. 11). The heresy to which Erricker is referring, is an opposition to the idea 
that, ‘values can only be derived from religious truth claims in particular, or from 
epistemologies in general’ (Erricker 2000b, p.58). This kind of religious education, he 
asserts ‘is pedagogically restrictive and damaging’ (Erricker 2000b, p.58).  Erricker 
(2000b) goes on to say that it is necessary to go beyond a view of religious education 
that supports a particular kind of values education or one which focuses on truth claims 
or epistemology in terms of religious knowledge at all.  Instead he suggests it is 
necessary to ‘go beyond religious education and embrace relativism to establish an 
appropriate form of spiritual education that in turn embraces, rather than instructs, 
young people and the plurality of cultural experiences and values’ (p. 58). This will 
therefore be in opposition to an approach to religious education which focuses on the 
acquisition or even exploration of a realist representation of knowledge. Erricker looks 
to a very different understanding both of knowing and knowledge, shifting the locus of 
attention from the matter to be known to the child. He therefore intends to centre the 
key concern of religious education away from ontological or epistemological matters to 
the unfolding of meaning in the life of the child.   
 
In explaining what he means by this Erricker (2000b) in chapter 4 of Restructuring 
Religious, Spiritual and Moral Education quotes Vygotsky on the unfolding movement 
of thought ‘which is what we are now invited to attend to as our educational task, we 
cannot speak of a final product, that is, point at which ‘knowledge’ is established. 
Rather we must speak of an utterance (a ‘performative action’) that makes us aware of 
the point or site of understanding – the location – in the process” (Vygotsky 1987, 
p.250, quoted in Erricker 2000b, p 71).   Erricker’s (2000b) aim in the conceptual 
enquiry approach to religious education is to move the discussion towards an interest in 
the subject who has faith (see page p. 76) arguing that such an ‘understanding suffices 
as the basis of spiritual and moral education because it is the basis of community’ (p. 
77). This view of the educational place of religious education is reaffirmed in recent 
writing (for example Chater and Erricker, 2013) since the development of ‘Living 
Difference’ in 2004.  
 
More recently and in clarifying what religious education can offer young people, 
without which the curriculum would be impoverished, Erricker (2010) makes it clear 
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that in his view ‘religious education is derived from religious studies’ (p. 95). The 
emergence of the phenomenological approach ‘from a reductionism of the writings of 
Ninian Smart’ (p. 95) enabled the idea that ‘students should empathise with religions’ 
bracketing out their own perceptions and value systems which Erricker recognises as 
originally being promoted in the phenomenological writings of Edmund Husserl. 
Nevertheless, Erricker observes that all too often the purpose of religious education has 
been positioned extrinsic to the child, leading to problems for religious educators who 
have found themselves having to  defend the supposed positive contributions of 
religion and its values. This has taken the focus of religious education away from 
critical engagement with an enquiry into key the themes or concepts intrinsic to its 
understanding. Erricker’s (2010) approach to religious education is that it should have 
‘both intrinsic and extrinsic educational aims, for example understanding of religious 
perspectives and behaviour and the development of student’s capacities and skills’ 
(pp.76-77). This is in order to give the subject direction in terms of what he calls a 
‘discipline’. Devising a methodology which will ensure the discipline has ‘relevance to 
children’s experience and narratives’ (p.95), will ensure that the discipline of religious 
education will also contribute to extrinsic (by which he means for example educational) 
aims (see p.96). It is at this point that Erricker looks to current developments in 
educational policy and practice in other curriculum areas and looks to bring religious 
education to some extent into line.   
 
A significant move, in the agreed syllabus development of Living Difference (2004) at 
this time, was to in part emulate the National Framework for religious education by 
having a clear target for attainment. However instead of the ‘learning from’ and 
‘learning about’ targets which came from Grimmitt’s work of the 1980’s and discussed 
earlier in this thesis, Erricker proposed a single attainment target. This attainment target 
was intended to weave together both intrinsic and extrinsic elements of religious 
education whilst at the same time keeping the focus on the child and not the 
knowledge. The target looks at children and young peoples’ progress in religious 
education in terms of their being able ‘to interpret religion in relation to human 
experience’ (Living Difference, 2004) and this remained the same following the 
revision of the Hampshire agreed syllabus known as Living Difference revised (2011).  
Erricker reiterates the constructivist theory underpinning the practical work placing this 
clearly in contrast to instructional models; Erricker (2010) proceeds to identify three 
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‘specific criteria’ (p. 80) which he suggests underpin constructivism. The first of these 
is ‘enquiry’ and this ‘involves students actually carrying out an enquiry supported by 
their teacher’ (p. 80). The second of these is ‘Conceptuality’ which he says ’involves 
focussing the enquiry on one key concept throughout the enquiry process’ (p. 80) and 
thirdly ‘Integrity’ which ‘involves ensuring that the key aspects of the pedagogy are 
intimately and explicitly related to each other’ (p. 80).   
 
3.4.3 Practical developments  
In designing an Agreed Syllabus for religious education, Erricker (2010) saw that the 
‘development of pedagogical purpose was imperative’ (p. 81). However in order to 
reach as many teachers as possible, it could not be based upon one philosophical or 
epistemological position. Understanding pedagogy to mean ‘the relationship between 
theory and practice’ (p.77), he considered that pedagogic principles have to be 
inclusive, to refine teachers’ understanding of the subject and not be merely 
instructional. The Hampshire agreed syllabuses of 2004 and 2011 both contain a clear 
statement of the purpose of religious education including: To support students in 
developing their own coherent pattern of values and principles. To support their 
spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. To encourage them to interpret and 
respond to a variety of concepts, beliefs and practices within religions and their own 
and others’ cultural and life experiences. To develop the capacities to interpret, 
evaluate and respond to differing values and beliefs … through extending their thinking 
and analytical skills and their creative, imaginative and emotional development. 
To foster mutual understanding between students of differing religious and cultural 
backgrounds.  
 
In addition to this the single attainment target mentioned above is supported in this 
approach by a method of enquiring into concepts. Erricker considers a methodology to 
be ‘a procedural instrument. As such it is to be identified as a pedagogic strategy 
dependent upon and consistent with pedagogic principle and procedure already 
established’ (p.82). The method must be followed systematically (p.82) and the figure 
here represents the enquiry methodological process with two possible starting points. 
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At the ‘communicate’ step students are introduced the concept and invited to make a 
response to it from their own experience. At the ‘apply’ step students apply these 
different responses to situations in their own lives, society and the wider world. These 
first two steps Erricker understands as relating to Grimmitt’s idea of Preparatory 
Pedagogical Constructivism (Grimmitt 2000, p.47 quoted in Erricker 2010 p. 83). 
Supposing the concept for the enquiry was the concept of ‘sacred’, at the ‘enquire’ step 
the teacher will introduce meanings and understandings of the concept from for 
example the Jewish tradition. This corresponds to Grimmitt’s second stage of ‘Direct 
Pedagogical Constructivism’ (Erricker 2010 p. 83). Erricker discusses how the 
movement between the ‘apply’ and ‘enquire’ steps enable students to be confronted 
with the item of religious content directly. The next two steps of ‘contextualise’ and 
‘evaluate’ correspond to Grimmitt’s third constructivist stage which he calls 
‘Supplementary Pedagogical Constructivism’ (Grimmitt 2000a, p.47-48 quoted in 
Erricker 2010, p. 85). Here the Jewish understanding of the concept of sacred is 
‘contextualised’ within a specific example or case study, perhaps the Torah. This will 
be the kind of exploration that would reveal issues and implications ‘with regard to 
what makes the Torah Sacred and in what ways its sacredness might seem to be 
diminished or adaptable’ (Erricker 2010, p. 85). The evaluate step is itself in two part 
where students are enabled to make a critical evaluation of the concept both from 
within the context as for example by responding to a question such as ‘Why is the 
concept of sacred important for Jews?’ as well as outside the context by responding to 
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the question ‘To what extent is the concept of sacred important today?’.  Erricker sees 
all steps of this enquiry model as constructivist, including the step at which the 
religious information is introduced. The enquiry in the Living Difference methodology 
as Erricker (2010) explains it, is ‘firmly rooted in its developmental function for 
students. This remains the case whether the concept in focus is of type A … B … or C 
…’ (p 86). 
 
3.4.4 Critical Discussion    
In this section I look at three particular areas of concern raised by Erricker’s work. The 
first is in relation to his approach to religion, which invites a religious as well as 
philosophical critique, and the second closely aligned to this is his approach to how 
religion is to be brought into educative contexts. The third area is his approach to 
classroom practice or pedagogy, which Erricker has indicated he would like to treat 
separately from his way of conceptualising religion. In order to understand how 
Erricker is conceptualising religion in the conceptual enquiry approach to religious 
education it is necessary to look outside both manifestations of it in the agreed 
syllabuses Living Difference or Living Difference revised 2011. In a paper ‘Children’s 
spirituality and postmodern faith’ Erricker (2007) seeks to make a distinction between 
religion ‘understood as doctrinal formula, with its concern for knowledge, political 
ends and power, and faith as a possibility within an environment of uncertainty’ (p.51 ).  
He further points out ( see p. 52) that the terms religion and faith are usually thought as 
relational in some way, but he wants to ‘create a rupture’ (p. 52) between the two 
concepts. This is because he proposes the two concepts are quite different, with religion 
linked far more with ideas of knowledge and reality, concepts which he understands as 
being far away from that of faith. Faith by comparison, and drawing on insights of 
Derrida and Kierkegaard should be located in the ‘every day’ (p. 58) and more closely 
linked with spirituality. In an earlier paper Erricker (2001a) outlines religions as 
‘institutionalized structures that conserve and maintain tradition, act as political bodies 
that necessarily are concerned with matters beyond the faith of individuals relating to 
the way in which they make sense of the meaning and purpose of their lives for 
themselves’ (p. 34) again wanting to see faith and spirituality as not necessarily having 
any link with this. This way of approaching religion and distinguishing between faith 
spirituality and religion he regards as being ‘postmodern’; arguing for a postmodern 
spiritual education where the ‘educator used narration (the exchange of experiences) as 
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a vehicle towards faith, based upon the development of young people’s convictions’ 
(Erricker 2007, p. 59).  
Wright (2001a), in giving a critique of Erricker’s conception of a ‘postmodern spiritual 
pedagogy’ (p.120), argues ‘that it is incoherent on its own terms and, as a result, both 
internally unstable and vulnerable to external attack’ (p. 120). This is for example 
because although Erricker recognises there are problems with knowledge, however 
instead of looking to theoretical resolutions of this  reaches to a ‘postmodern fire’ (p. 
120), which Wright suggests means he misses opportunities for developing his theory 
more coherently.  What is likely to follow therefore from Erricker’s analysis of 
religion, is an element of risk in the way religion is to be represented in the classroom. 
This is perhaps further complicated since Erricker’s position (see for example Erricker 
2010, p.9) is that the means of studying religion in educational contexts including in 
religious education should be derived from and directly linked to religious studies. The 
risk I take from this comes from his suggesting that religion, which he has linked with 
knowledge and reality, is the kind of thing that has to be studied in a particular kind of 
way. The risk is that once again religion is positioned as content driven and the content 
becoming once more objectified. Erricker does look to Kierkegaard for an explanation 
of faith in relation to religion and knowledge, but does not follow this through in any 
detail into his model of religious education. Theology or theological enquiry is 
understood as only one possible way to study religion, rather being able to reveal 
anything of particular value. It appears then that not only are there underexposed 
assumptions regarding religion in Erricker’s view of religion in religious education, but 
also possibly in addition to this as Cooling (2002) asserts Erricker’s ‘discussion of the 
status of human narratives reveals a marked ambivalence … to institutional religion 
and its attendant orthodoxies’ (p. 108). 
Other methods Erricker (2010) suggests could be available to religious education would 
include anthropology, sociology, history; philosophy and psychology (see p. 44). 
Erricker’s intention in settling on such a broad approach to the study of religion is that 
it will enable a framing of the edges of the discipline of religious education. However 
since Erricker  does not give acknowledgement to the different theoretical positions of 
these disciplines, and that the theoretical perspectives they have could in fact be in 
conflict,  in my view serves only to add to the complexity and lack of clarity of what is 
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meant by religion in religious education in the conceptual enquiry approach as 
originally configured. The motivation for trying to agree the boundary of the discipline 
Erricker says is in order to be able to fit in with other subject areas in the ‘common’ 
school (p. 17). However what seems likely to occur with this approach to religious 
education is that the boundary between religious education and other areas of study will 
be further confused. This is because in seeking the boundary through engaging with 
differing means of studying religion, since they themselves may have different 
theoretical positioning , for example in relation to the boundaries between religion and 
culture in fact leaves religious education open to confusion with other activities in 
schools such as history, psychology, sociology or personal and health education.  
Erricker (2010) was however concerned by what he considers as the scientifically 
‘orientated secularism of mass western education’ (p.16) citing the findings of the 
Runnymede Trust Report (for example see Berkley and Vij, 2008). This report which 
examined religious education in faith schools, recommends key ways in which faith 
schools can contribute positively to the English education system. Erricker notes that to 
implement these findings would require a radical reorientation of the ‘vision of faith 
schools’ (Erricker 2010, p. 19) because they too often display an ‘insular and absolutist 
approach to faith’ (Erricker 2010, p. 19). Linking all this to his previous research into 
spiritual development he notes ‘spirituality is not commonly a part of the educational 
lexicon of teachers in state schools’ (Erricker 2010, p.20).  His view is that neither 
religious education in faith schools nor in the non-denominational state school has an 
adequate sense of ‘its contribution to the primacy of overall educational goals based on 
the development of young people’. In addition to this Erricker’s (2010) view is that 
religious education can make a difference   ‘in relation to what a ‘religiously literate’ 
student will be able to achieve – (to) how that quality would make a difference to them 
as a person’ (p.67).  However, Erricker is also clear that to do this meaningfully would 
require ‘a new vision for state education … and a clear understanding of the role of 
religious education within that’ (p. 20). So although Erricker’s intention is to identify 
that new vision for religious education in education within in the public sphere, or the 
‘common school’ as he determines is needed, it is not clear to me how his argument 
regarding religion or education reveal precisely how his approach will achieve what he 
hopes.  
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In making my second broad critique, that is in relation to philosophical issues of 
Erricker’s approach to religious education, I begin by pointing out that a consequence 
of him insisting religion is concerned with knowledge and reality necessitates him 
having an ontological as well as epistemological position in relation to religion. That 
Erricker’s (2000a) position is relative he makes clear when he says that ‘(t)he first 
principle that underpins a narrative pedagogy’ (p.194), ‘is that all ‘knowledge’ is 
relative’ (194).  Looking to Lyotard, Erricker (see 2000b) emphasises that value 
judgements are made on the basis of custom, and are in this sense a construction. At 
this point Erricker links closely with the work that Grimmitt (1987, p. 109ff) had 
already undertaken in relation to constructivist thinking in religious education. From 
this point, Erricker moves to assert that the primary educational aim of religious 
education is to ‘attend to the construction of self in community’ (Erricker and Erricker 
2000b, p. 131).  
In proceeding to develop his relativist position on the relationship between religion and 
education, Erricker (2000b) suggests that the educational purpose of religious education 
is not only the child’s construction of knowledge, but also of themselves in relation to 
their own community.  Knowledge constructed in the classroom will be on the 
understanding that it is ‘fluid, contingent and constructed by the narration of stories’ (p. 
109). Erricker sees religious education understood in this way  as an ethical project in 
terms of the formation of the self, but he insists that this is a self that is also ‘fluid and 
contingent’ (p.113). Theologically, philosophically and now educationally the key 
questions I have for Erricker are in relation to constructivism, that is to say how this is 
understood in particular in relation to religion in religious education as well as in 
relation to the educative purpose of religious education in relation to the child.  This is 
because although the construction of the individual is with the purpose of developing 
community, because it is taking place in school it is therefore happening separately in 
some kind of communal isolation.  One problem is that Erricker does not give a clear 
account of the relationship he envisages between the individuals who are together 
constructing their identities. Furthermore there is no political discussion in his work 
about the role of education in the public sphere, instead Erricker moves at this point to 
explaining developmental models of self; such as those of Piaget and Kohlberg (see 
Erricker and Erricker 2000b). My point is that since these are in the main psychological 
perspectives on the concept of the self or the child in relation to the other, there is an 
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absence of an argument in relation to education. That is to say there is an absence 
regarding what it is that education in general should do or aim to achieve in the public 
sphere, therefore there is no particular positioning or explanation of what it is that 
religious education in particular should aim to achieve in regard to the public sphere.  
 
My final critique is to consider whether in the context of the classroom, Erricker’s 
proposal for conceptual enquiry can therefore bring about what he hopes. Erricker has 
settled upon concepts to be studied in religious education. This has resonance with the 
work of Trevor Cooling and his ideas about ‘concept cracking’; however Erricker does 
not mention Cooling in his later expositions of Conceptual Enquiry (2010). Possibly 
this is because of the theological gulf between Erricker’s post-modern constructivist 
approach to religion in religious education and the theological work of Cooling. 
Constructivism undoubtedly presents some problems to religion and religious education 
as conceptualised by Erricker, highlighted in this approach by Erricker’s insistence on a 
post-modern deconstructive perspective on religion. In my view his position on religion 
is fragile in the large part because of his relativist position. Furthermore, the point I 
want to highlight in relation to my longer argument is that therefore the conceptual 
enquiry approach to religious education, as presently configured, is unlikely to be able 
to give a strong enough account of the significance of plurality.  Erricker’s position on 
religion has both philosophical and theological problems and in turn these lead also to 
difficulties in relation to education as well. Thus his approach to religion, far from 
resolving some of the problems of representation which Jackson identified, ensures the 
relationship between educational subject (the child) and the new material being 
presented to the child is not clear. This is in a large part because the approach places 
such a great significance on the role of narrative, both problems from assumptions 
regarding the existence of grand narratives of religion as well as the lack of detail 
around how any of these relate to the narrative of the child. 
 
Despite having to face critique in these three areas, the conceptual enquiry approach 
has several strengths. The first being that it is the only approach to religious education 
considered here that has systematically attempted to resolve the relationships between a 
conception of religion and religion in the educative context. This is because in the 
development of the approach educative considerations have been taken into account, 
especially in relation to the methodology for teaching. The conceptual enquiry 
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approach to religious education enabled Erricker to move the locus of religious 
education to the educational subject, the child, although the way in which this is argued 
reveals the need for further work to be undertaken regarding the relationship between 
the educational subject and religion. Therefore, in particular there seem to be some 
remaining problems within this approach in relation to both religion and education and 
importantly to how these positions relate together theoretically. Erricker has opened up 
a different set of epistemological problems from either Jackson or Wright enabling new 
light to be shed on existing difficulties faced by religious education.  Nevertheless, I 
have aimed to show here that insufficient consideration of the ways in which different 
theoretical positions and narratives relate to each other, has made sure that 
considerations about why working these things out precisely might matter in the public 
sphere have been missed.   
 
3.4.5 Conclusion  
The conceptual enquiry approach to religious education emerged in reaction to the 
phenomenological approach influential since the 1970’s. Erricker’s foremost concern 
regarding the phenomenological approach however was not in relation to the 
representation of religion itself but to the way in which it seemed to pay ‘insufficient 
attention to the experiences of the learner as part of the model of enquiry’ (Erricker  
and Erricker 2000a,  p. 188). Erricker’s thinking as this developed into the Hampshire 
agreed syllabus, Living Difference (2004), therefore sought to advance a particular 
view of the teacher-child relationship considered necessary for good curriculum 
learning. The significance of identifying pedagogy and not just the knowledge to be 
transmitted had been recognised during the decade leading up to 2004 and was seen in 
the redevelopment of the English National Curriculum, and later paralleled in the non-
statutory framework for Religious Education.  Erricker sought, in the conceptual 
enquiry approach, to devise a methodology for religious education which is congruent 
with contemporary practice in schools, and where the epistemological and 
philosophical principles underpinning his analysis of religion were somehow distinct 
from the pedagogical processes and procedures. Erricker (2010)  concludes that his 
approach is constructivist in a broad way; the big aim being to develop a process that is 
not only theoretically grounded but also in line with national thinking on pedagogy in 
relation to contemporary policy and practice, as well as being easily accessible for 
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teachers ( see p. 79). It should be able respond affirmatively to the question regarding 
whether the pedagogy can ‘translate from theory effectively into a learning process 
which is accessible to teachers and offer a clear definition of progression which can 
ensure effective planning, teaching and learning and assessment’  (p. 80). 
 
The strength of Erricker’s approach is its awareness of the need to have an educative 
focus. Erricker gives much more attention to educative matters in his work than can be 
seen in the work of either Jackson or Wright. However emphasis on a constructivist 
approach to learning still ensures some questions remain regarding the theory of 
religion underpinning the conceptual enquiry approach. This is because a constructivist 
view of education that suggests it is possible to build different meanings is likely to 
lead to a relativistic view of religion in the public space. In addition to this, Erricker’s 
intention was to keep these two significant elements of religious education apart, but in 
seeking to identify and separate the ‘subject matter’ of religious education from the 
process, it is possible that the process becomes far more instrumental than was 
intended. In addition there is a problem in the way the individual narratives of the 
children are given pre-eminence; I have noted that insufficient attention is given to the 
possibilities of the dialogue and the consequent inter-subjectivity realisations through 
narrative relationships.  In addition to this the role of the teacher is underdeveloped. 
However the most critical questions for the conceptual enquiry approach to religious 
education, as developed by Erricker, arise principally from both the heavy reliance on 
constructivist model of learning as a basis of a model of education as well as reliance 
on post modernism as a theory underpinning the view of religion. Taken together the 
result is that this approach will need to respond to the challenge of relativism. And this, 
I will argue, can never be resolved so long as the educational and religious 
underpinnings remain the same. This is because the consequence is that they do not 
offer a good enough basis to take religious pluralism seriously.  So although the 
conceptual enquiry approach to religious education gives a valuable framework for 
religious education, I assert it still needs further development of theory in relation to 
what it means to be religious and to actually live a religious life. This is because as it 
stands religion is treated in an objective manner.  This objectification of religion 
therefore serves to constrain the ways in which this approach can be said to be 
educative despite the best of intentions of its author.  
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3.5   Overall conclusion to chapter 3   
This chapter has made an opportunity for me to interrogate further, assumptions which 
have persisted in religious education in relation to both religion and education. I have 
undertaken this through a detailed investigation of three current and influential 
approaches to religious education each of which attempt to address problems raised by 
confessional and phenomenological approaches to religious education. The three 
proposals analysed in this chapter have each highlighted in different ways for example 
the consequences of religion in religious education being only partially conceptualised. 
My interrogation of the three approaches to religious education has revealed that each 
acknowledge the importance of considering carefully how religion is to be represented 
in the classroom. Nonetheless, since each conceptualise religion in different ways, there 
continues to be no agreement precisely about what is to be done in terms of that 
representation.  Therefore one conclusion I draw from this chapter is the need to gain 
further clarity on ways in which religion can be conceptualised and conclude that doing 
so will be important for the future development of religious education. 
The second concern emerging from my investigation through this chapter is a lack of 
agreement regarding what it is that religious education is understood to be able to do or 
should aim to achieve educatively. In chapter 2 it became clear that a consequence of 
placing knowledge at the centre of religious education resulted in a lack of focus on the 
educational subject. I have found that one consequence of the focus on knowledge has 
been that discussions in religious education have been located predominantly in 
epistemological or ontological discussions about religion and religious differences in 
terms of truth.  Such discussions in religious education in general are then orientated 
around dealing with differences which are perceived as a difficulty or problem to be 
overcome by some means or other.  This can be seen for example in Jackson’s 
insistence on ‘epistemological openness’ (Jackson 2012a, p. 3) and Wright’s resort to 
critical realist theory. Wright’s approach to religious education has been firmly located 
in ontological and epistemological concerns and his educational proposals equated to a 
theory of learning. Erricker on the other hand seeks a resolution by focusing on 
difference, holding a relativist view of knowledge and positioning his work both 
epistemologically and educationally linked to a constructivist approach to learning.   
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There can be little doubt that a distinguishing element of and strength in Erricker’s 
position, is that he places the child at the centre of his educative proposal. However 
there is still a weakness here. This is because the way he engages with educational 
theory, does not enable him to sufficiently conceptualise the educational subject or 
precisely engage with what it is that the teacher should do in relation to the child; 
leading instead to a discussion regarding learning. Overall then the big point I want to 
make from my investigation through the whole of chapter 3 is that mistakes made in the 
conceptualisation of religion have ensured discussions about education have in the 
main been limited to disagreements about learning about knowledge. The argument I 
am building here is that questions regarding clarity in relation to both religion and 
education must be addressed. Doing just this is what forms the next two chapters of my 
thesis.  Although Jackson, Wright and Erricker may have sought to respond to one or 
other concerns to some extent, I have uncovered that each proposal is in some way 
incomplete because in each case there is not a thorough consideration of both and 
especially not in relation to each other. I conclude from this chapter that assumptions in 
respect of both religion and education remain and have led to lack of clarity on these 
matters in the different approaches to religious education. Furthermore I want to 
suggest that this has contributed to confusion regarding what can be said about what it 
is religious education should aim to achieve in the public sphere. In addition to this, and 
linking with chapter 2, I have observed that the assumptions which I have identified 
through my detailed study in the work of Jackson, Wright and Erricker are also 
continuing to inform current policy reports such as that of Clarke & Woodhead (2015), 
Dinham & Shaw (2015) and the Report of the Commission on Religion and Belief in 
British Public Life (2015).  
Over the next two chapters I begin to lay out my argument for a new conceptualisation 
of religious education, taking up first in chapter 4 the need for clear discussion about 
religion and in chapter 5 the need for a clear discussion of education. I proceed now in 
chapter 4 through considering not yet another definition of religion, but through 
presenting three structurally different answers to the question as to what it means to be 
religious.  In chapter 5 I intend to bring some clarity to what it is that education should 
do, and, in chapter 6 I bring findings from chapter 4 and 5 together in order to first 
briefly re-examine Jackson, Wright and Erricker, before presenting a new proposal for 
what it is that religious education should aim to achieve in the public sphere. 
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Chapter 4:  What does it mean to be religious? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I take up the need for a clear discussion about religion. In discussing 
three different conceptions of religion I present three structurally different answers to 
the question as to what it means to be religious. The first conception sees being 
religious as a matter of having beliefs and asserting that these beliefs are true. The 
second conception sees being religious as a matter of practice, that is, as conducting 
one’s life according to certain rules or traditions. Here being religious is not a matter  of 
having certain beliefs, but as conducting one’s life in a certain way – and in its ‘pure’ 
form this happens without ascribing to any beliefs. The third conception sees being 
religious in terms of existence, that is, as a particular way of leading one’s life. What 
distinguishes this conception from the second conception is that this is precisely not 
seen in terms of following a certain tradition or rule, but as a way of existing and 
leading one’s life that is beyond and without rules. What distinguishes it from the first 
conception is that there are also no beliefs involved, at least not if beliefs are seen as 
propositions (part of the difference hinges on different translations of the Greek word 
‘pistes’ which in the first conception may be translated as [propositional] belief but in 
the third is translated as ‘trust’).  
 
I will show below that each conception can exist in a ‘pure’ form, though in most cases 
those who consider themselves religious may have elements of each of the three 
conceptions in some combination and relation together. The three conceptions are also 
related to theological arguments. Partly theological argument is about which conception 
would properly count as an answer to the question as to what it means to be religious. 
But also, under each conception we can find different theological positions that seek to 
articulate different positions within each conception. I will provide examples of all of 
this in the sub-sections that are to follow. The point I want to reveal in this chapter, is 
that the way religion has been conceptualised in religious education in general has been 
objective. My question is whether this may have resulted in something having been 
missed which may be important and if so I will look to bring to my new proposal. 
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4.2 Religion as belief 
Where religion is conceptualised as belief, what it means to be religious in the ‘pure’ 
form is understood as a matter of being in possession of a set of beliefs, a set of 
propositions which refer to something objective and external to the person themselves. 
A belief in this case understood as aiming at truth or at least as something having direct 
connection with an external and real state of affairs. To be religious is to believe, in the 
sense of having such propositional beliefs. Christianity offers several examples of this 
understanding of what it means to be religious.  The New Testament is not only full of 
injunctions ‘to believe’ but also frequently links holding beliefs with an understanding 
that this is a meritorious thing to do (Cottingham 2002, p.343). In addition to this, the 
traditional framework of scholastic teaching within Christianity has provided patterns 
of legitimating belief (Williams 2005, p.11) and such authoritative positioning of belief 
can be found in the early creedal statements of the Church from the second century 
after Christ onwards. Kelly (Kelly 2006, p. 42) asserts that there is no doubt that belief 
was considered an indispensable precondition of baptism. This is significant, for 
baptism is the rite constituting admission to The Church. Therefore to require assurance 
of this belief in the form of a profession of belief, where belief is viewed 
propositionally, raises the status of adherence to the propositions. My point here is to 
illustrate the significance of the relationship between a way of being religious and the 
profession of belief. Further, I want to acknowledge there are questions regarding the 
origin and importance of a particular interpretation, and hence authority, regarding 
maintaining consistency of the set of beliefs which constitute a particular religious 
tradition. 
 
It is not too difficult to see how clarifying the set of beliefs that count as forming a 
particular religious tradition, may become important as time distances believers from 
foundational moments of that religion. Lennan 
 
(1998) considers the situation of the 
early Christians who, following the crucifixion must have made different kinds of 
attempts to both express and explain the inexpressible. He suggests that they moved to 
do so through the use of symbols and that symbols initially enabled believers to 
continue to transcend propositions.  However, since each particular religious tradition 
has a concern both to pass on the ‘true’ meaning of the symbols to the next generation 
as well as wanting to value the collective experience of the community over time, 
propositions also come to be important as it were to support the correct or 
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‘authoritative’ interpretation of the symbols for the next generation. In addition to this 
sometimes passing on the one true interpretation of the symbols can gain preeminent 
importance. Here questions of authority, in terms of decision making and the possibility 
or otherwise for interpretation in relation to that authority, will be of great importance 
and be open to possible contention. In the Roman Catholic Church authority has been 
increasingly drawn over the centuries to the role of the Bishop of Rome, the Pope, and 
the place of individual interpretation of the symbols has been limited. Furthermore 
interpretation at various challenging points in history, for example during the 
reformation and in the 19
th
 century with the emergence of questions around evolution 
for example, even outlawed. In the Protestant Churches authority tends to lie with the 
scriptures and The Bible may be taken literally word by word as a collection of 
propositions itself.  Lennan shows that he has some concern and a preference for the 
earlier symbolic communication of ideas since ‘the power of the symbol was that it 
would connect the events of the past, which had formed the faith of their ancestors and 
the promise of the future, with the life of the people present’ (Lennan 1998, p. 72). 
Further he suggests that ‘faith expressed symbolically, communicated truth – but a truth 
that was as much about the way of life as it was about a formula of words’ (Lennan 
1998, p. 72). It is this emergence of a conceptualisation of truth as external to, but 
having direct correspondence with, the formula of words, with the propositions as 
being the actual single explanation rather than one of many possible interpretations of 
the symbols, that enables me to formulate and present more clearly the conception of 
religion as belief and consider what is understood to be religious in these terms. 
 
What is at stake here theologically, where religion is conceived as sets of beliefs or as 
propositions, is a disagreement regarding the concept of belief itself. Theology when 
religion is conceived as belief makes certain assumptions about the centrality of these 
beliefs; it will take time to reflect upon, discuss and in other ways make an exploration 
of the formulae, the forms of words comprising the propositions. The related symbols 
also become an object of study and the discussion has a significant locus around their 
respective ‘truth’. Lennan suggests that The Church ‘has expressed its faith by means 
of formulation, the most solemn of which were defined in a concilar act’ and that the 
‘clearest example is the Nicene Creed, often referred to as “The Symbol of Faith”’ 
(Lennan 1998, p. 73). Here the formula, the beliefs articulated as a series of 
propositions, become a means of defining what religion is. In so doing what it means to 
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live a religious life becomes equivalent to adhering to a set of propositions, such 
adherence is the way by which what it means to be religious is defined. Belief is ‘in’ 
the externalised propositions and faith too is understood in this conception of religion 
in an abstract way, as for example in the idea of ‘The Faith’.  The concept of faith is 
forced into a relationship with an absolute conception of truth and as such open only to 
contention substantively. Although what it means to be religious, when conceived as 
belief, shifts significantly into being entirely equivalent to an acceptance of a set of 
propositions theologically, the emergence of this shift is not entirely simple as the 
concept of belief becomes problematised in relation to both truth and authority. Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith observes in ‘The Meaning and End of Religion’ (Smith, 1963) and later 
in ‘Faith and Belief: The Difference Between Them’ (Smith, 1998) that the role of 
belief changed in light of other shifts of conceptualisation of various key ideas between 
the pre and post-modern worlds. Further, from the seventeenth century Smith (1963) 
suggests that new ways of looking at the world emerged and in particular ‘new 
generations took over (the concept of truth) to designate … the intellectual construct’ 
(p.38). Even the concept of religion itself shifted to becoming an ‘abstract idea’ (p.38) 
and since there was more than one system, the idea of ‘religions’ which can be set one 
against the other also emerged and also that they ‘can be regarded as true or false in an 
intellectualist sense’ (p. 39). In addition to this,  Smith suggests ‘we may observe the 
change in application … from the dynamic of the heart to impersonal system; from 
singular to plural; and from a Platonic to a propositional conception of truth’ (p. 39). 
 
The point I want to impress here is that the additional complexity and significance of 
differing ways in which ‘belief’ has come to be understood, for example in relation to 
truth, is important. This is because it ensures a range of hidden assumptions are made 
about what it means to be religious, that is to exist religiously in the world. I refer to 
two observations about the way belief is used to exemplify my point here. The first is in 
Smith’s observation of a shift in the linguistic use of the word ‘belief’ in the modern 
period. This linguistic shift is from a prevailing use of the first person of the verb as in 
‘I believe’ towards a more impersonal and objective use of ‘they believe’. Good (2010) 
notes how this has also impacted on contemporary conventions in academic writing in 
English where to be objective is preferred and the views of the writer tend to be 
expressed in the third person as for example in ‘it is believed that’. Good asserts that 
this objectification or ‘change in the subject subtly shifts the nature of the speech act 
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involved – from the existential to the descriptive – and alters the authorisation of the 
speaker’ (p. 70).  The second, following from this, is in relation to the descriptive and 
analytical nature of propositions and especially as they are conceived as being in 
relation to aligned concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘authority’. This can be seen especially in 
religious traditions such as Christianity where religion conceived as belief seems to 
have had a tendency to fragment, and sometimes for quite subtle distinctions to have 
emerged between sub-sets of beliefs. This has come to be known as ‘denominational 
difference’. Here discussions between subtle and precise meanings of words have led to 
divisions between groups of Christians.  Kelly (2006) has observed that this was in part 
what the early formulations of creeds was designed to mitigate against (p. 211).  
Differences between the sets of beliefs may become the focus of attention and this can 
be additionally problematic if disagreements regarding what are true and also what is to 
be known gain in importance, leading to further disagreements regarding authority. 
Both observations I note here if not exposed clearly can lie underneath understandings 
of the word belief, and when applied to religion have the consequence of changing how 
what it means to be religious is understood.   
 
In bringing this observation of a shift in emphasis in the use of belief into my 
discussion, I intend to shed further light onto what may become theologically 
significant when religion is conceived as propositional belief. I have noted that the 
centrality of concern moves away from the one who is religious to the propositions 
themselves, the beliefs. I suggest that this is significant because as the focus moves 
away from the subject who is religious, there is an increased objectification of the 
beliefs and following from this objectification of what it means to be religious. It is 
consequently possible for theology itself to become objective, to become an unsituated 
exploration of what it means to exist religiously. Theology, where religion is conceived 
as belief, can become more interested in the exploration of questions regarding the 
relationship for example between belief and ‘true’ knowledge. These abstract 
discussions are likely to become matters considered by the religious authorities as of 
absolute concern. Truth, as an absolute kind of external reality, becomes the reference 
point also for justifying of what it means to be religious. What it means to be religious 
where religion is conceived of as belief seems then to necessitate an engagement with 
the relationship between knowledge, belief and justification. Gettier’s (1963) challenge 
to previous assumptions about what counts as knowledge and its relationship to true 
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belief, raises new questions for theology in this context, especially in relation to the 
links between justification, knowledge and belief. However, if knowledge retreats into 
becoming the kind of thing that requires both certitude and correctness, belief is nudged 
to become the kind of thing that which possibly ‘implies uncertainty, error or both’ 
(Good 2010, p. 70).  
 
Belief therefore, in contemporary ways of thinking has come to have at least two very 
different possibilities of meaning. This ambiguity of meaning when located at the 
central point of a conception of what it means to be religious, risks forcing a divide 
between religious and non-religious contexts. However this range of possibility for the 
concept of belief is not new, it is already present in Greek philosophical thinking as 
seen in that made between doxa and episteme in Plato’s analogy of The Cave. As Smith 
highlights (in Good, 2010), belief seems to imply in contemporary understandings of 
the word, not just part of a journey towards ‘true’ knowledge as in the analogy of The 
Cave but also to refer to something antithetical to, almost the opposite of, knowledge. 
Religion therefore conceived as propositional belief and relating to external ‘truths’, 
means that religious knowledge  understood as having a special kind of authority, risks 
contributing to a kind of separation between religion the rest of intellectual life. 
Theological questions raised by this conception of religion can be identified within 
Christianity from the earliest times. For example disagreement between scholars about 
interpretation of the Greek term ‘pistes’, in particular how the term when read in 
several places in Paul’s letters is highly significant here ( see  for example Botha 1987, 
p. 228) and I will return to when considering the third conception of religion. 
 
Religion conceived as belief, therefore has potential to force a distinction between 
different statuses of knowledge and locate the discussion about religion into a 
conversation about truth and truth claims. Theology, where religion is conceived as 
belief, becomes a reflection not only on a propositional understanding of belief, but 
also of religion and religious truth itself. Importantly, it is also likely to discuss 
questions which contest conceptions of religion compromising the possibility of 
‘truthful’ interpretations of such religious truths. Religion when conceived as belief 
becomes something to be held or grasped and further where propositions are usually 
conceived as being in a direct and correspondent relation with an external and true 
reality. Living a religious life may be conceived as the same as living a ‘truthful life’,  
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interpreted to mean one where the individual is living adhering to and also probably 
living out in some way the beliefs in their lives. The propositions become the beliefs, 
objectified and essentialised; and have authority in the lives of believers because they 
are ‘true’. ‘The Faith’ is understood conceptually as describing the collection of 
propositional beliefs to be believed ‘in’. Arguments manifesting in logical and 
reasonable ways are cited as evidence for belief, theology where religion is understood 
as belief will be interested discussing these arguments. Belief and knowledge are 
therefore sometimes used interchangeably in this religious context, counter to the 
oppositional usages of the concepts in contemporary use outside religion as Smith 
observed. This is because where religion is conceived as belief, believing something to 
be true is usually taken to mean the same as or at least a nuanced version of knowing it. 
Certainty, where religion is conceived as belief, will be applied equally to knowledge 
from wherever it comes from. A theological discussion where religion conceived as 
belief, in summary will consider theological questions problematising concepts which 
are of interest to and linked with propositional belief. There will be a particular 
emphasis on knowledge, on truth and truth claims and further, knowledge and truth 
themselves are conflated.  
 
4.3 Religion as practice 
The second way of conceiving religion I consider is in terms of practice.  In its ‘pure’ 
form religion when conceived as practice is as a set of actions embedded into the way 
in which someone conducts their life. To be religious in this way of conceiving religion 
is simply to conduct one’s life in a particular way, according to a particular rule which 
becomes authoritative in the religious person’s life. There may be an external authority 
for this way of life, but its authoritativeness lies in the evidence of the lived practice 
rather than in a set of beliefs. Through illustrating this way of conceiving religion from 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism, and giving a response to questions regarding what it 
means to live a religious life, my point will be that is it possible to understand what it 
means to be religious in its ‘pure’ form entirely in terms of practice. In addition to this, 
I want to develop an argument to show that practice can also serve as a means of 
marking the edge between religious and non religious life. Tong and Turner (2008) 
discuss this in the context of Islam ( see from p.41) and in particular in a discussion on 
veiling show how this practice (of veiling) is a means by which ‘a woman’s pious 
(religious) life style also enables her to be distinguished from the non-Muslims within 
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the wider society’ (Tong and Turner 2008,  p. 49). In this way, adoption of certain 
practices becomes a vehicle for being seen by others as manifesting ways of being 
religious and of living religiously in the world. Furthermore, there is also a strong 
connection between living religiously in terms of adopting certain practices and being 
religious in terms of becoming a better person.  Therefore in this way of conceiving 
religion, what it means to be religious can also be about the choices one makes and can 
be about how one lives in every day life in order to become a better person. The 
practices serve to guide the individual and perhaps also the community into an 
understanding of piety, of what it means to be religious and live a religious life in 
practice.   
 
That following a discipline of practice may also necessitate guidance is discussed by 
Mahony (1987 p. 19 cited in Rose 2001, p.196). When exploring  Mahony’s 
observations further, Rose notes ‘three different kinds of disciplined practice, 
heteronymous discipline, governed by external authority; autonomous discipline, where 
authority exists at the very depths of one’s personal being; and interactive discipline, 
marked by a combination of both external and internal sources of authority’ (Rose 
2001, pp. 20–22). The way of life for a Cistercian monk exemplifies this well. 
Everything about the monks’ way of life in the 12th century was determined precisely 
by ‘behaviour, liturgy, rituals, feasts, and work’ (Coomans 2013, p.161), and the 
buildings themselves constructed in such a way as to facilitate this practice. Disciplined 
practice was determined in each element of the abbey ‘the church, cloister, chapter 
house, dormitory and other common rooms’ such as ‘ the gate house, refectory, kitchen, 
infirmary, guest house, storeroom, sacristy and the novice’s house’ (Coomans 2013, 
p.161). There is evidence of recognition here of how conceiving what it means to live a 
religious life can be determined by practice. Further, that this practice has ‘apostolic 
authority’, ‘because each one of you, having chosen to practice the religious life and 
because the health of souls is assured by such regular practice, but because … what 
ever you establish by it among you who have adopted that religious practice, we 
confirm by apostolic authority’ (Berman 2000,  p. 92). The Cistercian way of living the 
religious life shows how a discipline may be both internally or externally organised; it 
may have varying sources of authority but in each case to understand the practice its 
purpose is significant. Since living a religious life can, in the conceptualisation of 
religion as tradition, be conceived as following a form of practice in a more or less 
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disciplined way, in this conceptualisation of what it means to be religious a variety of 
practice can count as religious practice. In the case of a contemporary Muslim woman 
beginning to wear the veil, it can be a conscious decision about identifying as a 
Muslim. However it may be simply about following one’s mother or sister in the 
wearing of the veil, in much the same way that a child will pick up other ways of living 
in the family. Either way it is the practice that comes first. 
 
In developing my articulation of religion as practice it is interesting to consider how in 
Judaism, traditional interpretations of The Law (Halakha) do not attempt to conceive of 
a separation between areas of religious or non-religious life. Religion is in general 
conceived as the practice of particular actions, and this is enough to reveal what it 
means to be a Jew; what it means to live a religious life as a Jew is understood solely in 
terms of the practices adopted in one’s life. To be religious it is not necessary to believe 
anything in terms of propositions, neither is it necessary to access a particular kind of 
awareness; although each of these could also be ways of being religious in terms of 
Judaism. Truth, where religion is conceived of as tradition, cannot be externalised and 
only through the practice of tradition can truth can be conceived or conveyed. This is 
because the conception of truth is not external to the practice and it is not 
communicated in propositions. In this way it is perfectly possible to be a ‘secular-
religious’ Jew who holds no propositional beliefs. To live a religious life in this sense is 
the day to day living of the practice passed down as tradition, and which has the 
purpose of ensuring a good life as determined by and within the tradition.  Where 
religion is conceived as practice, living with the reality of the practice is both guide and 
advisor. From this position asking the question of Judaism ‘what does it mean to be 
religious?’ is capable of being answered not by looking to a set of beliefs as 
propositions about how things are, but instead through familiarity with the practice.  
This will have application in all aspects of the life but especially exemplified the 
keeping of Kosher, placing a Mezuzah on the door post, and lighting candles at the 
beginning of Shabbat. The same could be asserted in some cases for what it can mean 
to live a religious life in the context of Christianity; my point is that religion 
conceptualised as practice comes from a care for living the practice which marks the 
tradition, and in this conceptualisation is what it means to be religious. 
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To further deepen my exploration of religion conceptualised as practice, I want to note 
that what it means to live a religious life in this sense can be characterized by care for 
the practice and how this impacts significantly on the interpretation of other ideas 
associated with religion. Smith (see 1993) in considering the pre-modern period shows 
the concept ‘belief’ to have had different meaning at that time compared to now. I bring 
this into consideration to emphasise a further distinction between religion conceived as 
practice rather than as belief and therefore what in their ‘pure’ forms mark out someone 
as living a religious life. This leads to emphasizing the importance of exposing 
assumptions regarding the way for example the idea of belief is to be interpreted in this 
context, and the problems which result when they are used without sufficient care. This 
is a matter of theological concern and a theological exploration of religion as practice 
must be open to such ambiguity. Smith, citing for example Chaucer’s The Canterbury 
Tales, reminds us to be aware of the way connotations of the word ‘lief’ in medieval 
English, drew the concept of ‘love’ and ‘belief’ closely together; connotations which 
persist but are not frequently recognised in the use of the word today. To believe 
something in medieval times was similar to loving and caring for it. Importance here 
being given to a conceptualisation that includes the idea of shared practice and living 
together with those who love and care for the same practices in life, and that this is 
understood as what holds a tradition and a people together. Consequently these 
practices carry authority for the community and are authoritative as spiritual guides as 
the example of the Cistercian rules shows. I want to emphasise here that the concept 
belief where used in relation to religion conceptualised as tradition has nothing 
whatsoever to do with propositional belief and everything to do with a love of the 
practice, the discipline of the tradition.  
 
Theologically these last points reveal how an articulation of religion as practice will 
include reflection on all aspects of life, all behaviour. All actions, the use and design of 
buildings as well as ways that people live together in a particular ways are in the mix 
for discussion. Theology where religion is conceived as practice will investigate 
practice in such a way so as to understand what it means to live a religious life as 
practice in the present moment as well as over time. My point is also that theology 
where religion is understood as practice is a way of theologising that crosses 
conventional boundaries and can be found in all religious traditions. The context will 
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be important, embedded practice needing interested observation in such a way where 
assumptions can be exposed. 
 
4.4 Religion as existential 
Religion conceived as existential places the idea of faith as its centre. This is faith 
understood as trust; and brings into my discussion the second interpretation of the 
Greek term ‘pistes’. This trust resembles revelation, and entails a willingness to be 
open to another kind of awareness or manner of attending. Religion so conceived 
stands in contrast to religion as belief where there is a tendency for beliefs to be 
externalised and formulated in terms of something external to the believer as ‘objects of 
belief’. Religion conceived as existential is in intimate relation with the subject, the one 
who is of faith. Religion conceived as existential is therefore where faith is 
conceptualised subjectively and the relationship between faith and subjectivity is so 
close that care must be taken not to confuse it with knowledge (Kierkegaard 1974, p. 
30). Theologically, the idea that moments of attentive awareness are of acute 
significance is central when religion is conceived as existential. What it means to live a 
religious life is understood as the kind of life and way of living where such attentive 
awareness is preeminent. This can be exemplified in the ideas of ‘theoria’, or ‘gazing’ 
or ‘attentiveness’ found and claimed as having particular importance in Orthodox 
Christianity. 
 
However, although this kind of awareness is documented widely cross religious 
traditions, it is not exclusive to any one and can be exemplified in core teachings of 
many. It can be seen in for example the promises of G-d to Abram (Genesis 12), the 
baptism or ascension into heaven of Jesus, the account of Prophet Mohammed’s (pbuh) 
encounter with the Angel Gabriel in the cave or the enlightenment of Siddhartha 
Gautama. Although these particular accounts are of privileged moments, significantly if 
they are only understood through the lens of religion conceived as belief, the events 
become formalised and their uniqueness essentialised. However there is another way of 
understanding these accounts. Where religion is conceived as existential such 
awareness exemplifies a kind of awareness and attending, in the case of Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam to the voice of God and in Buddhism attending to the moment. The 
important thing in each case, and which lies at the heart of religion conceived 
existentially is that this kind of attending is open to everyone and further is a desirable 
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state of affairs.  Faith, in this case in the ‘pure sense’ where religion is conceived in 
existential terms, matters precisely because such attention and awareness reveals 
ultimate significance for both the unique subject and also for the intimate relationship 
itself. The theological discussion turns on the distinction to be made between 
‘faithfulness’ which I consider to be equivalent to religion as existential and the use of 
the word ‘faith in’ which corresponds to the conception of religion as belief (see for 
example Herbert, 1955). 
 
Simone Weil writes extensively about faith but this is never in isolation from practical 
and particular examples of human existence. This point is important as I move to sketch 
out further a conceptualisation of religion as existential. This is important because it 
especially shows how such a conceptualisation of faith is rooted in the lived life of the 
individual subject, although it has nothing necessarily to do with a discipline of 
practice. This is not only important but highly significant because the existential 
conceptualisation of religion I am seeking to outline here is one which is focused on the 
subjective existence of each person and one which resists essentialisation. Weil (1965) 
describes her vocation, as a drawing to the ‘presence of God’ (p. 53) and over again 
explains her sense of needing to remain outside ‘on the threshold’ (p. 43) of The 
Church. Her locus of concern is regarding her awareness of the relationship between 
God, the divine, and humanity. She is  interested in the possibility of a sense of joy in 
suffering as emphasising the existential gulf, ‘we know then that joy is the sweetness of 
contact with the love of God, that affliction is the wound of this same contact when it is 
painful, and that only the contact matters, not the manner of it’ (p. 53). In order to put 
into words her awareness of the gulf between the finite and the infinite she compares 
this to the distance between the perfection of God and the ‘imperfection of the 
creaturely’ (Eaton 1984, p.14).   
 
For Weil there was a realisation of the possibility of transformation through such an 
awareness as she describes. Although drawn to Christianity, Weil was had made a 
study of Hindu sacred works and this helped her to increase her existential 
understanding of Christianity.  Blackburn (2007) notes Weil’s exploration into 
Hinduism ‘clearly influenced her approach’ (p.262) and further that ‘Weil understands 
the message of the Upanishads that this peace comes with the recognition that one’s 
real self is part of the creative force of the universe, brahman’ (p. 263).  Blackburn and 
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others have commented on the influence of Weil’s readings of Hinduism on her 
explicitly profound writings and reflections on her own experience of God. This sense 
of the presence in the world of God also led her to be committed to living a life which 
embodied the sense of freedom and justice she experienced. Weil was politically 
engaged from her early years, taking leave of absence from her position as university 
professor to live alongside the workers during the French general strike of 1933 and 
later taking part in the Spanish Civil war on the Republicans side. These examples help 
me show how Weil’s life reveals what it means to live a religious life existentially. For 
Weil this life of faith was not about following a particular system of belief or tradition  
but grew out of an acute awareness of freedom and justice and also of suffering; of 
existence itself. What is important here is the consequences of her realisation; that to 
live in the subjective and existential moment is revealed embodied in her life. 
 
Weil’s embodiment of the existential religious life is acute and in some ways extreme.  
She notes how even forms of human effort and production such as hunting, fishing and 
gathering, appear as a ‘simple reaction to the inexorable pressure continually exercised 
on man by nature’ (Weil 1958, p.60). Nature she understands as offering another and 
particular opportunity for the opening an existential awareness.  The concept of 
freedom is also important for Weil.  Indeed, Weil makes an appeal for there being a 
strong relationship between the conceptualisations of freedom and existence, since 
‘each man is necessarily free with respect to other men, because he is in contact with 
the conditions of his own existence’ (Weil 1958, p.60). For Weil it is loss of the 
awareness of one’s existence that will result in loss of freedom. However on the other 
hand it is the breadth of her considerations as to what she counts as religion, as well as 
what she counts as being religious, that allows her to speak in the broadest terms about 
faith. Faith she considers as being awareness. Faith is not essentialised but to be 
understood as a ‘cosmological relation in terms of a goodness which is beyond our 
power in this life to explore, but which we know insofar as our exploration reveals it’ 
(Eaton 1984, p.15).  
 
A relationship with nature is one way Weil considers man can both approach and be 
approached by God.  This relationship, which is really an existential awareness, is one 
way for freedom to come to exist.  In the essay ‘Forms of the implicit love of God’, 
Weil (1965) discusses three ways in which God is really, although secretly, present (p. 
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94), ‘these are religious ceremonies, the beauty of the world and love of our neighbour’ 
(p.95). However what she means by religious ceremonies is distinctive from the 
conception of religion as tradition, it is not the practice of the ceremony that is central 
here, but the existential awareness that it opens the subject to.  This existential 
awareness and attentiveness that comes from it is the way I am understanding ‘faith’ 
lying at the heart of religion conceived as existential. Weil (1965) explains this further 
in her understanding of the soul, and which she sees as taking place only through grace. 
It is this that makes possible a course which can avoid both ‘uncritical 
anthropomorphism and mystic silence’ (p.18). In other words what makes it possible to 
remain a subject in the world capable of engaging with others. It is important to note 
that Weil has a particular idea of God. God is not essentialised and external but present 
in the world, and quite likely informed by her study of Hinduism. God comes into the 
world through the action of human freedom and she describes the awareness of God as 
being sensed in all things, including and especially through suffering and affliction.   
 
Nevertheless, it is Weil’s exploration of attending that I particularly want to draw into 
my discussion regarding religion conceived as existential. Here, as already mentioned, 
what it means to be religious and to live a religious life is one which is focussed on 
faith. However it is important to grasp that in this understanding of faith, faith can only 
exist in terms of the subject. Any idea of ‘growing in faith’, is not a developmental 
idea,  it is not something that can be staged or ‘structured’; in this context it can only be 
understood in terms of the subject growing in attentiveness to their existence in the 
world. It resembles revelation, one that leaves behind a trace or kind of memory that 
changes the way someone lives and perceives from thence on. Understanding this is 
essential to understanding what it means to live a religious life where religion is 
conceived as existential. It is in stark contrast to religion conceived of as belief where 
to be religious is understood to be adhering to a set of objective propositions and where 
truth is objective, external to the believer. Religion conceived as propositional belief is 
focussed on the object, the objective and ‘true’ belief.  Religion conceived as existential 
focuses on the faith, the trust or in other words the presence of the subjective subject. 
The trusting-ness of the subject is as the subjectification of the ‘unique one’ who is 
existing, and this takes place through attention. It is then that faith can emerge, through 
grace, into the world. 
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Religion conceived of as existential focuses on subjective faith. But this is not just faith 
in one particular moment but also in time. Religion conceived as existential is in some 
way beyond words; it is not and cannot be accessed through a formula of words. 
Neither is it a system of practice, and for this reason articulating religion conceived as 
existential can often be in the form of analogy or metaphor. Merton (1975) has likened 
the religious life to a journey or passage through a door. It is not conceived of as fixed 
in a particular moment in time, but as a movement through and beyond time.  Merton, 
committed to a life of silence and solitude, writes of his self-exploration in relation to 
what he terms ‘the divine’ and considers that ‘his true self was empowered from 
beyond the empirical self in a way that was beyond the grasp of reason’ (Bragan 2011, 
p. 36). When reaching to find words to communicate this encounter in The Asian 
Journal Merton (Merton 1975) writes, ‘(t)here is no use asking for it. Yet you must ask. 
Who? For what?’, ‘(i)t is neither in this world nor another. It is not based on anything. 
Because it has no foundation, it is the end of sorrow’ (p.154) and further ‘(s)uch is the 
door that ends all doors; the unbuilt, the impossible, the undestroyed, through which all 
fires go out when they have “gone out” ’ (p.154). Religion conceived as existential 
implies that the religious life is an awakening to a new kind of awareness, and, once 
this way  of ‘seeing’ has taken place, appearances will never be the same and further all 
action following will be different. It is similar to Levinas’ assertion that it is the face of 
the other that announces ‘the specific command: Thou shall not Kill’ (Simmon & 
Wood 2008, p. 232) from which all things will be different. This realisation of things as 
‘lined up differently’ (Merton 1975, p.152) leads Merton later into an exploration and 
particular understanding of The Gospel. However it is important to take extremely 
seriously that the first movement was an attentiveness to an ‘existential reality’ (Bragan 
2011, p.37) which Merton lived within the depth of his being. 
 
Weil and Merton begin to give us an idea of the conceptualisation of religion as 
existential, as a kind of progressive attentiveness. Further that this attentiveness as it 
emerges transforms all things and in particular the subject.  This attentiveness is not 
bound by a particular formula of words or actions and is both in and beyond time.  
Where Weil has given a sense of the moment of growing awareness and gives 
examples of the varieties of activity in life that can enable the one living the religious 
life to attend, Merton takes this into a sense of timelessness.  Kierkegaard can add to 
my discussion of religion as existential through his particular understanding of faith 
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and importantly in his conceptualisation of subjectivity. Kierkegaard converted to 
Christianity at the age of 25 and describes his life until this point as having passed 
through three stages; the aesthetic, the ethical and finally the position of faith. This is a 
journey which all men may take rather like the journey of Plato’s prisoner out of the 
cave, however it is a journey that not all men either begin or complete; it is a journey 
that is one that has to be decided upon.  The importance of this decision Kierkegaard 
explores at length in Fear and Trembling (Kierkegaard, 2008), where he uses the story 
of God’s command to Abraham to kill his son to illustrate the difference between the 
position of resignation and faith. Resignation requires the courage to accept suffering 
whereas faith requires courage to be loved by God; this paradoxical and humble 
courage Kierkegaard describes as the courage of faith (Carlisle 2010, p.93).  
 
What is important to note here is that deciding to adopt a new way of existing, is not 
simply a matter of adopting a new set of propositions or practices and also such 
awareness may first come upon the person unawares. However, many writers talk about 
a point where a choice is made; albeit not necessarily a rational choice. Kierkegaard for 
example considers the choice as something ‘by which he is prepared to live, and to 
which he has a non-rational commitment’ (Warnock 1970, p.7). Kierkegaard speaks of 
the illusion of objectivity and looks for a recovery of the capacity for subjectivity; 
subjective knowledge is that which cannot be passed on or taught and in this way 
resembles faith.  Kierkegaard also emphasises the difference between what 
‘imagination gives us, and what religion … bestows upon and requires of us’ (in 
Pattison 1984, p.7). Imagination implies a continuing objectivity and separation; it 
belongs to the stages of the aesthetic and ethical and is therefore limited as a means of 
attaining religious consciousness (see Pattison 1984, p. 8). Resignation is a giving up 
whereas by faith ‘I acquire everything’ (Kierkegaard 2008, p.35). Imagination can be 
an important step on the journey towards faith, but imagination keeps us in the position 
where there is a distance between the real and the possible. Faith on the other hand is 
beyond imagination in a place where it is possible to realise our ‘absolute freedom and 
responsibility for our own existence’ (in Pattison 1984, p.11) and become a ‘knight of 
faith’ (Kierkegaard 2008, p.53). 
 
Kierkegaard explores this further; the singularity of the ‘I’ is his central concern and as 
already mentioned is particularly exemplified in his reflection of the biblical account of 
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Abraham’s willingness to obey God’s call for him to kill his own son (Kierkegaard 
2008, p.4). Importantly for Kierkegaard, Abraham’s response is of ethical concern 
since it is only in a singular response such as Abraham’s utterance ‘here I am’ that the 
ethical judgment, which can be understood conceptually as existential, is made. For 
Kierkegaard there can be no generalisable, essential, ethical rule applicable to everyone 
for he contests the possibility of essentialising the subject; the ‘absorption of the Other 
into the Same’ (Simmons and Wood 2008, p. 2). An existential conceptualisation of 
religion will therefore be one that gives focus to the centrality of the subject. However 
this is not in isolation, but in relationship which adds something to this way of 
conceptualisation of faith. As for Weil there is the emphasis on the moment of 
attending as being an opportunity to ‘be near to God’ (Weil, 1965, p. 74) and from 
Merton there is the sense of this drawing into and beyond time. However from 
Kierkegaard I draw the most systematic exploration of religion conceived as existential. 
In particular it is his understanding of faith which I move to bring into my discussion 
now, and this understanding I will use in a later chapter to bring out a new reading 
educatively of Weil. Kierkegaard (1974) talks about ‘impassioned interestedness’ as 
being ‘the condition of faith’ (p.30) and in which ‘faith can come into being’. 
Kierkegaard’s argument for subjectivity develops in relation to this, for faith is the 
infinite interest of the subject and comes about because the subject is infinitely 
interested. Faith has no need for objective proof, were it to depend upon such objective 
it would not be faith. It is only when faith ‘begins to cease being faith’ (Kierkegaard 
1974, p.31) that proof becomes necessary. 
 
Thus the key theological questions where religion is conceived as existential are 
concerning faith, faith as trust in existence and attending with impassioned 
interestedness to the choice; to step into the unknown.  A theological exploration of 
these questions will enable an interested, intellectual reflection; it will bring articulation 
to the study of matters of faith understood existentially. Faith understood existentially 
is intimately related to and dependant upon subjectivity and so theology where religion 
is conceived of as existential will also be likely to enter into an interested exploration of 
subjectivity. Theology of religion understood as existential will not be without paradox 
because at times it will be required to articulate that which is almost impossible to 
articulate, for this reason it is certainly associated with intellectual risk. The existential 
conception of religion in the ‘pure’ sense could mean a religious life lived with little 
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objectivity for where there is more objective dependability there is less inwardness and 
therefore less faith. Thus it is that Kierkegaard (1977) says ‘the less objective 
dependability, the deeper the possible inwardness’ and ‘the corresponding passion of 
inwardness is faith’ (p.19). It is this depth of subjective inwardness that religion 
conceived as existential interprets as truth, it is something probable but not certain, for 
where there is certainty there can’t be risk upon which, paradoxically, faith is 
dependent. Kierkegaard describes there as being a level of absurdity about this, about 
the way in which these things cannot be possessed but only given the conditions in 
which they can emerge into the world. Theologically the study will be subjective in 
process, seeking not certainty but instead a life of contingent positions where the most 
the theologian as subject can say  is perhaps only  that ‘he all but knows, or as good as 
knows, extremely and exceedingly just about knows’ (p.180). Theology where religion 
is conceived as existential will be likely to acknowledge there is an absurdity about 
speaking about the object of faith, since faith can only exist in a condition of 
subjectivity. Faith cannot be ‘had’ or possessed but only lived. 
 
  
4.5 Conclusion 
I have discussed three different ways of conceptualising religion in this chapter in order 
to articulate three corresponding responses to the question ‘what does it mean to live a 
religious life?’ These articulations have attempted to outline what I have termed a 
‘pure’ form of each way of conceptualising religion. I have nevertheless made it clear 
that often in reality the way in which a religious life is lived is most likely to be in some 
way informed by two or more ways of conceptualising religion. This will also be the 
case for any particular religious traditions and definitely the case when plurality within 
traditions is attended to. For example Islam in general makes a theological distinction 
between the concepts of ‘aquidah’ (belief) and ‘ibadat’ (practice), and in general most 
Muslims are agreed on the importance of both. However inside as well as between 
existing divisions, for example between Sunni and Shia traditions, ‘aquidah’ and 
‘ibadat’ may be further and subtly interpreted in a range of ways.  
 
In addition to this, and to add to the complexity of the situation it may be that inside 
any one sub group in any one tradition, there is a tendency to be best understood in one 
particular conceptualisation rather than one of the others I have discussed here. For 
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example the best entry point into Buddhism for example may be through an existential 
conceptualisation of religion, in order to best be able to understand what it means to 
live a religious life as a Buddhist, the same may also be for someone living life as a 
Hindu or Jain and yet in all cases there may be elements of tradition or even belief as 
well. Theologically each conceptualisation of religion is likely to bring a different set 
of theological questions which require a different range of investigations. This is 
because the assumptions made by each way of conceptualising religion with regard to 
what it means to live a religious life are very different.   
 
The critical point I want to make through this whole discussion, and in order to give 
articulation to the different ways of living a religious life, is that it is possible to hold 
there are different theologies at work in these three ways of conceptualising religion. 
That there are different questions being responded to, and that all are likely to be 
important, means that it is probable all will merit inclusion in a religious education. My 
intention in this chapter therefore has been to highlight that there are more complex 
ways of responding to the question ‘what does it mean to be religious?’ than the three 
approaches to religious education I have discussed in chapter 3, and primarily theorised 
by Wright, Jackson and Erricker respectively,  have been open to.  In addition to this I 
want to make the point that  the responses from all three ways of conceptualising 
religion should be attended to since they are likely to make a difference as to  how it is 
understood what religious education should aim to achieve. My next step in chapter 5 is 
to examine education carefully, with a view to being able to bring some clarity to what 
it is that education should be aiming to achieve. I do this first before bringing together 
my findings in chapter 6, in order to address questions regarding religious education’s 
purpose in the public sphere in a new way. 
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Chapter 5: What should education aim to achieve?  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I take up the need for a discussion about what education should aim to 
achieve. In the first of three sections I begin with a consideration of the work of 
Richard Peters. This is because he gives a clear articulation of what education should 
aim to achieve through engaging systematically with the question ‘what makes 
education educative?’ as contrasted to other kinds of things such as instruction, 
coercion or indoctrination. From Peters I establish education’s interested position in 
relation to human freedom whilst recognising that Peters’ conception of freedom has 
worked against religious education. For this reason in the second section of this chapter 
I consider a different conception of freedom from Arendt. Whereas Peters’ conception 
sees freedom as highly individualized, related to a particular view of personal 
autonomy and aligned strongly with reason and knowledge, the alternative conception I 
bring to my argument understands freedom in relation to ‘action’; that is to the 
particular way Arendt understands ‘action’. In the second account freedom is not 
associated with ‘free-will’ or ‘sovereignty’ but as being something that exists in the 
public sphere, itself secured through a quality of human interaction, that is as action 
under the condition of plurality.  
What distinguishes Arendt’s conception from Peters’ is that freedom, rather than 
understood in terms of reason and a particular view of knowledge, is understood as a 
‘phenomenon’ (Arendt 2006, p. 144) of the public sphere. Further, it needs to make no 
clear distinction between belief and knowledge but is instead dependent for its 
existence on action in plurality. Nevertheless, Arendt thought education should be 
separate from the public sphere. In  disagreeing with her on this point, I argue that since 
education has an interested position in relation to freedom and freedom can only appear 
where people are together, schools should be considered as ‘spaces of appearance’ that 
is part of the public sphere. From here I conclude that for this to be the case, education 
should bring the child to ‘action’.  In the third section of this chapter I consider the 
difference conceptualising education in relation to action rather than reason makes and 
present with Weil an enquiry into the role of the teacher. These three sections lead me 
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in chapter 6 to be able to present a new position regarding what religious education 
should aim to achieve, following my unfolding argument through chapters 4 and 5. 
   
5.2 Peters, education and freedom. 
In this section I first present and then discuss Peters’ key ideas regarding education. I 
have chosen Peters’ work not only because of the systematic way in which he addresses 
the question ‘what is it that makes education educative?’ but also as Martin (1981) 
explains, it was Peters who first captured ‘our concept of the educated man’ (p.97).  
Peters looks to distinguish between ‘education’ and ‘the educated man’, making the 
point that it is not enough to simply ask ‘whether a person has been educated and 
whether he is an educated man; for the former could be taken as meaning just ‘He has 
been to school’’ (Peters 1970a, p. 17). The educated man says Peters (1968) ‘is one 
who has achieved a state of mind which is characterized by a mastery of and care for 
the worth-while’ (p. 46) and ‘things that have been transmitted (which) are viewed in 
some kind of cognitive perspective’ (p. 46).  Elsewhere Peters (2010) makes it clear 
that ‘our concept of an educated person is of someone who is capable of delighting in a 
variety of pursuits and projects for their own sake and whose pursuit of them and 
general conduct of his life is transformed by some degree of all round understanding 
and sensitivity’ (p. 8).  An educated person then is someone who has quite a particular 
understanding of things; and is not a person who just has a ‘know-how or knack’ 
(Peters 2001, p.19). Thus to be considered as educated is not a single thing, and 
bringing about the educated person is the ‘outcome’ of what ideally education is to do 
(see Peters 2010 p. 12). Peters (1968) offers three broad criteria for what education 
should do, all of which fall under the concept of education which he understands to be 
‘a family of tasks’ (p.30). The first is that education implies the transmission of what is 
worthwhile, second that it must involve knowledge and understanding or some 
cognitive aspect that is not inert, and thirdly that education rules out some procedures 
of transmission on the grounds that they lack ‘wittingness and voluntariness’ (p. 45). 
Peters (2001) makes clear that the necessary connection between education and the 
educated person is that ‘‘education’ suggests that what develops in someone should not 
only be worthwhile but also involve the development of knowledge and understanding’ 
(p.19). 
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5.2.1 Knowledge and reason  
Peters understands there to be a strong relationship between the educated person and 
knowledge and, importantly, understanding. By this Peters (1968) means that to call 
someone educated they must not only be well informed but they ‘must also have some 
understanding of the ‘reason why’ of things’ (p. 30). Furthermore, this understanding 
cannot be ‘inert’, a point which he explains in two ways. First ‘it must characterize his 
way of looking at things’ (p. 31) and secondly it must ‘involve the kind of commitment 
that comes from being on the inside of a form of thought and awareness’ (p. 31). In 
other words, understanding knowledge must change both the educated person’s outlook 
on things, as well as make a difference by being important to the person in some way. 
Peters goes on to discuss what he calls ‘the cognitive requirements’ (p.31) of ‘being 
educated’ as having something to do with the ‘whole man’. This is in order to make a 
point that education cannot be tied down to a ‘specialized competence’ (p.32). 
Acknowledging this, enables him to make a clear distinction between education and 
training, that is to say a distinction between an educated man and one who has just been 
trained in some way. The difference has to do with the fact that someone who has been 
educated will in some way have ‘much more awareness of the different facets and 
dimensions’ (p.32) of a particular matter and be linked with ‘a wider system of beliefs’ 
(p.32) where as to be trained implies just the development of a skill or more limited 
competence (see p.32). 
To some extent Peters’ thinking developed in response to a prevailing educational 
focus in parts of Europe and in the United States of America in the first half of the 20th 
century, which he critiqued as too ‘child-centered’ (Peters 1968, p.35) and as 
emphasising ‘procedural principles to the detriment of valuations about content’ (Peters 
1968, p.35). He argued instead that education is the kind of thing which needs to be 
‘achieved’ (p. 24) and sought to ascertain the normative character of what counts as 
good education. Peters asserts a link between education being not only worthwhile but 
also something desirable to undertake (Warnick 2007, p. 59). Thus Peters (1968) argues 
that an educational situation ‘is one in which an environment is specifically contrived 
so that what is good can be promoted and passed on’ (p.195) to the one who is being 
educated; this is not only a worthwhile thing to do but it should be undertaken. Peters’ 
(1968) critique of Dewey’s position is that it does not  address precisely what it is that 
needs to be achieved, for example in the difficult matter of liberty; and Peters goes on 
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to explain that the difficulty is that attention came only to be ‘focused on the manner 
rather than the matter of education’ (p. 35).  
In order to understand Peters' interest in what it is that needs to be achieved in the 
transmission of what is worthwhile, it is necessary to clarify rather precisely his 
position on knowledge. Further, the reason why Peters’ understanding of what it means 
to be educated is framed in terms of knowledge is highly significant. Peters’ particular 
analytical philosophical background means he has an understanding of knowledge as 
being the kind of thing that someone can know for sure ‘are the case’ (see for example 
Peters 2010) in other words he means justified in some way that involves reason. 
Therefore, even if a belief is a shared belief and agreed between members of a 
particular group, it cannot have equal standing with knowledge in the educational 
context. This leads him to make a clear distinction between belief and knowledge. The 
significance of which in the context of the educated person becomes apparent when he 
begins to discuss the kinds of methods that are appropriate to use in education as he 
notes that belief,  because it is less than rational, is not open to cognitive examination in 
the way as knowledge is.   
This distinction between belief and knowledge in terms of their respective openness to 
reason, leads Peters to be able say that since the adoption of second-hand beliefs cannot 
be something a person when acting as an autonomous person would do, belief does not 
belong in education in the same way that knowledge does (see Peters, 2001). This is 
because beliefs are transmitted in a different kind of way that does not deliberately 
involve reason.  A school, to be educative, should be engaged in the transmission of 
worthwhile knowledge rather than second-hand beliefs and further, it should be doing 
this in a particular kind of way that is not the same as instruction or indoctrination. 
Peters’ view is that ‘indoctrination occupies a kind of half-way house between 
conditioning and rationality’ (Gatchell 2010, p. 16). Indoctrination therefore is not 
something that can be linked to knowledge and understanding but belongs with belief. 
Nevertheless Peters acknowledges that beliefs are important to the people concerned, 
for ‘indoctrinated beliefs, if they are beliefs, must be meant’ (Gatchell 2010, p. 16). 
However, ‘what distinguishes them (from knowledge) is that they are irrational’ 
(Gatchell 2010, p. 16).  Nevertheless, even though knowledge is associated with reason, 
there is still a problem to be overcome. For so long as what is ‘worthwhile’ knowledge 
is determined from outside the student, the student will still most likely need to be 
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persuaded of it. Hence although indoctrination is ruled out for the reasons discussed 
here, questions regarding the ‘how’ of the transmission of knowledge still pertain. 
Education in Peters’ understanding, cannot therefore avoid taking an interest in 
freedom. 
In distinguishing between education and instruction, as well as excluding indoctrination 
from education, Peters (1970a) reiterates that ‘for something to count as an educational 
process, then, a minimum of comprehension must be involved’ (p. 42).  This is because 
whatever is being presented to the child must be presented in a ‘kind of way which he 
has to grasp himself’ (p. 41). Peters (1968) understands this idea of ‘grasping for 
himself’ as related to the concept of autonomy which he asserts ‘implies the ability and 
determination to regulate one’s life by rules which one has accepted for oneself’ (p. 
197). Things like conditioning and brainwashing and probably also some forms of 
drilling (see Peters 1968, p. 197) must therefore also be excluded. Furthermore Peters 
(1968) also excludes such things as conditioning as counting as a ‘technique’ of 
education. This is because of their ‘lack of respect for persons’, (p. 197).  Peters’ links 
autonomy closely with reason and choosing, and further, throughout his work he brings 
these things together to support his perspective regarding the cognitive requirements of 
education (see for example pp. 30 – 35). 
At this point I want to highlight Peters’ understanding of a necessary connection 
between reason, as the ultimate controlling faculty, and autonomy. Building on 
Aristotle’s insistence that man was rational as revealed by his capacity ‘to impose plans 
and rules’,  Peters (1970b) understands there to be a direct relationship between his idea 
of ‘the educated person’ and autonomy. Such a strong connection with reason however, 
raises questions for education in determining which particular matters are to be 
regarded as more or less educationally worthwhile, that is more or less open to reason. 
Peters intends his argument regarding the educated person, to enable him to draw clear 
conclusions regarding the place of knowledge and belief in education. Thus, he 
concludes education should only be engaged with the transmission of knowledge and 
not belief; only knowledge is educatively worthwhile. This is an important point for the 
development of my argument and something I will take up in the following chapter.  
Nevertheless Peters still needs to resolve the matter of how knowledge from outside the 
student is to be transmitted. In dealing with the matter of coercion Peters (1968) turns 
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his attention in some detail in ‘Ethics and Education’ to a discussion of freedom, 
recognising that applying principles regarding freedom in relation to education ‘is not 
so straight forward’ (p. 193). He also notes ‘a case can be made in terms of liberty for 
such conditions of order in school which illustrates the paradox of freedom very well’ 
(p. 194). He explains this point by saying, ‘(i)f the rule of law imposed impartially by 
those in authority is absent it is simply not the case that children are actually able to do 
what they individually want’ (p. 194). Some conditions, he argues,  must be put in 
place in order for the overriding aim of good education to be implemented. However 
freedom Peters makes clear, is an ‘independent principle like justice’ and therefore 
‘cannot be abrogated entirely for the sake of the promotion of what is good’ (p.195); it 
has to be taken seriously. A clear argument with respect to the freedom of the teacher 
as well as parents also has to be found, particularly if freedom is understood in relation 
to freedom of opinion. So the key point Peters has to make in each of these respects, in 
a nutshell, is that although individual freedom may have to be compromised in some 
way in the educational context for the sake of other goods, freedom cannot be entirely 
abrogated. Whatever is put in place must at very least have the potential for the 
individuals to freely choose, in terms of being able to reason, and this ought not to be 
compromised at all. 
 
5.2.2 Education as bringing the child to reason 
A central aspect of Peters’ work is the way he understands the educated person in 
relation to reason. Here I tease out the implications of two strands of his argument; both 
relevant in the development of the longer argument in my thesis. The first is regarding 
the involvement of reason in the distinction Peters makes between knowledge and 
belief. His point is that since knowledge and not belief is open to reason, and being 
open to reason is the most important quality of what is worthwhile, only knowledge 
belongs in an educative context. This has had a powerful influence on religious 
education and I outline the heart of the discussion here. However it is the implications 
of his second strand of argumentation, in relation to freedom and reason, that I go on to 
show in chapter 6 is more significant. Furthermore  because of previously insufficiently 
considered assumptions made about both religion and education,  I argue that this has 
been almost entirely missed. Peters’ argument that only knowledge counts as 
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worthwhile in education has had significant ramifications in the development of 
religious education theory. Early published discussions for example between Phillips 
(1970) and Peters’ collaborator Paul Hirst (1970), as well as more recently revisited 
between John White (2004 and 2005) and Andrew Wright (2004b and 2005) reveal the 
extent of the disagreement regarding the place of religious belief in educational 
contexts. Building on Peters in brief White (2004) argues that since religious belief is 
not open to reason, it consequently cannot be part of bringing about the educated 
person. Thus he concludes it has no place in schools intending to be educative.  
To be sure, most religious education theory in England since the 1960’s has developed 
in response to challenges regarding the status of religious knowledge.  I mention 
Wright’s (2004b) position here because it illustrates particularly clearly the serious 
implications of this for religious education. As noted by Gearon (2013), Wright’s work 
broadly follows the same lines as Peters’ rejecting ‘any phenomenological setting aside 
or sometimes called ‘bracketing out’ of truth claims’ (p. 123),  affirming the place of 
knowledge and reason in educative contexts. Wright proceeds to develop his argument 
for critical religious education on this basis; asserting that critical thinking and reason 
are central as the child engages with knowledge in terms of truth and truth claims. My 
point is that such an emphasis limits what Wright can include in religious education. In 
addition to this religious education that starts from this point, although Wright (2003) 
recognises some dichotomy ‘between rational theology and experiential religion’ (p. 
283), is unlikely to be able to reveal to the child sufficiently what it could mean to live 
a religious life.  This adds to my critique of Wright’s approach already discussed in 
chapter 3.  
The second point I take up here is the way Peters conceptualises freedom in relation to 
reason. I have already noted that Peters needed to emphasise reason in relation to 
knowledge in order to make a distinction between indoctrination and education. 
However to articulate his position in relation to freedom in order to rule out coercion, 
reason is brought into play once again. Peters (2001) declares his interest in how people 
‘learn to be free’ (p. 12) suggesting that  the school has to be actively concerned with 
the business of advancing reason in relation to the ‘transmission of various forms of 
skill and knowledge’ (p. 116). In developing his thinking about freedom however, he 
explores three distinctive ways of looking at freedom discussed by Weinstein and Ben 
(see page 12) that he considers to be particularly helpful in the educative context. The 
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first is to understand freedom as a social principle that it is involved with how people 
live well together, second to understand man as a chooser and third to understand 
freedom as autonomy.   
By suggesting that freedom can be understood as a social principle, Peters (2001) 
begins by recognising that a ‘state of natural freedom is an illusion’ (p.12) in the social 
context, since if there are ‘no levelling constraints like those of law and custom, men do 
not in fact live unconstrained lives’ (p.12). This is simply because those who are 
physically or psychologically weaker are likely to be ‘constrained by the strong’ (p.12). 
He therefore recognises the necessity of there being constraints on individual freedom, 
whilst identifying that underlying this principle is a presupposition of the notion of 
‘man as chooser’ (p. 13).  This justification is important for his whole argument as he 
acknowledges although people can have their options ‘closed up by other men’ (p. 13) 
so long as they are still free to make choices it is actually still possible to call someone 
free even when constrained. So for Peters, freedom is an idea inextricably related to the 
way he conceptualises autonomy and implies the necessity of the person being able to 
choose certain constraints.  
Peters gives practical examples to show how his resolution of the paradox, which is 
through his understanding of freedom in educative contexts, might work out in a 
school. He suggests that it would be possible to identify many situations, for which I 
give the example of when the child would prefer to play but is in a mathematics lesson, 
where the child has his or her actions constrained in school yet could still be understood 
as remaining a chooser. Peters emphasises that the usual expectation of an educated 
person is that they can be a chooser. Recognising that a child may be deterred from 
being so by a number of things, not least by pressure from those around them, 
nonetheless Peters makes the point that being deterred from being a chooser is not 
precisely the same thing as being constrained from choosing. The child being deterred 
or dissuaded by her peers would not be the mark of an autonomous person, whereas the 
child choosing to act in a particular way, for example to sit still in a mathematics 
lesson, would be.  Peters (2001) is interested in what it is that ‘has to be added for a 
chooser to develop into an ideal type of character in which being free features’ (p. 13) 
and he says that to ask this question is the same thing as to ‘ask for the criteria for 
calling a person autonomous’ (p.14). Peters (2001) argues from this that in order to call 
someone autonomous it is necessary for them to be a chooser, and this he explains is to 
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be a ‘rational being’ (p. 16) placed in ‘the situation of practical reason’ (p.16). 
Autonomy therefore for Peters, is inextricably linked with being in the situation of 
practical reason and may entail a compromise in terms of freedom. For example, the 
child in reasoning may choose to submit to the authority of the school, however this 
could only be in order to achieve a greater good; that is to become an educated, an 
autonomous, person.  
Thus these two interwoven arguments, lead me to conclude that Peter’s view on what 
education should aim to achieve, could be summed up by saying that it should bring the 
child to reason. However, in my discussion of Wright above, I have begun to show that 
this view is problematic. Indeed education focused on knowledge and reasoning is 
unlikely to be able to address sufficiently well matters in relation to the question ‘what 
does it mean to be religious?’ in all the ways explored in chapter 4. In chapter 3 I have 
shown that in order to defend against the challenge of indoctrination, or 
confessionalism Wright, and also in different ways Jackson and Erricker, tended to 
focus on adjusting their approaches to transmitting the content of religious education. 
Each, albeit in a slightly different way, argues that religious belief and practice is a kind 
of knowledge and therefore all their approaches to religious education are ones that 
give reason an important place. Each in their own way argue that religious education is 
to a greater or lesser extent a reasoned engagement with what is worthwhile in Peters’ 
terms. More recent approaches to religious education seek external social justification 
for religious education for example with reference to ensuring ‘religious literacy’ (e.g. 
see for example Dinham & Frances 2015). However this again leads to discussion 
about knowledge and its transmission, and based on education understood as bringing 
the child to reason.  
In rest of this chapter I lay out the beginning a new line of argument in which I 
challenge the view that the most important thing education should aim to achieve is to 
bring the child to reason. I begin by challenging Peters’ conception of freedom as 
aligned with reason, proposing a different conception of freedom from Arendt. This 
leads me to be able to take another look at freedom in education, discussing instead the 
conditions under which freedom’s existence is possible and thus to draw different 
conclusions about what education should do. In the last section of this chapter I 
consider the role of the teacher in ensuring education is educative and  in chapter 6 
move forward in building my argument regarding what religious education should do in 
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order to be able to fully respond to the question ‘what does means to live a religious 
life?’ 
 
5.3 Arendt and freedom  
Much of Arendt’s work developed from her observations of and grave concerns 
regarding the Nazi holocaust, and the capacity of states seemingly to be able to make 
people participate in grand schemes of violence and destruction against other human 
beings. Young-Breuhl
 (2004) suggests that Arendt’s work could be understood as an 
attempt to understand ‘the deeper forces and ideas that constituted in her understanding 
the preconditions for the elements that has crystalised into totalitarian forms’ (p. 111). 
Arendt’s (1973) starting position, especially after the publishing of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, is from questions regarding what it means for a human being to begin 
as a newcomer in the world of others, or in her words ‘the actualizing of the human 
condition of natality’ (Arendt 1998, p. 178). Peters conceptualises freedom in terms of 
the autonomous man as a chooser which Arendt understands as freedom identified with 
sovereignty (see Arendt 2006 p. 162 and 1998 p. 234). This identification she sees as 
highly problematic since freedom linked with ‘the ideal of a free will, independent 
from others’ (Arendt 2006 p. 162) is most likely eventually to lead to the opposite of a 
free society, evidencing that during the Nazi period human beings apparently chose 
freely to deny the opportunity for other human beings to begin in the world. Arendt 
(1968) presses her point further when she says that ‘this identification of freedom with 
sovereignty is perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the 
philosophical equation of freedom and free will. For it leads either to a denial of human 
freedom - namely, if it is realized that whatever men may be, they are never sovereign - 
or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be 
purchased only at the price of the freedom, i.e., the sovereignty, of all others’ (p.163). 
Her view is that in order to be free it is sovereignty that must be surrendered. Surrender 
is necessary because it is when ‘men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as 
organized groups, they must submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual 
will with which I force myself, or the "general will" of an organized group’ (p.163). I 
proceed now to detail Arendt’s position on freedom and then to discuss it in relation to 
education, moving on in the last section of this chapter to investigate when it may make 
a difference to conceptualise freedom as action in education, especially for the teacher.  
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5.3.1 Action, the public sphere and natality. 
Arendt’s (1968) view is that freedom and sovereignty are in fact contradictory ideas; 
for freedom could not exist under a condition of non-sovereignty either (see p. 168).  
Freedom, she says, as ‘sovereignty is possible only in imagination, paid for by the price 
of reality’ (Arendt 1998 p. 235) and that reality is that we are not all the same. In other 
words conceptualising freedom as sovereignty risks sameness. Whereas the reality of 
our uniqueness means that each of our beginnings in the world require our ‘not being 
able to control or foretell its consequences’ (p.235), were each of our beginnings to be 
limited by others’ autonomy, uniqueness would be eliminated. Recognising the 
absurdity of this situation (see p. 235), she proposes another way of regarding freedom 
and one that allows all of our unique beginnings to survive the ‘disabilities of non-
sovereignty’ (p.236). She proposes that freedom be considered not as a possession at 
all, but as ‘a state of being manifest in action’ (p. 161) and vitally that this can only 
exist under the condition of plurality. 
Arendt’s (1998) understanding of the relationship between freedom and the human 
activity of ‘action’ under the condition of plurality is vital to appreciate. Arendt recalls 
a distinction between the ‘vita activa’ that is the way human beings live in the world 
among other human beings (p.20) and the ‘vita contemplativa’ which can be 
exemplified in extreme by death or the life lived separately from others. Politically 
speaking, she says a life lived separately resembles death in that ‘if to die is the same as 
"to cease to be among men," experience of the eternal is a kind of death, and the only 
thing that separates it from real death is that it is not final because no living creature 
can endure it for any length of time’ (p.20). Thus she expresses her principal concern 
with the vita activa, that is the political life of human beings in the world, and in 
discussing this designates three fundamental human activities, ‘labor, work and action’ 
(p. 7). Labor is defined as being the human activity that corresponds to bodily 
processes, eating, sleeping and so on and the things that are necessary in order to 
maintain this.  Work on the other hand corresponds to the ‘unnatural and ‘“artificial” 
world of things’ (p. 7). That is to say the things human beings make in this world that 
are additional to maintaining basic living, such as crafting tables and chairs, which 
could not exist without human activity and so are distinctively related to being human, 
but which none the less are not permanent.   
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Work is the activity that corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence as when 
she says ‘work and its product, the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence 
and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time’ 
(Arendt 1998, p. 8). However it is action as Arendt (1998) explains, in contrast to both 
work and labor, that ‘is the only activity that goes on directly between men without the 
intermediary of things or matter’ (p. 7). Action is the very thing that makes the 
difference and is an interference with the ‘general laws of behaviour’ (p.8). Since it is 
‘men and not Man’ (p.7) who live on the earth and it is action that enables each of our 
uniqueness to exist. We are each distinct, for ‘if men were endlessly reproducible 
repetitions of the same model, whose nature or essence was the same for all and as 
predictable as the nature or essence of any other thing’ we would be replicas and not 
human beings. So it is that she insists ‘(p)lurality is the condition of human action 
because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same 
as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live’ (p.8). 
Action can be summed up simply as human togetherness in plurality, and is the way 
‘men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; they are the modes in 
which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men’ 
(Arendt 1998, p. 176). All three labor and work, as well as action ‘are also rooted in 
natality in so far as they have the task to provide and preserve the world for, to foresee 
and reckon with, the constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world as 
strangers’ (Arendt 1998, p.9). Each of us makes our beginning in the world at our 
births, but in that we are able to act in the world beyond our homes, to act in the public 
or shared realm, we are also beginners and in each moment come new and fresh into 
the world. So Arendt (1968) can say that it is because each one of us ‘is a beginning, 
man can begin’ (p.166) and further to be able to begin is to act and it is this that ensures 
that ‘to be human and to be free are one and the same’ (p.166). However it is necessary 
to appreciate quite how important Arendt’s (1998) point is regarding action 
corresponding ‘to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live 
on earth and inhabit the earth’ (p. 7). This is because she is interested in each unique 
human being ‘who’ inhabits the earth and not just the generalised concept of ‘man’. 
Therefore it is our unique togetherness, the unique ways in which we can be together, 
that is  what she means by plurality and which is ‘the condition … of all political life’ 
(p. 7).  Work, labor and action are all concerned with human existence, ‘birth and 
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death, natality and mortality’ (p. 8), however action, as noted above, is the ‘political 
activity par excellence’ (p.9). 
Action therefore is not only the way by which the child as newcomer arrives into the 
world, but also the way the child begins to exist in the world as the unique subject of 
their own life. Freedom is hence understood as being the kind of thing that exists in the 
public space where people are able to appear as unique, and distinguished one from 
another. Arendt (1998) emphasises that although we are unique, action as distinct from 
work and fabrication ‘is never possible in isolation’ (p. 188).  In fact plurality, which is 
being with others, is so important that ‘to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to 
act’ (p. 188).  Indeed it is this dependence upon being with each other that ‘is the price 
that human beings pay for freedom’ (p. 244). Being with others is the price paid for 
‘the joy of inhabiting together with others a world whose reality is guaranteed for each 
by the presence of all’ (p. 244). This is because ‘left to themselves human affairs can 
only follow the law of mortality, which is the most certain and the only reliable law of 
a life spent between birth and death. Arendt (1998) is clear that it is the possibility that 
the ‘capacity for action’ contains within itself ‘certain potentialities which enable it to 
survive the disabilities of non-sovereignty’ (p. 236). Thus it is the ‘faculty of action that 
interferes’ (p. 246) with the laws of the world, ‘because it interrupts the inexorable 
automatic course of daily life’ (p. 246).   
It is action Arendt (1998) says that ‘has the closest connection with the human 
condition of natality’ (p.9) and by this she means ‘the new beginning inherent in birth’ 
(p.9). But this may seem to be something of a contradiction since the world, where 
there are others, already exists. So it is that Arendt goes onto say that it is only possible 
that the one beginning newly in the world ‘can make itself felt in the world ( … ) 
because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew’ (p. 9). So 
action is both the way by which the newcomer comes into the world as well as the way 
the world, which is the space of public appearance, is sustained.  Arendt (1968) asserts 
that the public sphere, which is the space where the newcomer comes or appears into 
the world, cannot ‘be taken for granted wherever men live together in a community’ 
(p.152). Indeed she traces the origin of freedom being conceptualised as sovereignty as 
having emerged during the early Christian era, and as this being the point when 
freedom came to be understood as synonymous with free-will. Arendt (1968) expresses 
her view that this idea of freedom is one where ‘the presence of freedom was 
125 
 
experienced in complete solitude’ (p. 156).  Building on this Arendt (1968) expresses 
her concern that as philosophers have become interested in freedom since the Roman 
period, it has been the Christian view where freedom made a ‘philosophic shift from 
action to will-power’ (p. 161) that has been engaged with. Through time therefore 
freedom and autonomy have been inextricably linked with ‘sovereignty, the ideal of a 
free will’ (p. 246).  Freedom has become aligned with the idea of human beings being 
‘independent from others’ which Arendt warns will eventually prevail ‘against them’ 
(p. 246).   
Arendt’s view of freedom, it is clear, is at variance with such independence since ‘all 
human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is only action 
that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men’ (Arendt 1998, p. 22). 
Arendt’s (1968) view is that freedom is a ‘supreme gift’ (p.167) which seems distinct to 
human beings and ‘develops fully only when action has created its own worldly space 
where it can come out of hiding, as it were, and make its appearance’ (p.167).  In 
clarifying what she means by this ‘worldly space’ or the  ‘public sphere’ and how this 
relates to action Arendt (1968) noted that the ‘distinction between a private and a 
public sphere of life corresponds to the household and the political realms, which have 
existed as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state’ (p. 
48). Indeed a ‘distinctive trait of the household sphere was that in it men lived together 
because they were driven by their wants and needs’ (p. 30). Arendt (1977) makes a 
further distinction, citing  Aristotle,  that practical things ‘have  ends other than 
themselves’ (p.60), whereas ‘action is itself an end’ (p.60). She likens the difference to 
the making and the playing of a flute, where for the flute maker the end is the flute 
whereas she likens the playing of the flute in a performance to action. The performance 
is dependent upon there being a public space into which it is heard; furthermore the end 
of the performance is unknown at the beginning even though there was a deliberate 
choice to play. So it is with action in plurality. There does need to be some deliberate 
choice to make space for the newcomer to come into the world (p.60), so in the context 
of a school this means all students and teachers will share the responsibility for that. 
However with regard to Arendt’s meaning of the word ‘choice’ it is important to note 
that this is something different to the way in which Peters uses this word. Arendt argues 
that choice is something coming out of desire rather than reason, for reason is the kind 
of thing that has an end other than itself. This is in contrast to action which an end in 
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itself. Choice is necessary ‘whenever men act for a purpose’ (p.61) but ‘the purpose 
itself, the ultimate end of that act the sake for which it was embarked on in the first 
place, is not open to choice’ (p. 61).  
The public sphere then, is the place where human activities beyond the household are 
located, and Arendt (1998) extends her point by saying that ‘the distinction between 
private and public coincides with the opposition of necessity and freedom’ (p. 70). She 
asserts from this that the ‘most elementary meaning of the two realms indicates that 
there are things that need to be hidden and others that need to be displayed publicly if 
they are to exist at all’ (p. 70). Freedom is the kind of thing that belongs in the public 
sphere; indeed if it is to exist at all it is as the result of action and is the kind of thing 
that needs to be displayed publicly for it to have not only existence, but also meaning. 
Freedom, she concludes is therefore by its nature dependent upon plurality and is ‘the 
very opposite of "inner freedom," the inward space into which men may escape from 
external coercion and feel free’ (Arendt 2006, p. 145). Freedom, of which Arendt 
speaks, can only exist where the public sphere exists and both are dependent upon 
action for their appearance under the condition of plurality. Moreover Arendt (1998) 
can say that ‘action is the political activity par excellence (p. 9), and how that it is 
natality, and not mortality, (that) may be the central category of political, as 
distinguished from metaphysical, thought’. In this way Arendt can go so far as to say 
that the ‘miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, 
"natural" ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is 
ontologically rooted’ (p. 247). 
In summarising this section, I have noted how Arendt through her writing has explored 
the absurdity of freedom conceptualised as sovereignty. She argues instead that 
freedom is something that can exist in the world precisely because we are all unique 
human beings rather than something to be possessed by individual human beings at the 
expense of others. This is freedom understood in relation to action under the condition 
of plurality. Action, summarised as human togetherness in plurality, is contrasted to 
labour and work. Although all three as activities of the vita activa are necessary for 
human natality into the world of others, whereas labor corresponds to those activities 
necessary to sustain our physical existence and work corresponds to those things we do 
in the world such as fabricating objects and so on; what really makes it possible for us 
to exist as human in the world is action. Action is the way of being together that 
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enables us to appear to each other, not as objects, but as men. This togetherness is 
plurality and is the condition of public life. Freedom then exists or develops only when 
unique human beings out of choice, through action under the condition of plurality, 
create the worldly space or the public sphere. 
 
5.4   What is required of education? 
I opened the discussion in this chapter by showing that education should have an 
interested position in relation to freedom. I have also begun to reveal that Peters’ 
particular conception of freedom, because of its dependence on the distinction between 
knowledge and belief and hence on reason and autonomy, has been particularly 
problematic for religious education. This is because such a distinction between 
knowledge and belief is likely to limit the inclusion in the curriculum of the full range 
of ways in which it is possible to live a religious life as I have discussed in chapter 4.  
In the next section of this chapter and in order to resolve this problem, I have 
investigated a different conception of freedom. I have shown that both freedom and the 
public sphere, wherein freedom can ‘make its appearance’ (Arendt 2006 p.167), are 
entirely dependent upon a particular understanding of ‘action’. My intention in this 
section is to see in light of this, what new possibilities open up for education in general 
and later, in the final chapter of my thesis, for religious education in particular.  
The point I want to make is this. Where freedom is conceptualised as a ‘state of being 
manifest in action’ rather than sovereignty, education that has an interested position in 
relation to freedom should be conceptualised as being concerned with bringing the 
child to the kind of human togetherness that is action. This is where action itself is 
characterised by what Arendt (1977) calls choice (p.60), rather than reason alone. 
Reason Arendt sees as only one aspect of choice. In other words action is not 
something that happens by itself, it needs some volition of which reason is only one 
aspect, but sufficient to say here that choice is a characteristic of action which is 
understood as human togetherness in plurality. This contrasts to education where 
freedom is understood as sovereignty; for in this case education becomes inextricably 
linked to reason. Indeed there is a further problem for reason, the significance of which 
was identified by Arendt (1997), and this is that reason standing alone has the need of 
ends other than itself (p.60). This is to be compared to choice which is understood in 
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terms of contingency and as such an end in itself. Arendt therefore in understanding 
choice as part of action, ensures the possibility that action in plurality is the place of 
beginning. Arendt (1977) brings into her longer argument on this Duns Scotus’ 
discussions on the limits and limitations of reason (see p. 128ff). Scotus’ position is 
that this is in part because of human beings’ physical finitude, and asserts that it is the 
contingency of choice that is necessary for freedom. Indeed Arendt recognises the 
significance of Scotus’ contribution to this discussion in that it is he who has noticed 
the risk of necessity aligned with reason. Scotus was prepared to concede that instead it 
is contingency that is the price of ‘the gift of freedom – the mental endowment we have 
for beginning something new, of which we know that it could just as well not be’ 
(p.195).  
However it is important to recognise that Arendt (1961) did not actually see education 
in the way I am setting out here. Although her view was that the essence of education 
was indeed ‘natality, the fact that human beings are born into the world’ (p. 173), her 
concern was that the natality of the child is a fragile process and thus risky for the 
child. Her conclusion from this is that education belongs to the private sphere.  In 
addition to the fragility of natality Arendt notes another risk. As well as the physical 
dangers children may experience if they are let loose in the world insufficiently guided, 
there is the risk that the existing order of things will overwhelm and prevent the natality 
of the child. Arendt (1961) also wants to resist the idea that education could either 
become ‘an instrument of politics’ (p.174) or another equally dangerous possibility that 
political activity itself could be ‘conceived as a form of education’ (p.174).  
 
5.4.1 Education as bringing the child to human togetherness: to action in plurality 
Arendt’s (1961) view that education and the public sphere should be kept separate,  lay 
in her observations that countries during the 20th century have ‘sought ‘to equalize’ or 
even erase as far as possible the differences between young and old, between gifted and 
the ungifted, between children and adults and particularly between pupils and teachers’ 
(p. 180). This attempt at erasing difference, to understand equality as sameness, has in 
her view not brought about hoped-for freedom for all. Rather a consequence of this 
attitude to equality has been that adults have either left children to their own devices or, 
in totalitarian situations, a few assert extreme control over others. In common with 
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Peters, Arendt criticizes child-centered education, but for a slightly different reason. 
She suggests this is a sign that where adults let go of their responsibility for children, 
responsibility is also loosened for the world. In addition to this her awareness of the 
need to take seriously the dis-equity of relationships, leads Arendt to formulate 
particular conclusions about the relationship between education and political life. 
Arendt is acutely aware of what will happen ultimately when ‘an authority’ becomes 
dominant and uses its strength to dominate another group; in her view it leads 
inevitably to totalitarianism. Nevertheless, although I share her concern, her precise 
formulation of argument at this point is one I want to challenge. However, I do want to 
trust the robustness of her argument about freedom in general to support my longer 
argument regarding freedom in relation to education and also ultimately to religious 
education.  
My challenge begins with Biesta’s (2014) questioning of Arendt’s fear regarding 
allowing education to be a space of natality, that is her separation of education from 
politics and the developmental distinction Arendt makes ‘between “child” and “adult”’ 
(p. 113). Biesta points out that elsewhere in her writing she shows interest in all 
children and adults, suggesting that this shows that in fact all her work reveals the 
centrality of the question ‘what does it mean to exist politically?’ (p.114) relating to 
everyone.  Arendt’s response over and again to this question is that to exist politically 
means to exist in a condition of plurality; and to do so in such a way that freedom can 
appear in the world. With Biesta I want to take this into the context of education and 
would want to ask Arendt what would happen if schools were seen only as places ‘for 
the acquisition of knowledge and skills but not also as a place where freedom might 
appear’ (Biesta 2014,  p.118).  Biesta continues by saying that it cannot be that children 
appear only at some point in the future, which is in some way to be inserted safely into 
the world when they reach adulthood. His point is that children must be understood as 
human beings, capable of making their beginnings now; that is as already existing in 
the world in the present. Biesta’s point is that education therefore does not need to 
resort to a developmental understanding of children. Rather what is required instead is 
an understanding of what conditions school should cultivate in order for children to 
make their appearance in the world.  
I have argued that education, and therefore an educative school should be a place of 
human togetherness; a place where people exist together in plurality and that it can 
130 
 
therefore be a place of appearance. I agree with Arendt that education should be a place 
of natality, however I challenge her view that education belongs in the private sphere 
by putting to her that surely she would not want to suggest that education cannot be a 
place where freedom can appear.  Surely it would be far more terrifying to think of 
schools as places where freedom was prevented from appearing, places where there 
was an erasure of plurality, action therefore prevented. In moving to conclude this 
section I am arguing that education must be considered as a place of action (rather than 
fabrication or work) and that education should be regarded in terms of bringing the 
child to action. This is because education has an interested position in relation to 
freedom, which I understand in Arendtian terms.  Freedom is understood here as the 
kind of thing that can exist in the world only under certain conditions. Therefore I 
conclude that education must be conceptualised as a place of appearance, understood in 
terms of action and concerned with human togetherness; education therefore must be 
considered as part of the public sphere. What education should do therefore in bringing 
children to action is to bring children to choice regarding human togetherness, which is 
distinct from simply bringing people together, in order for them to make their 
appearance in the world.  
 
5.4.2   What is the teacher required to do? : attention, honesty and discernment 
To be sure, the teacher has a significant role in relation to the child’s education. With 
Arendt (1961) I note that this is a relationship that entails great responsibility ‘implicit 
in the fact that the young are introduced by adults into a continuously changing world’ 
(p.189). In this section I look at how the teachers’ role will be understood differently 
depending upon what it is considered education should do. If, following from Peters 
(1968), education should bring the child to reason, teaching requires the teacher to 
‘reveal our reasons to the students and, by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation 
and criticism’ (p. 39).  Further, teaching will remain ‘pre-eminently concerned … with 
the adoption of methods appropriate to the development of knowledge and 
understanding of principles’ (p.40) and be focused on the production of separate 
autonomous individuals; located in the cognitive domain. However here I want to take 
up some different possibilities that an Arendtian understanding of freedom may bring 
to education. Although I would not want to say that reason is never important in 
education, what Arendt’s work on freedom has revealed is that it is not the heart of 
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what education should do. What is at stake is not only the existence of freedom but also 
the possibility of the child herself beginning in the world, because the two are bound up 
together. There is a connection between freedom, the possibility of there being a place 
where the child can make her beginnings and the beginnings the child will make (see 
Biesta 2006, p. 47 for a similar discussion). 
The educational question I am asking at this point however is what the teacher should 
do. And it is Weil (1965) who helps me begin to explore and also to articulate how the 
teacher can bring the child to a way of being with others in such a way that enables the 
child to appear in the world of others, not as an object but as a human being. Weil 
suggests that the role of the teacher is in fact not to ‘do’ very much at all in the sense of 
engaging cognition. Rather her view is that the teacher will find that ‘our deep purpose 
should aim solely at increasing the power of attention’ (p.68). She is trying to articulate 
precisely what the teacher should do for the child in order to ‘increas(ing) the power of 
attention’ since attention as Weil conceives it is not exactly the kind of thing that can 
be ‘paid’ (p.70). Therefore it is not related to muscular effort but in a way called forth 
as the teacher brings the child to attend.  
In drawing my argument together and since I understand action in Arendtian terms as 
something that can only happen under the condition of plurality, it seems to me that the 
first thing the teacher has to do is to bring the child to attend not only to something but 
perhaps also at times to someone new. The teacher will do this in the ways she behaves, 
in the ways she speaks and moves with the children. Inviting the child to observe, to 
notice and talk to and with others enables the child to realise there are choices in terms 
of relationship outside the home that make a difference. As the child attends to others 
by choice, the risk of and possibilities from which are uncertain, the conditions start to 
exist under which action is possible. It is important to remember that for Arendt choice 
is not linked primarily with reason, but something that comes out of desire. There is a 
connection here with Weil’s view of attending. This is because, for Weil, attention ‘is 
bound up with desire. Not the will but with desire – or more exactly, consent’ (Weil 
1963, p. 107). Lewin (2014) points out that ‘Weil wants to maintain some separation of 
attention from will’ (p. 364), and  this is because as Weil ‘suggests that the personal 
will, with its concern to fix itself on a particular problem constitutes a dependency at 
odds with the purity of desire’ (p.363). For Weil the perfect manifestation of attention 
is prayer, ‘(p)rayer being only attention in its pure form’ (Weil 1963, p. 108). There is a 
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connection here between Weil’s view of prayer in relation to attention and Arendt’s 
view of the vita contemplativa. Arendt (1998) notes the traditional relationship between 
the vita activa and the vita contemplativa is a hierarchical one (p.17). However she 
makes it clear that she does not see the traditional hierarchical relationship precisely 
because of the pre-eminence she gives to the vita activa, which is action in the public 
sphere. Thus, with Arendt and Weil I can say that since education belongs in the public 
sphere it is to attention as part of the vita activa that the teacher brings the child to, and 
not necessarily to prayer. Nevertheless, Weil helps me to begin to articulate a strong 
connection between the two, for attention ‘taken to its highest degree, is the same thing 
as prayer. It presupposes faith and love’ (Weil 1963, p. 105). 
So it is that as the child attends to someone outside their immediate family, most likely 
first another child and then the other children and to other things in the class; the 
important aspect here is the teacher’s responsibility to ensure the actuality of plurality.  
Indeed as Weil suggests ‘(t)eaching should have no aim but to prepare, by training 
attention, for the possibility of such an act’ (Weil 1963, p. 108). In the secondary 
school in preparing the conditions for the child to come to attend the teacher may set up 
a new display, something unusual or perhaps in some other way unexpected. This could 
be for example a vase of flowers or leaves, a glass of water, something that gives the 
young people an opportunity to pause and notice something in a new way, to notice the 
reactions of others and hence to regard others in the class in a new way as well. The 
teacher needs to bring the child or young person to attend to the existence, and the 
uniqueness of all others. Such bringing to attention can be understood as an interruption 
in the flow of the life of the child in order to make possible their arrival in the public 
sphere. The role of the teacher is going to be an extremely delicate one, but significant 
since she is part of ensuring the conditions are present through which the child begins 
in the world. It requires care and ‘responsibility for both, for the life and development 
of the child and for the continuance of the world’ (Arendt 1961, p. 186) and 
interestedness on the part of all concerned. In some respects this may not seem very 
different to any other lesson, where the teacher asks the child to listen before they are 
taught something. The point however, I am making here is that the purpose of this and 
what makes it educative as I understand things with Arendt, is different. And this is that 
the purpose here is to bring the child to action and not only to reason. 
133 
 
How this happens matters, for if the existing way of things is too strong, if others 
overwhelm her, the child’s own beginning will be prevented. In recognising plurality 
herself, the teacher helps to bring about the conditions under which this child is able to 
act; to speak and to think. The child makes her beginning and so is enabled to become 
part of the existing ‘orders’, which is not a once and for all thing. The teacher will also 
bring the child to attend to other things and there will at times be a focus on ‘the 
acquisition of knowledge, skills, values and dispositions’ (Biesta 2014, p. 64). 
However, education’s interest and starting point will always be in the action of the 
unique subject, in her natality and thus in enabling the conditions under which freedom 
and the public sphere can exist. In the nursery this may happen where the teacher 
invites the child to notice how another child is playing or drawing or riding a bike and 
without judgment opens the possibility of the child seeing the other in a new way. As 
the other child responds, interestedness begins and there is an opportunity for 
togetherness that was not present before. The teacher, as she calls the child to attend at 
times to other people and at other times to other and different things such as a bird or a 
flower or a falling leaf in autumn, she is ensuring human togetherness; which is action 
in plurality. 
Attention for Weil has some relation to intention, in that it is not something that exactly 
happens by accident, but is also not precisely in the choosing, in terms of the will, of 
the child or teacher. Rather it ‘consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, 
empty and ready to be penetrated by the object, it means hoping in our minds, within 
reach of this thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with it’ (Weil 1965, p.68). 
Although attention is something we have to do for ourselves, Weil’s point is that it is 
something we are unlikely to do without, at least at the beginning, the guidance of a 
teacher. The teacher first calls to the child, and waits for the child to respond; indeed 
attention could be thought of as a kind of gift the teacher offers to the child, but a gift 
that is not possessed either by the teacher or the child. It could be considered to exist in 
the response of the child and lies somewhere in between them. The child has the 
opportunity and with the teacher’s careful observations and comments may be brought 
to attend to the possibility of suspending day to day business (the kinds of things that 
Arendt may term work or labor), for even just a moment, and instead ‘waiting, not 
seeking anything, but ready to receive … in its naked truth’ (Weil 1965, p. 72).  
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This way of looking at the role of the teacher is what I want to term as existential rather 
than instrumental. This is because it is focused on how the teacher exists with the child, 
and not only with what the teacher wants to bring about at some point in the future.  
The teacher brings the child to the point of attention in this moment, but of course there 
needs to be something to which the child can choose to attend. As the teacher calls the 
child’s attention to the world, the teacher’s attentiveness over time enables the child to 
‘hold’ their own attention independently; the child can make her own beginnings in the 
world and will not be overwhelmed by the world. The teacher brings the child to 
attention, and as I have already noted the teacher in a way cultivates a kind of desire in 
the child for ‘attention is bound up with desire. Not with the will, but with desire - or 
more exactly consent’ (Weil 1963, p. 106). This more resembles faith than free-will in 
the way that Peters’ means consent. Consent, in this way of considering things with 
Weil, is something that exists in the relationship between the teacher and the children; I 
would want to propose it resembles the kind of human togetherness that is action, and 
is only possible under the condition of plurality.  
But although this kind of attentiveness is important, it is not enough. The teacher needs 
to invite an intellectual engagement with the world in a way that Weil (1963) calls the 
‘virtue of humility’ (p.116) and which I want to term intellectual humility.  The power 
of attention is for Weil a part of the intellectual order (see p. 116) and should lead 
towards another aspect which the teacher needs to draw the child towards and this is the 
capacity for discernment. After a while the child led by her own desire, becomes able to 
discern through intellectual humility what is desirable from what she desires. None of 
this is the same as applying reason because is not a matter of choosing one thing over 
another, but rather of arranging things in a particular,  that is in an attentive, humble 
and discerning, way. ‘Intelligence can never perpetrate the mystery (that is the world), 
but it, and it alone, can judge of the suitability of the words that express it. For this task 
it needs to be keener, more discerning, more precise, more exact and more exacting’ 
(p.118).  Without any doubt the teacher also has to be attentive to the child. 
Furthermore the teacher, as a representative of the existing order of things, must herself 
be open to change to discovering new ways of existing in the world. And then, with 
intellectual humility, so also come to discernment.  
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5.5 Conclusion  
In developing my argument for what education should aim to achieve, I have started 
with affirming the interested position education has in freedom. However I have argued 
with Arendt that freedom is the kind of thing that can only come to exist in the world in 
human togetherness, which is action under the condition of plurality. Education then 
should bring the child to action. In doing this, and as the child makes her first 
beginnings into the world of others, the teacher should be there to bring the child to 
attend to others and to other aspects of the world. This is so that there can be 
recognition of plurality and hence human togetherness. To imagine children coming 
into the world separately, into a world where things remain the same; of children being 
forced into the existing order of things without question would be the opposite of what 
I argue education should do. Arendt describes this as ‘alienation – the atrophy of the 
space of appearance’ (Arendt 1998, p. 209), and belongs in a labouring society where 
‘all activities are leveled down to the human body’s metabolism with nature and where 
no exchange exists but only consumption’ (Arendt 1998, p. 209).  Under these 
conditions children become producers, and their outcomes products. In this situation it 
would be as if all people were alike. Sameness not plurality would be the prevailing 
way of things for the ‘sameness prevailing in a society resting on labor and 
consumption and expressed in its conformity is intimately connected with the somatic 
experience of laboring together, where the biological rhythm of labor unites the group 
of laborers to the point that each may feel that he is no longer an individual but actually 
one with all others’ (p. 214). 
Arendt has already noted that education is unlikely to be possible when it starts by 
taking ‘into account only the group and not the individual child’ (Arendt 1961, p181). 
Furthermore she says, ‘(t)his unitedness of many into one is basically anti-political’ 
(Arendt 1998, p.214). In chapter 6 as I develop my argument for what religious 
education in particular should aim to achieve, I want to begin to identify the 
significance of education that brings a range of ways it is possible to live a religious life 
into the educative discussion. In the epilogue to Eichmann in Jerusalem (see Arendt & 
Kroh, 1964), the reader is offered the opportunity to give some consideration to the 
matter of whether legally one can be regarded guilty for a crime that one did not intend 
to commit. It is concluded that not being aware offers neither defence nor gives claim 
to innocence. Moreover, Arendt gives me cause for grave concern that education 
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cannot be considered as simply part of the  man-made world that is a place only of 
work and labour.  Indeed if it is not considered as a place for action and speech, 
education will be ‘as in despotically ruled communities which banish their subjects into 
the narrowness of the home and thus prevent the rise of a public realm’ (Arendt 2006 p. 
147). In such a situation freedom has no worldly reality, it cannot and does not exist. 
Taking this principle into my argument for what it is education should aim to achieve,  
I would want to say that an adult participating in ‘work’ or ‘labor’ with children can 
only have an outcome of replication of sameness and this must be considered as anti-
political. This is also anti the public sphere and cannot be called education. Thus, 
although there is much from Peters that I would agree with, my proposals are quite 
different in the way of defining the educated person in terms autonomy. For in my 
proposal autonomy is understood in relation to action rather than reason. This is action 
under the condition of plurality rather than autonomy understood in terms of the 
choosing of a rational being. Further my proposals are different in another way, since 
an important point I want to make is that understanding what education should aim to 
achieve in terms of reason alone would not preclude labor or work being confused with 
education. Labor or work manifesting under the guise of education, I would argue with 
Arendt, would only serve to perpetuate the possibility of the banality of totalitarianism; 
risking the future of all children, those here and now and those yet to come.   
So it is that in addition to this, my argument develops in such a way to enable me to 
conceptualise teaching as best understood as a form of patient waiting. A kind of 
patient waiting which allows for the attentive one, who is the teacher, to perceive and 
ask the other, who is the child, ‘what are you going through?’ (Weil 1965, p.72). So it 
is that Weil (1965) can say, as paradoxical as it seems, that ‘a Latin prose or geometry 
problem, even though they are done wrong, may be of great service one day, provided 
we devote the right kind of effort to them. Should the occasion arise, they can one day 
make us better able to give someone in affliction exactly the help required to save him, 
at the extreme moment of his need’ (p. 76). The child can be active in this process, 
bringing their own new observations into the educative context, for if it is only the 
teacher who is bringing the world to the child, there is a danger that the teaching 
becomes part of the existing order overwhelming the child. But for this to happen 
something else needs to be taken into account, something which Weil missed and 
which Arendt enables me to take account of. This is freedom, understood in relation to 
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action, and upon which the rest of my thesis depends. Teaching in religious education I 
will argue in chapter 6 should also be seen as a form of action, enabling the natality of 
the child, the new to appear. And religious education in Arendtian terms will be 
understood as having a particular possibility of enabling the miracle that could save the 
world. Motivated by this observation, I take the argument formed in this chapter for 
what education should aim to achieve on into chapter 6 and in bringing chapters 4 and 
5 together I make clear my proposal for what religious education should aim to achieve.   
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Chapter 6:   What should religious education aim to achieve? 
 
6.1 Introduction:  
This chapter is in four sections. First, in light of my discussions in chapter 4 and 5, I 
revisit my critique of the interpretive, critical realist and conceptual enquiry approaches 
to religious education.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 give a systematic analysis of the three 
proposals, highlighting the extent of difficulty religious education faces in relation to 
two persistent problems. That is in relation to assumptions made about what it means to 
be religious and in relation to a lack of precision regarding what education should aim 
to achieve. In section 6.4 I present my proposal for a new approach to religious 
education, and bring together the elements of my argument as it has developed through 
the proceeding chapters. Finally in section 6.5, following clarification of why this 
approach is both significant and distinctive from what has gone before, I move to 
concluding why it is important for the world that religious education is considered in 
this way.  My point is that something important has been missed both in terms of what 
religious education should aim to achieve as well as an in particular, in terms of what 
the teacher of religious education should do to make that possible.  
 
6.2 Naming the problems in religious education 
 As I have already discussed in chapter 2, each of the three theorists of religious 
education discussed in chapter 3 was chosen because of the particular way they are 
continuing to have considerable influence in contemporary religious education. Two 
issues emerged from my investigation as persistently problematic.  The first of these is 
the different ways in which religion is conceptualised and indeed precisely because 
‘how the nature of religion is construed’ (Barnes 2014, p. 233) remains contested, that 
there is persistent disagreement about exactly what is to be done in religious education. 
In spite of this however, my research in chapter 3 revealed there is nevertheless 
agreement about the importance of religion being represented well in the classroom. 
Indeed as Barnes has recently noted, ‘the controversial issue is not that religious 
education should aim to reflect the nature of religion’ (Barnes 2014, p. 233) but 
continuing and persistent disagreement about the nature of religion, remaining in recent 
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reports, ensures there can be no agreement about what counts as the best religious 
education.  This observation determined my next step in chapter 4. This was an enquiry 
not in order to find yet another definition of religion, but rather an investigation into 
three structurally different ways of answering the question regarding what it means to 
be religious. I wanted to show in this chapter that hitherto something has been missing 
in discussions regarding religious education and that taken together with my findings 
from chapter 5 regarding what education should achieve, that I can offer a way of 
moving forward from the impasse of disagreement. 
The second issue I observed in my research in chapter 3 is that each of the three 
theorists showed a lack of precision about what education should do in the public 
sphere. It is possible that this is a legacy from the 1930’s when, as I noted in chapter 2,  
religious education at this time had a protected position because of its links with the 
churches and did not engage with wider educational developments of the period. Other 
writers that informed Jackson, Wright and Erricker’s work, such as Grimmitt (see for 
example 1987b), also have limited their investigations into what education should do, 
leaving their ideas on religious education to rest on broad assumptions about education. 
The key problem is not so much that there is disagreement between the different 
approaches to religious education I discussed in chapter 3, but rather there is wide 
variation of substantial engagement with the matter of education. As a consequence in 
my view many assumptions were, and continue to be, made. In the case of Wright his 
engagement with education amounted to little more than discussion of a ‘learning 
theory’ as if this was equal to a full exploration of what education is or should do. In 
chapter 5 therefore I undertook an in depth enquiry, not into the abstraction of 
education, but an enquiry regarding what education should aim to achieve. In doing so I 
identified some problems in the work of influential thinkers in the philosophy of 
education during the 20
th
 century such as Richard Peters, and in particular problems 
that Peters’ arguments present to religious education.  
I proceed in the next three subsections to briefly recap the work of Jackson, Wright and 
Erricker and their respective approaches to religious education, interrogating them in 
light of my observations in chapters 4 and 5. I then move on to dig deeper into these 
assumptions in 6.3 before laying out my new proposal in section 6.4. 
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6.2.1 The interpretive approach  
The interpretive approach to religious education drew on, and developed from, a 
number of sources. These included most significantly, anthropological writings from 
Geertz as well as the writing of Smith and Edward Said (see Jackson 2012b) and 
anthropological research methodology impacted this approach in at least three ways. 
First it was a means of accessing information about religion at the beginning of the 
development of this approach. Secondly it greatly informed Jackson’s development of a 
theory of religious education and thirdly informed the materials which developed to 
support this in the early days. However this approach has broadly ensured that what is 
brought to be represented in the religious education classroom has been limited to 
religion understood as what I have termed in chapter 4 as belief and especially 
tradition. I have discussed Jackson’s (1997) claim to ‘epistemological openness’ 
(pp.122-126) and more recently (see Jackson 2009) he made clear once more that the 
approach ‘is not relativistic in relation to truth, aiming for a procedural epistemological 
openness acknowledging varying and often competing truth claims’ (p.25). This has 
been explained elsewhere as meaning that students have ‘a right to study different 
views of truth represented within and across religious traditions as well as considering 
the functions of religious activity in people’s lives’ (Jackson 1997, p.126).  
Jackson’s (1997) view then, is that religious education processes should not take on a 
particular position in relation to truth, hoping that the projects’ ethnographic approach 
will assist with this distancing (see p. 126). In addition to this there is an intention that 
religious education will contribute to the development of students’ sensitivity (see p.47) 
and is entailed in the work of reflexivity and edification within the theory. Jackson cites 
Said’s praise of scholars who he admires, for example that there is always a ‘direct 
sensitivity to the material before them and then a continual self-examination of their 
methodology and practice’ (Jackson 1997, p.47). Furthermore there is an intention, 
when this is brought into religious education that this same sensitivity can be cultivated 
in the child through a religious education programme based on this method. 
Nevertheless, I have critiqued Jackson’s work in two ways. First asking whether it is 
able to be open to the range of ways it is possible to be religious that is whether the 
ethnographic process is as able to ensure religion is as distinguishable from culture as 
Jackson hopes. Secondly and most importantly in light of my work in chapter 5, 
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whether he is precise enough about how he understands what education should aim to 
achieve in the public sphere.  
Indeed, Jackson (2004b) in suggesting that religion is just one of other ‘subjects of 
study’ (p. 26) reveals assumptions being made about religion as well as about 
education. Although various reasons are given for why religious education is 
particularly distinctive and valuable, the limits put upon his analysis of religion by his 
recourse to anthropological and political scholarship ensures Jackson’s work may be 
closed to acknowledging the full range of ways in which it is possible to live a religious 
life as I have discussed in chapter 4. As a consequence of this, the interpretive approach 
remains vulnerable to the challenge of whether its proposals actually differ from 
something like cultural learning. Although Jackson recognised the need for further 
research in this area (see for example Jackson 2004a, p.158ff), elsewhere it is clear that 
the need for clarification of how the terms ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ may or may not be 
used interchangeably remains (see for example Jackson 2006, p. 295ff.). The 
interpretive approach therefore has limitations, because of its emphasis on 
anthropological ethnographic theory and research, in its ability to express the ways in 
which it is possible to live a religious life.  Although Jackson (see for example 1997) 
recognises the dangers of objectifying religion and treating it either as something to be 
believed or not believed (see p. 52) and identifies theoretical and practical problems 
with the phenomenological approach (see p.53), Jackson does not ask educational 
questions about religious education. This means the justification for religious education 
lies in a cultural interpretation of religion, the consequences of which I explore further 
in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.2 The critical realist approach  
Wright, in developing the critical realist approach to religious education, has been 
writing in reaction to the confessional religious education of the mid-20
th
 century and 
responses to this from the phenomenological approach. Wright seeks a religious 
education that enables pupils ‘to wrestle with ultimate truth’ (Wright 2007a, p. 7). The 
approach to religious education he has developed focusses on religious truth claims 
(see for example Wright 2007a) which I would suggest relates to what I have in chapter 
4 termed religion as belief. Arguably religious education limited to an investigation of 
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truth in the way Wright proposes is open to the critique of being unnecessarily narrow. 
This is not only in its conception of religion but also the ways in which distinct 
religions can be represented in the classroom, and this is because of its focus on the 
singular and particular rather than the general (see for example the discussion between 
Jackson 2008 and Wright 2008).  
Teece (2005) points out in addition to this that it is important ‘to recognise that, as far 
as it is possible to talk about religions as ideological or theological systems, the 
particular claims to truth that are deemed significant by religious believers vary both 
between traditions and within traditions’ (p.36). Further, that care should be taken ‘not 
to impose an interpretation of religion that is essentially western and rationalistic on the 
way that religions are understood in religious education’ (p.36). Wright’s particular 
emphasis on reason, as a necessary strategy for engaging with truth and truth claims, 
limits the possibilities for exploring what it means to be religious in religious 
education, however it also presents a further problem. Wright does show an interest in 
freedom in so much as he gives an extended exploration (see especially 2007) to 
discussions that have been had regarding distinctions made between comprehensive 
and political liberalism in relation to education. However there is a distinction between 
Wright’s approach and the approach I have taken. This is that I begin with a precise 
discussion of educational theory starting from Peters. So where Wright’s view is that 
reasoning will enable the child’s reflection on the importance of truth in their own life, 
in light of my work in Chapter 5, I can show clearly now that this reveals assumptions 
Wright is making about what education should aim to achieve.  And further, I can show 
why the leap Wright makes to learning theory, based on knowledge, in writing about 
what it is that the teacher should be doing in religious education so conceived is in my 
view flawed.  
 
6.2.3 The conceptual enquiry approach  
By way of contrast to Jackson and Wright, Erricker’s (2010) proposals which form the 
basis of the Hampshire Agreed Syllabus for religious education ‘Living Difference’ 
(2004) and ‘Living Difference revised’ (2011) and as discussed in chapter 3, are 
focussed around a process that the teacher should undertake with the children. Children 
are invited to ‘communicate’ their responses to a concept and then the teacher enables 
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the students to ‘apply’ the concept to their lives before ‘enquiring’ more carefully into 
what the concept might mean for other people. The next step is for the concept, as 
understood by others, to be presented to the students in the form of a case study; that is 
in a real life ‘contextualisation’. Following this students are invited to ‘evaluate’ the 
concept both from within and outside the context. This in order to determine how or 
why the concept is important for a particular group exemplified in the context, before 
also evaluating whether the concept could have any importance or significance to them 
or to someone who was not of that particular religious tradition.  
Important to note here for my longer argument that Erricker (2000) is critical of 
Kohlberg’s emphasis on reason and reasoning (see for example p. 87), preferring a 
relational approach to the work of the classroom community, citing Gilligan and 
Benhabib (see p. 115). Indeed the conceptual enquiry approach is a model for teaching 
which intends to ‘contribute to overall educational goals based upon the development 
of young people’ (p. 67).  It is also important to note Erricker explains how his work 
was framed to a large extent in response to the phenomenological approach to religious 
education. However in contrast to Wright or Jackson, Erricker sought to ensure an 
educative aspect to his work asking educational questions from the beginning and 
discussing this in terms of ‘pedagogy’ (see Erricker 2010 pp 35-42). Nevertheless, in 
light of my discussion in chapter 4, questions remain about whether a relativist 
approach to religion as implied by Erricker in the conceptual enquiry approach to 
religious education, has sufficient scope to be open to all ways in which it is possible to 
live a religious life as I have discussed in chapter 4. That is to say for a person who 
understands themselves to be living a religious life, recourse to relativism is not likely 
to be a satisfactory way of explaining religious plurality.  
Nevertheless Erricker does discuss his interest in another area of human life which he 
terms ‘spirituality’ (see Erricker 2001). However the relationship between spirituality 
and religion, although discussed (see especially Erricker and Erricker 2000b),  is never 
precisely explained in terms of what the teacher should do. Furthermore, and connected 
with this, Erricker insists that there is a strong relationship between religious education 
and religious studies (see 2010). Erricker therefore reveals his position on religion and 
he does this in two ways.  First is that he sees religion as separate from ‘spirituality’ 
and secondly therefore that the core work of religious education is an enquiry into 
religion understood only as belief and practice. In the following section 6.3, I go on to 
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unpick some of the consequences for religious education where assumptions about 
religion only in terms of belief and practice are made.  
6.3 Interrogating problems and discovering new possibilities  
I have so far shown that all three of the approaches to religious education hitherto 
discussed each have a clear and particular way of conceptualising religion. Further in 
each case the conceptualisations Jackson, Wright and Erricker developed in their 
respective approaches to religious education have been in response to developments in 
the history of religious education. To be sure, the ways in which religion has been 
conceptualised has led directly to particular approaches to the study of religion in 
religious education. Further, what has been common to most, except perhaps for the 
interpretative approach where there is an overlap with religion and culture, is the 
tendency to assume that the boundaries of what counts as religion are clearly defined 
and that there is another kind of thing that is not religion. Therefore to resolve the 
issues presented by both specific definitions of religion as well as ones where there 
may be confusion with culture,  instead of seeking a definition of religion or addressing 
the question ‘what is religion?’ my approach in chapter 4 has been to explore different 
ways of responding to the question ‘what does it mean to be religious?’. 
My intention in this section is to show that something important has been missed or at 
least remained weakly articulated in religious education where religion is objectified as 
a consequence of particular definitions of religion being adopted in religious education, 
as well as where there is confusion between religion and culture. Through asking the 
question ‘what does it mean to be religious?’ in chapter 4, a different question to the 
one asked  by Wright, Jackson and Erricker, I have noticed some new possibilities 
opening up which in my view seem likely to be important. I have found that the 
question ‘what it means to be religious?’ has revealed it may not always be necessary to 
make a categorical distinction between religion and non-religion at all. This distinction 
is only needed when religion for example is understood as propositional belief (as with 
the critical realist approach) or where there is uncertainty about the overlap with 
religion and culture (as for example in the interpretive approach). In the case of where 
religion is understood only in relation to belief, ‘truth’ is understood ontologically as an 
absolute external reality and the reference point for explaining what it means to be 
religious. This has had serious consequences for religious education. For where religion 
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is limited to being understood in terms of propositional belief, the key questions asked 
of religious education tend to be epistemological. Educational questions are either 
missed altogether, or in some way ‘bolted on’ after the epistemological questions have 
been addressed.  
Erricker (2000) recognises that there is more to religious education than the study of 
beliefs and traditions, and opposes ‘the idea that values can only be derived from 
religious truth claims in particular, or from epistemologies in general’ (p.58). However 
because he does not ask the question ‘what does it mean to be religious?’ the vehicle by 
which he introduces another dimension is through reference to ‘spirituality’ in religious 
education. In particular he explores historic discussions that have taken place regarding 
‘spiritual development’ in education in general and religious education in particular 
(see pp.36-58 and Ericker 2001). Erricker’s point is that where religious education is 
only understood as objective beliefs it will be impossible for young peoples’ 
contribution to be ‘positively received if they (have to) ascribe to an agenda that is 
already predetermined’ (p.58), in other words he has a concern for how the young 
person with their own new ideas can come into a world where everything is already 
decided. Although Erricker’s concern is an important one, and one I recognise and 
identify with, his resort to a particular way of understanding spirituality as a means of 
bringing this dimension into religious education is liable to the same charges that I have 
noted in chapter 3.   
I noted in chapter 3 that the move to a spiritual approach to religious education in the 
1970s emerged from the phenomenological approach, and is therefore also vulnerable 
to a charge of confessionalism. Erricker (2010) recognised that what became known as 
the experiential approach to religious education was ‘usually understood as a type of 
phenomenological/psychological method’ (p. 51). However, acknowledging the 
‘existential overtones’ (p.51) of this approach, Erricker was clear he wanted somehow 
to draw these overtones into religious education. Nevertheless instead of addressing or 
looking for it in religion itself, he does this by looking to research on spirituality in 
education.  In addition to this, and in taking care to avoid coercion or indoctrination, 
Erricker (2010) recognises that indoctrination can take place in many aspects of life not 
only in the context of religions (see p. 14). However, Erricker does not make a rigorous 
analysis of freedom and offers no explanation of it either in relation to education as a 
whole or in particular in relation to religion and religious education in particular. As a 
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consequence the conceptual enquiry approach relies entirely on a particular approach to 
enquiry in order to ensure there is no indoctrination. This approach is broadly based on 
the three stage constructivist approach to learning developed by Grimmitt (see 
Grimmitt 2000a and 2000b).  
The critical point here is that although Erricker identifies that religious education has a 
problem in relation to the relationship between the subjective and competing sets of 
claims to objective truth, instead of asking further questions of religion or other 
educational questions in order to interrogate what education should do, he moves to 
understanding the matter as an epistemological problem that can be resolved by turning 
to a constructivist approach to learning.  He does this because he limits his 
understanding of what it means to be religious to religion as belief or practice. The 
subjective has been positioned as an educational concern by asserting that the 
cultivation of spirituality is an educational purpose rather than as a way of existing 
religiously in the world. He then looks for epistemological solutions, asserting that ‘it is 
necessary to present the case for a pedagogy based on relativism’ (Erricker 2000, p. 
58). 
To be sure as already discussed in chapter 4, Wright also understands the matter of 
competing truth claims in religion as principally raising epistemological questions for 
religious education. And Wright, as I have already noted, turns to critical realism for 
resolution. Jackson (2004) in also engaging with this discussion, notes that there has 
been a ‘radical questioning of the nature of knowledge’ (p.11) in religious education. 
However, Jackson critiques Erricker’s relativist position on knowledge, noting it has 
important consequences. One being that this can lead in religious education to a 
‘tendency to be eclectic and to gather beliefs from a variety of sources … such 
combinations seen as tentative and open to modification’ (p.12). Such epistemological 
disagreement has led in part to the existence of different and conflicted approaches to 
the teaching of religious education. Nevertheless the bigger problem here is in relation 
to the problem of representation. This is because for someone for whom what it means 
to be religious is adhering to a set of propositional beliefs holding them as special 
religious knowledge and as true, representing them in a relativist way in the classroom 
is untenable. It is for this reason that Wright and Jackson reject the post-modern, 
relativist approach adopted by Erricker.  Erricker (2000b) makes it clear that he sees 
‘no hard and fast distinction between the terms’ (p.69) relativist or postmodern because 
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of the ‘considerable overlap between and significant diversity among the writers in this 
category’ (p. 69).  Jackson on the other hand has already made clear that the 
interpretive approach to religious education takes a neutral position epistemologically 
in much the same way as an ethnographer should.  A persistent impasse exists therefore 
between the original authors of the three approaches to religious education I have 
interrogated in my thesis, about the problems raised by what they each in different 
ways term ‘plurality’ in relation to competing truth claims (see Jackson 2004, Wright 
2007 & Erricker & Erricker 2000).  
Plurality understood only in terms of difference, continues to present dilemmas for 
religious educationalists (see for example Skeie 2007, Jackson, R., & Fujiwara, S. 
2013& Baumfield, V. M., Conroy, J. C., Davis, R. A., & Lundie, D. C. 2012). Much 
theory in religious education, as I have already shown, tends to look to epistemological 
questions leading in turn to epistemological investigations and proposals. However 
with regard to the matter of plurality, I have begun to develop my argument instead 
from an educational question, and ask when does plurality matter in education, or put in 
another way how does plurality effect what education should aim to achieve? I have 
already articulated a response to this question in chapter 5 and conclude with Arendt 
that plurality matters very much in relation to the unique child; that is the child who is 
in, or the subject of, the educational context. I have spelled out that plurality effects 
education in a very particular way. In fact plurality rather than being a problem is 
central to ensuring education can achieve what it should aim to achieve.  
To be sure, much work in religious education has until now been more or less 
consciously influenced by the thinking of writers such as Peters. This has led to an 
emphasis on defending religious knowledge as being in some way worthwhile drawing 
on long standing assumptions about religion being in some way good for society and 
people. A critique of this thread of discussion can be seen through this thesis. Further 
and since Peters’ arguments as previously discussed lead to a view that education 
should bring the child to reason, religious education has become centered on ensuring 
children are reasoning in some way about this knowledge; whilst usually recognising 
that there may be some difficulties about this for the person of religious faith. My point 
is that since plurality has by and large been regarded in religious education as an 
epistemological problem, this has ensured that religious education has been interested 
mainly, but in different ways, in engaging with and resolving questions about 
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competing truth claims. This in turn has ensured that the representation of religion in 
the class room has been limited to belief and practice.  Taken together with a focus on 
advancing the child’s capacity to reason, in my view religious education has been 
incomplete in two ways. Incomplete both in terms of its account of what it means to be 
religious and incomplete educatively. Instead in the proposal I lay out in the next 
section, I begin with an educational question about how education is conceptualised in 
relation to plurality. And from here, with Arendt, I take a look at what effect 
recognising the importance of plurality should have in religious education that is 
educative.  
I have already noted in Chapter 2 concerns raised regarding the confessional approach 
to religious education at the end of the 1960’s, and in particular accusations of 
indoctrination.  It is widely agreed therefore that secular religious education must be 
alert to the risk of, and has no part to play in, indoctrination. Further, I have already 
argued for education as having a position in relation to freedom, therefore for religious 
education to be educative it too must have an interested position in relation to freedom. 
Nevertheless, and as I have also noted earlier in this thesis in chapters 2 and 3, religious 
education because of its historical concerns regarding confessionalism has its own 
particular and distinctive reasons for wanting to ensure that freedom is taken seriously. 
In addition to this, I have shown that Peters understanding of freedom not only has 
general educational consequences but also has particular and significant implications 
for religious education in relation to knowledge. Therefore, rather than moving to 
Peters for a proposal regarding freedom to counter indoctrination in education, I move 
to see what happens for religious education when freedom is conceptualised from 
Arendt and religion is conceptualised not in only terms of belief and practice but also 
existentially in terms of faith. In the next section I show that taking these elements 
together where plurality is understood not as difference in terms of different truth 
claims, but in terms of the uniqueness of the child, the educational subject, something 
new is possible.  
My research in chapter 5 has shown that in order to ensure education is educative it is 
fundamental to ask questions in relation to education. In my view this has been 
insufficiently tackled by those working in the field of religious education theory. In 
chapter 4 I have shown that when what it means to be religious is understood in terms 
of existing in the world in a particular way, as when religion is conceptualised as faith, 
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what counts as living a religious life is no longer bounded by knowledge and tradition. 
Thus it can be seen that conceptualising religion in a limited way unnecessarily 
constrains what is possible in religious education. I proceed now in section 6.4 first by 
recapitulating my discussion regarding freedom in relation to education. I show why 
this is particularly important for religious education by revealing connections between 
an existential response to what it means to be religious and what education should do; 
that is to say where education is conceptualised in relation to action in plurality with 
Arendt, rather than reason.  With Weil I then go on to argue quite precisely what the 
teacher of religious education should do. The new possibilities for the religious 
education which follow from this I argue can respond to my overarching research 
question lying at the heart of this thesis.   
 
6.4 A different option for religious education 
In this section I present my argument for an existential approach to religious education. 
My proposal in short is that religious education, in order to be educative as discussed in 
chapter 5, should be understood as a ‘place of appearance’ (Arendt 1998, p. 199), 
where people are together ‘in the manner of speech and action’ (Arendt 1998, p. 199). 
My argument proceeds first by recalling that my research has shown that numerous 
problems face religious education where religion is only assumed as being 
propositional belief or practice. I propose that theologically there is another, as yet 
unconsidered, option where religion instead of being conceptualised as belief or 
practice, is conceptualised existentially as faith. My proposal for an existential 
approach to religious education lies in bringing religion conceptualised as faith together 
with my response to the question ‘what should education do?’, to which I have 
responded with Arendt in chapter 5 that education should bring the child to action. I 
undertake this presentation by developing my argument in two key interconnected 
steps. The first is to explain why it is important that plurality is understood in a 
particular way in religious education in order for religious education to be educative 
and the second step following from this is to explain the central importance of 
conceptualising religion in religious education as faith. In drawing these two steps 
together I am able to explain why I conclude that an existential religious education will 
have clarity of educative purpose in the public sphere in terms of aiming to bring the 
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child to action, why therefore it will have an interested position in relation to human 
freedom and importantly be able to explain clearly what it is that the teacher of 
religious education should do.   
I begin explaining the first step in my argument by recalling that Arendt conceptualises 
freedom as something that manifests itself in relation to action. Action is only possible 
under the condition of plurality, and through which means the public sphere can come 
to exist. I want to make it clear therefore that it is significant that plurality, in my 
proposal for religious education, refers to the plurality of the children in the class. In so 
doing, discussions about what religious education should aim to achieve will be 
securely understood in relation to something that happens to the child.  Further, 
Arendt’s work has revealed a different relationship between plurality and freedom that 
is important in my argument and which I suggest also opens new possibilities regarding 
what religious education should be aiming to achieve. It is also important to appreciate 
fully the significance of freedom not being understood in relation to reason and 
autonomy, that is freedom as sovereignty in Arendtian terms, but in relation to action. 
This is not to say that reason is not important in religious education, neither is an 
existential religious education disinterested in religion conceptualised as belief or 
practice. However, since what is at stake here is the life of the child, the critical point of 
my argument at this stage comes from Arendt’s view that plurality is the condition 
under which freedom can come to exist in the world. Thus plurality needs to be 
understood in relation to the subject of education – the child - and not religious belief 
or practice.   
Plurality in religious education, rather than being understood in relation to religion as 
belief or practice and therefore presenting an objective problem in religious education 
needing to be resolved because of competing truth claims, can now be understood as 
being the condition under which human action is made possible. Indeed action, which 
Arendt (1998) suggests ‘is, in fact, the one miracle-working faculty of man’ (p. 246) 
and understood as human togetherness,  is dependent upon plurality. The possibility of 
natality that all human beings ‘are capable of by virtue of being born’ (p. 247), is what 
enables each of our beginnings in the world of others. This way of looking at things 
ensures that the unique child is placed at the center of educative concern. However, this 
is not the individual autonomous subject who is similarly marked one from another by 
difference, but rather the unique subject who is dependent on the other for their 
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existence as free in the public sphere, which itself is brought into existence through 
human togetherness. What is highly significant about this way of viewing plurality in 
religious education, and which I will draw out further in my conclusion, is that it makes 
it possible for the unique child to make her beginning in the world of others in a way 
that is inextricably linked to freedom and the possibility of the public sphere existing at 
all in the world.  
My second step is to explain the central importance of religion being conceptualised as 
faith in my proposal for religious education. Religion conceptualised existentially as 
faith recognizes theologically and has particular interest in, as well as an intimate 
relationship with, an exploration of human subjectivity. Indeed, religion conceptualised 
as faith across all religions as noted in chapter 4 has a concern for existence because 
human subjectivity is at its heart. Because of this, religion conceptualised as faith draws 
into religious education the subjective, an existential response to the question what does 
it mean to be religious. My point is that this matters not only because religion 
conceptualised as faith draws the subjective in to religious education. It matters also 
because religion conceptualised as faith has the capacity to play a significant role in 
making it possible for plurality to be taken seriously. Therefore religious education 
conceptualised existentially can make the difference between a group of people merely 
being together in a school and the educative possibility of existing in human 
togetherness.  
Faith translated from the Greek ‘pistes’ as ‘trust’, is where what it means to be religious 
is understood not as something for which there is an object, as is the case where 
religion is conceptualised as belief. Rather what it means to be religious is understood 
in this case as a mode of existence, and for which Kierkegaard (see 2008) explained is 
something ‘one is willing to live or die’ for. Religious education which begins from an 
existential conceptualisation of religion can be understood as education into a mode of 
existence, which is action. It is an invitation to make a subjective response directly to 
the question ‘what does it mean to live a life?’ religious or otherwise. Religious 
education in this way of looking at things has the purpose of bringing the child to a 
mode of living in the world where the existence of freedom is possible.  A critical point 
that follows from this and which lies at the heart of my proposal is that religious 
education where religion is understood as faith can contribute to bringing about the 
conditions where freedom can exist. This is freedom understood in terms of action 
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under the condition of plurality. In section 6.5 I go onto show that religious education 
understood in this way has the capacity to address the persistent problems it has faced 
in terms of teachers not understanding what it is that they should do. In the rest of this 
section I look directly at what it is that the religious education teacher should do,  
noting that it is likely that bringing the child’s attention to others, in order to bring the 
subjectivity of each child to action, will be central in this new understanding.   
 
6.4.1 What should the teacher of religious education do? 
My overarching research question was developed from the question Cox (1983) 
identified as ‘what is religious education essentially trying to do at this point in 
history?’ (p.115), rephrased as ‘what it is that religious education should aim to 
achieve?’  My third research question had two parts the second of which was ‘what 
should the teacher of religious education do?’ In this section I bring the findings of all 
that has gone before in my thesis to bear on this question to determine a response.  In 
asking this question I want to emphasise the role of the teacher in religious education 
and do so through reflecting on what might happen if teachers are enabled to appreciate 
three particular points.  The first point is appreciating that plurality in religious 
education should be understood in terms of the unique educational subject, that is the 
particular children in a particular classroom. Secondly that what education should aim 
to achieve is conceptualised as bringing the child to action and that there is a 
relationship between this and plurality. These two points taken together link with my 
third point regarding religion being conceptualised not only as belief and practice but as 
existential in relation to faith understood as trust. An appreciation of these three 
elements together will, in my view, help the teacher begin to understand what she 
should do in religious education in the public sphere in a new way.  
Rather than focussing on the object of study as being something to be learned and the 
teacher’s role as being in some way concerned with facilitating the child’s learning of 
that, in my proposal here the teacher’s role changes. The teacher’s attention will now 
be with the child. What the teacher needs to do is to bring the child to attend and the 
teacher needs to consider how she will do that in relation to something new to the child. 
For example, it may be that the child is exploring the idea of ‘special’ before perhaps 
moving on to exploring special places from the perspective of the Jewish tradition. The 
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important thing will be to find a way of opening the conversation in a way that 
cultivates the desire in the child to attend.  I have noted that neither Jackson nor Wright 
considered in any great detail what the teacher should do. Erricker (2010) in contrast 
has however developed a clear a method of enquiry which prescribes, building on 
Grimmitt (2000), step by step the journey the teacher should take with the child. I have 
argued however that Erricker’s relativist, post-modernism position leads inevitably 
back to a focus on knowledge. The consequence of this and the point I want to make is 
that in fact in some respects there is less distinction between the three approaches than 
at first may seem to be the case. I look instead to Weil to help me explain more 
carefully what it is that the teacher should do in religious education. I pick up the 
discussion I began in chapter 5 examining here the difference bring her thinking on 
attention makes for religious education, that is where religion is conceptualised as faith 
and education conceptualised with Arendt in relation to action.  
Religious education as I am proposing it, is best understood as the cultivation in the 
child of a mode of being in the world. This mode of being is close to what Arendt 
explores as human beings existing in the world in such a way so as to be able to make 
their beginnings in the world of others. This does not mean that religious education is 
without content, but that transmission of knowledge and cultivation of reason are not 
sufficient educative purposes or things to be achieved alone. Weil brings an existential 
view to my proposal for what the teacher of religious education so conceptualised 
should do, and can be understood as three steps in relation to any particular piece of 
material in a practical unit of work. Weil’s idea of ‘attention’ is the link in my 
argument between religion conceptualised as existential and education conceptualised 
in relation to action. The teacher must first act in such a way as to interest the child in 
something new something from outside the child that they would perhaps not otherwise 
meet. The teacher secures the conditions for action by calling the child to attend first 
perhaps to the other children but she must also call the child to attend to the world, so 
ensuring the child’s beginning in the world is possible. In a class with seven year olds 
this may begin perhaps with a glass bowl of water on a low table placed centrally when 
the children come into the room. The teacher invites the children to sit around the table 
in a circle perhaps first in silence, before bringing the children to attend to what 
happens when the water is moved by a hand, or more water being poured into the bowl 
or by the movement of breath on the surface of the bowl. The teacher will open a 
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conversation between the children about what they have noticed, perhaps agreeing and 
disagreeing with each other about this water and other examples of water they have met 
in their lives. However the important thing here is the attention, agreeing and 
disagreeing is important in so much as it advances the depth of attentiveness. There 
would be no particular time limit set for this step.  
Secondly the teacher needs to bring the child to a kind of intellectual humility. I 
understand this to be a step that follows bringing the child to attention, and means 
bringing the child to a point when she not only attends to what is brought to her, but 
also engages with, explores and enquires into it further; but without prejudgement. At 
this point if the teacher has begun to bring some additional content to the child for her 
to attend to, there will be intellectual engagement with the material, but with a degree 
of humility (for further exploration of what Weil means by humility and why it is 
important in this context see for example Weil 2003 pp.138-141) or open mindedness.  
It could be here that the teacher brings to the child the range of ways water is 
understood by people living a religious life as Christian in baptism; and at this point 
many possibilities could be explored. The important thing is that at every step the 
child’s attention is deepening, and which Weil has helped me to understand is the 
purpose of teaching (see Weil 1963, p.108). 
The third and final step is one of discernment, and this where the teacher ensures that 
the child’s enquiry reaches some kind of a resolution, albeit contingent, about the 
importance of something. However this is not simply to reach a judgement. What is 
required is to weigh things up and to be able to discern by delving into the matters that 
have been considered before perhaps to rescuing something that seems to be of value 
lying in what is being explored and enquired into with humility. This is something 
important for the child herself, for others and even for the world. Opportunities for 
young people to attend to and dialogue with their peers, understood with Arendt as 
action, will have consequence for the existence of the public sphere. What is at stake 
here is the life of the child and freedom of the public sphere, and bringing into the 
public space things of value. Education understood only in terms of knowledge and 
bringing the child to reason alone cannot secure freedom.  The teacher of religious 
education in bringing the child’s attention to the way in which she herself exists in the 
world, is explicitly enabling her to find her own life view so she can make choices 
about how to live. However, because this is undertaken in the condition of plurality and 
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because educatively religious education is understood in terms of action where the 
child is able to make her beginnings in the world, this is an uncertain but not accidental 
outcome. Nevertheless it is indeed precisely the thing that religious education should 
set out to achieve. 
The acquisition of knowledge alone is insufficient for freedom to exist in the world. 
Instead children and young people through action can begin to find reflected positions 
on and the importance of what it means to live their own life, and in so doing secure 
freedom of the public sphere.  By way of closing this section and before moving onto 
the final section of this chapter, I note how Arendt exposes some possible 
consequences for the world if (young) people, in or out of the public educational 
contexts, are not able to think for themselves and which I discus in the next section 
before taking this up again in the conclusion to my thesis. 
 
6.5 When might it matter that religious education is understood this way? 
I have tried to show, especially in chapters 2 and 3, that there needs to be greater 
precision about the use of the term ‘religious education’. I look now at how my 
proposal put forward in this chapter is distinctive as compared to the proposals for 
religious education made in the interpretive, critical realist and conceptual enquiry 
approaches by Jackson, Wright and Erricker respectively. In so doing I seek to 
highlight the difference it makes that religious education is conceptualised in terms of 
action and where religion is conceptualised existentially, not limited to religion as 
belief and tradition. Furthermore I consider the difference it makes when the teacher of 
religious education’s role is understood as bringing the child to attend, to intellectual 
humility and discernment. I approach this task by comparing in each case first between 
my proposal regarding plurality and bringing the child to attend, secondly with my 
proposal regarding intellectual humility and thirdly my proposal for discernment before 
in each case reaching a conclusion regarding its distinctiveness. I close this section 
through a consideration of some implications of my approach in relation to action.  
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6.5.1 The interpretive approach 
In the interpretive approach as proposed by Jackson, plurality is understood as meaning 
‘religious plurality’; indeed Jackson states in several places the interpretive approach to 
religious education ‘aims to help children and young people find their own positions 
within the key debates about religious plurality’ ( see Jackson 1997, 2004a and 2005). 
Although he is interested in the children ‘finding their own positions’ this is limited to 
‘the key debates about religious plurality’. In my view, this is problematic for two 
reasons both of which relate to his understanding of plurality. The first is that Jackson’s 
starting point is with the plurality of religion rather than the plurality of the children 
and linked with this Jackson’s conceptualisation of religion as limited to belief and 
tradition. The implication of not interpreting plurality in relation to the classroom 
community is, from an Arendtian point of view, the loss of the possibility of the 
children making their beginnings in the world. My position on plurality in relation to 
religious education turns things around. Instead of asking questions first about religious 
plurality I have begun with an educational question ‘when does plurality matter 
educatively?’  
In responding to this question, I have not looked at plurality in terms of religious 
plurality but on the plurality of the unique children in the class. This has enabled me to 
shift the discussion away from knowledge and through introducing a third way of 
conceptualising religion has also opened up the possibility of discussing subjectivity. 
Hence my approach lends itself to an understanding of religious education in direct 
relation to the conditions required for action. The significance of this move has been 
that I am able to place human existence and freedom at the heart of my proposal for 
religious educational rather than epistemological conundrums about truth. Jackson’s 
focus on religious plurality, especially where religion is restricted to being understood 
in terms only of belief and tradition, makes it more likely that the discussion will be 
oriented around knowledge and not to a focus on the unique child. This leads me to 
conclude that Jackson’s approach despite the best of intentions ensures that it will be 
extremely difficult to understand how a young person would in actuality be able to 
‘find their own position(s) within key debates about religious plurality’; and in 
particular how this can have any meaning in the public sphere.  The reason why this is 
the case is explained further by the second problem I identify. 
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The second problem regarding Jackson’s focus on religious plurality is that he does not 
write precisely about how, in order to avoid charges of indoctrination, it is that the 
teacher is to interest the child in what is to be represented. The interpretive approach is 
understood as having four steps in order to overcome problems of representing religion 
in the classroom, and the first of these is representation. Although consideration about 
the importance of representing religion accurately in the classroom is discussed in the 
literature extensively (see for example Jackson 1997, 2000, 2004a, 2010), as already 
discussed the use of ethnographies of religion serves only to emphasise further the 
weight the interpretive approach gives to conceptualising religion as belief and 
practice. This, taken together with a focus on the plurality of religion rather than on the 
plurality of the children in the classroom, serves to limit the way this approach can 
demonstrate that it, or more particularly the teacher could really be interested in the 
child’s perspective on things.  This is in contrast to the approach I am advocating where 
what it is that the teacher is to do is made clear; that is to bring the child first to attend. 
I have argued that it is through being brought to attend, at least to the others in the 
class, that the condition of plurality can be ensured; my point is that in my proposal 
plurality as a condition for action is taken seriously. Jackson, aware of the issues of the 
relationship between the child and the religious material to be represented in the 
classroom, insists that the interpretive approach neither ‘privileges the individual nor 
the religion but is concerned with the hermeneutical relationship between the two’ 
(Jackson 2011a, p. 192). His turn to hermeneutics is interesting, but not something he 
expands upon, either in general or  in terms of how it would enable him to describe 
what it is that the teacher should do in relation to the child. Nevertheless, since the 
understanding of plurality in the interpretive approach is only in terms of religious 
plurality this places weight upon the content of religious education. Therefore and 
despite wanting to discuss the relationship between the child in the educational context 
and the religious content, the position regarding plurality ensures there are limitations 
to this intention. This is not only regarding the extent to which the child will in fact be 
able to interpret what is brought to them but also a further significant implication lies in 
the way in which the possibility of the existence of human freedom and the public 
sphere is constrained. 
The next steps in the interpretive approach are interpretation and reflexivity. Jackson 
(2000) makes clear this is in order to ensure there is reflection which ensures a 
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‘relationship between the experience of the students and the experience of the insiders 
whose way of life they are attempting to interpret’ (p. 134). Citing strong influence in 
his understanding of interpretation from Geertz’s writing on ethnography (p.134), 
Jackson explains that the ‘interpretive methodology of the project was not just 
influenced by discussions of theory and methodology but informed by the project 
team’s own experience or ethnographic fieldwork’ (p.134). Sensitivity is regarded as a 
prerequisite on the part of the students in this process, but Jackson does not give advice 
to the teacher as to either precisely what they should seek to achieve or precisely what 
they should do. In the proposal I am making in this thesis, Weil’s discussions on 
bringing the child to attend, and through this to intellectual humility, help to explain 
what it is that the teacher is to do in order to bring the child to action in plurality.  The 
problem with the interpretive approach however, lies in the fact that the 
conceptualisation of religion is focussed on belief and practice ensuring religion 
remains only an object of study. Jackson is not inviting the children in the religious 
education class to become ethnographers themselves, but to study others’ 
ethnographies. Because of the emphasis on knowledge of beliefs or a tradition this 
approach serves to further orient the focus on to the religious material and away from 
the child. The child’s intellectual life is confined to one of ‘understander’, that is one 
who has to understand something; which is in contrast to the approach I am advancing 
in my thesis. By recognising another way of conceptualising religion, that is religion 
conceptualised as faith, I open the possibility of an exploration of subjectivity. What is 
at stake here from an Arendtian point of view is the loss of plurality. What is significant 
in this is that where plurality is lost, so also is lost the possibility of action and thus the 
possibility of the child making her beginning in the world and the possibility of the 
existence of the public sphere. 
The final step in the interpretive approach is edification, Jackson (2000) sees that this 
‘broadly resembles Grimmitt’s idea of learning from religion’ (p.135) and broadly 
speaking can be understood as some kind of reassessment of prior understanding. To 
some extent there is an element of similarity here between Jackson’s idea of edification 
and what I have termed discernment. However there are at least two significant 
differences in my understanding of discernment. The first is that edification is 
something that Jackson hopes will happen to the child through her encounter with the 
religious material with limited consideration of what the teacher should do in relation to 
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this.  The second significant difference compared to my proposal and in contrast to the 
interpretive approach is that of discernment. Discernment I understand from Weil is 
something the teacher needs to bring the child to. Further it is a particular way of seeing 
that is related to her understanding of choice, and is in a particular relationship with 
how one lives their life. Discernment cannot be left to happen by itself; it involves the 
teacher in coming alongside the child and is also related to a quality of attention. It is a 
deepening of the quality of attention that for Weil makes discernment possible. 
Discernment however, is not the same as reasoning nor is it the same as making a 
judgement. But importantly it cannot happen without the effort of attention. The 
teacher in bringing the child to discernment may ask simply ‘after what we have been 
exploring in this time together, how this might change what you do tomorrow?’ 
Signalling to the child that there may be something to consider in relation to how one 
lives a life. In my view this is important because in contrast to this Jackson, drawing 
from anthropological literature, assumes that something edifying will come out of the 
encounter the child has with the relations material as if by itself and without any 
particular effort. This understanding of edification, and that what comes through it 
could be something valuable, is only possible because Jackson in general makes 
theoretical assumptions about the inherent goodness of religion. Again something that 
from Arendt I would not want to assume at all.  
In conclusion to this section I note that a critical distinction between the approach I am 
proposing and the interpretive approach is because the focus in the interpretive 
approach is on religious plurality. This limits the possibility of action and hence 
limiting the possibility the child making her beginnings in the world. The difference 
this makes at best is that it will be impossible for human freedom and the public sphere 
to exist in the world because these are both dependent upon the condition of action in 
plurality. At very worst the opposite is possible, and this is the possibility of the 
emergence of totalitarianism. 
 
6.5.2 The critical realist approach 
Wright (2007) envisages that critical religious education will be ‘as a series of 
conversations between pupil’s horizons of meaning and the worldviews of a range of 
discrete religious traditions’ (p. 207) and by plurality Wright (see for example 2008) in 
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general means religious plurality. Wright (2007) sees his work as part of the heart of 
the ‘original vision of liberal education’ (p.207) citing the view of Hirst (p.31) that 
education is largely about the pursuit of knowledge. Hence his focus in the critical 
realist approach to religious education is centred on the plurality of religious 
knowledge, and most especially of religion understood as propositional belief (p.209), 
within the context of liberal education. This therefore places his discussion about the 
complexity of competing truth claims securely in the area of epistemology.  I have 
already explored problems that locating the discussion in the sphere of epistemology 
raises for religious education, but here I would like to highlight the particular and 
distinct implications of this focus in relation to the capacity of Wright’s approach to be 
able to take plurality seriously. The problems the critical realist approach faces are 
similar to that of the interpretive approach in that its focus is on religion as 
propositional belief. However the implications are even stronger for the critical realist 
approach because of the clear epistemological focus taken alongside a narrow 
conceptualisation of religion. The critical realist approach to religious education has 
reason and the formation of a ‘cognitively coherent world view’ (Erricker 2010, p. 59) 
as a central expectation of the approach leaving it open to critique from Arendt 
regarding the cultivation of freedom understood a sovereignty, and hence limiting the 
possibility of human action. 
Wright turns to the variation theory of learning in order to explain what will take place 
in a religious education classroom, however this taken together with the focus on 
knowledge and Hirst’s advocacy of liberal education means that any attempt at offering 
an explanation of what it is that the teacher should do in religious education is limited 
to bringing the child to reason. From this I conclude that the critical realist approach to 
religious education also limits the possibility for action in the Arendtian sense, because 
there is no recognition of the plurality in relation to the children in the class. What I 
mean by this is that because the focus in the critical realist approach is on reasoning 
about truth, this places the locus of attention well outside the subjectivity of the child. 
Furthermore the task of the teacher understood as bringing the child to reason has 
implications I have already discussed in chapter 5 and will return to shortly. Wright 
(2007) however does explore Smart’s discussion regarding the relationship between the 
teacher and the child in ‘liberal religious education’ (p. 85) as being the ‘relationship 
between subjectivity and objectivity in the study of religion’ (p. 85). Indeed this is the 
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critical question at the heart of the phenomenological concern going right back to 
Husserl. However in both Smart’s and Wright’s work this discussion takes place in the 
context of a conceptualisation of religion understood only as belief or tradition. 
Therefore, and hence for Wright at least, the subjective - objective relationship because 
of its focus on the religion as propositional belief focusses only on the object of 
religion, not on the relationship between the child and the object. Therefore, in my 
view, there is insufficient attention paid to the child as unique subject of education. The 
critical realist approach risks becoming one mainly of ontological and epistemological 
concern rather than an educational concern. Nevertheless, Wright discusses the 
necessity of bringing the ‘subjectivity of pupils into conversation with the objective 
truth claims of a range of religions and secular traditions’ (p.85). However this remains 
quite distinctive from approach I take from Weil, of bringing the child first to attend. 
My approach has emerged from a question regarding what is it that the education 
should do, and taking into account my discussion in chapter 5 with Arendt, has 
significant implications in relation to the possibility of the existence of freedom and the 
public sphere. 
Wright makes it clear that the critical realist approach to religious education is set 
within a view of education that ‘rests on the cultivation of academic freedom in the 
classroom’ (p. 86). My reading of Wright’s (see especially 2007) conceptualisation of 
freedom is that it is quite explicitly close to Arendt’s understanding of freedom as 
sovereignty and thus vulnerable to the full weight of her critique and the implications 
Arendt sees for this in terms of the possibility of ensuring the conditions for action.  
The academic freedom upon which Wright’s approach to religious education is 
dependant is also at variance with the intellectual humility which I propose the teacher 
should bring the child towards.  Hence I conclude that Wright’s proposals are probably 
the furthest away from my understanding of what religious education should do 
educatively, in terms of bringing children to action in the condition of plurality. This 
has significant implications for the possibility of religious education being interested in 
the cultivation of a mode of existence dependent upon human freedom. The critical 
realist approach, with such a view of what should take place in the classroom and such 
a limited understanding of what the teacher should do herself, I conclude with Arendt 
would be more likely to create the conditions for totalitarianism than freedom. This is 
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as a consequence of his theoretical proposals as well as uncovered assumptions being 
made about both religion and education in the critical realist approach. 
 
6.5.3 The conceptual enquiry approach 
Erricker (2010) holds that religious education ‘is derived from religious studies’ (p. 95) 
which is a ‘multidisciplinary endeavour’ (p. 95) and he adopts a relativist, postmodern 
perspective on the representation of religion in the classroom. His view is that religious 
education which emerged from a ‘descriptive phenomenological approach concerned 
with religious representation’ (p. 94), placed an over emphasis on the content of the 
curriculum is something he sees as having been problematic for religious education. 
Instead Erricker developed an approach to the teaching of religious education based 
upon ‘a methodology for conceptual enquiry’ (p.82); the intention being to place the 
educational interests of the child at the centre of the enquiry. However the point I want 
to make is that Erricker’s focus on religious plurality understood as difference (see for 
example Erricker 2001b and 2006) rather than the uniqueness of each child, still raises 
some problems. What is at stake here is that where plurality is seen in terms of the 
plurality of religion to be represented in the classroom, rather than actual human 
plurality, there is the possibility of each unique child’s new beginning in the world 
being lost and subsumed into sameness. However I think this is not what Erricker 
intended, but may be a possible consequence of him taking a relativist position in 
relation to religious belief. Arendt (1998) explains why this matters and presents such a 
very dangerous situation ‘where nobody can any longer agree with anybody else’ 
(p.58). Each person is ‘imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience’ 
(p. 58) which she continues by saying ‘is usually the case in tyrannies’ (p.58). If the 
conceptual enquiry approach were to find a way to include a broader understanding of 
religion, where religion as existential can be included, then the orientation may shift 
away from the material and open the possibility of children’s subjectivity being taken 
to the heart of the proposal.  
The implication of this not happening, but remaining with a relativist and postmodern 
approach to religion is that rather than the conceptual enquiry approach being able, as is 
intended, to ‘support students in developing their own pattern of values and principles’ 
(see for example 2004 & 2010) it is likely to have the opposite effect. This is because 
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the plurality of religion is understood as only in terms of belief and practice. Erricker 
(2010) explains that the first steps of his approach, in the ‘communicate’ and ‘apply’ 
steps, are where students are ‘engaged in an enquiry into and reflection upon their own 
experience’ (p.83). However, this taken together with the fact that the plurality of the 
children in the class is not being mentioned at all, seems very well to support Arendt’s 
observations of the imprisonment of each ‘in the subjectivity of their own singular 
experience’ (Arendt 1998, p. 58). In contrast to this, I have argued that what is 
educatively significant is precisely the plurality of the children; the teacher’s role is to 
bring each child to attend. Here the teacher has something important to do that is not 
accidental. In my view were the communicate and apply step to be understood in terms 
of bringing the child to attend, as Weil has enabled me to articulate, then the role of the 
teacher in this approach would be understood in a particular way very close to my 
proposal in this thesis.  If instead, rather than the teacher bringing the religious matter 
to the child with an acceptance of relativism and individual difference, the  first steps of 
the cycle of enquiry were to be understood as opening up the classroom to the plurality 
of all the children’s subjectivity and as bringing the children to attend, something 
different would become possible.  The approach to religious education argued for in 
this thesis, has an existential focus which is made possible by including religion 
conceptualised existentially as faith. In this conceptualisation of religion, theologically, 
subjectivity is something that can be explicitly discussed and explored. This is 
significant in terms of the possibility of religious education being educative because 
attention to the other, as I have proposed, is what can ensure plurality which is itself a 
condition of action.   
Erricker’s next step of ‘enquire’ is where a religious understanding of the concept being 
enquired into is brought to the students in a way which Erricker (2010) explains 
corresponds to ‘Grimmitt’s second stage’ (p.85) of constructivism. Erricker highlights 
that Grimmitt ‘makes the point’ (p.85) that the students are to be invited to be 
constructivist themselves in response to the new information the teacher introduces to 
them, however precisely what this means is not fully explained. Grimmitt’s third stage 
of constructivism is to be understood in relation to the ‘contextualise’ and ‘evaluate’ 
steps (p. 84). Grimmitt (2000) explains his work on constructivism has largely been 
drawn from the work of von Glaserfield (p. 210) and is used with the broad intention of 
‘showing how a constructivist approach to teaching and learning about religions in RE 
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differs from an instructional approach’ (p. 211). My problem with this is that the focus 
remains on the material being brought to the students, and without sufficient care being 
given to the attitude necessary on the part either of the teacher or the student. The 
assertion from Grimmitt is that this constructivist approach will be able to promote 
complex and sophisticated forms of learning (p.223) and further will enable pupils to 
engage critically in the process of meaning making ‘through consideration of the 
inescapable, ultimate questions that arise from reflecting upon the human condition 
(p.224). My suggestion is that if an existential conceptualisation of religion was 
included in how religion was conceptualised, and if the communicate and apply steps 
were understood in terms of bringing the children to action through bringing them to 
attend then this approach would be similar to that which I am proposing. Further, the  
‘enquire’ and ‘contextualise’ steps could be understood as bringing the child to 
intellectual humility. 
A concern I have with this approach as it stands is that what is missing is a view of 
plurality understood in terms of the children in the class, further in the absence of the 
role of the teacher being understood as bringing the child to attend is that this approach 
is likely to be far more coercive than Erricker or Grimmitt would want or intend. In my 
view this is because the educative nature of religious education has not been 
sufficiently explored by Grimmitt (see 1987a and 1987b) upon which Erricker built his 
understanding of constructivism in his proposals. The approach I have proposed in this 
chapter is that through understanding  the role of the teacher in terms of bringing the 
child to attend building on Weil, an attitude of intellectual humility will emerge on the 
part of both the teacher and the student. My understanding of humility has come from 
Weil and is the mode of existence necessary in order for the child to be sufficiently 
open to something new. My point is that the steps in the conceptual enquiry approach 
are in fact incredibly helpful in expressing what could be happening in an existential 
religious education. They would nevertheless require the inclusion of an existential 
conceptualisation of religion as faith taken together with education understood as 
bringing the child to action under the condition of plurality, rather than to reason. 
It is out of a deepening of the capacity to attend that discernment grows, and I want to 
make some observations about this as compared to the final step in the 5 steps of the 
conceptual enquiry approach, which as it stands is the ‘evaluate’ step. I do this by 
seeking some clarity of the difference between discernment and evaluation. The first 
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distinction between discernment and evaluation is that for Weil discernment is 
something subjective and not an objective judgement based upon reason. However 
being subjective does not make it any the lesser a part of the intellect, this is because 
for Well the intellect is not only bound by reason. Furthermore, this is also because for 
Weil knowledge is not attained only through reason but rather through attention. Indeed 
as Pirruccello (1997) has noted, Weil’s view seems to be that the best human beings 
can do in terms of gaining knowledge about the natural order  will be in terms of a 
‘discernment of a balance or equilibrium in the midst of continual change’ (p. 75). My 
proposal then sits well with the final step of the conceptual enquiry approach, but 
requires the addition of discernment to the evaluation as initially envisaged by Erricker. 
In my view this would bring something important to the approach. The most important 
thing is in the inclusion of religion conceptualised as faith into the way of 
understanding religion and a movement away from understanding religion in a 
relativistic way. This opens up the possibility for the child’s subjectivity in religious 
education and a different way to understanding the importance of the responsibility of 
the teacher to bring the child to attend. Another possibility is that the cycle should 
always continue round through a second communicate and apply step, where once more 
the subjectivity of the child and children together in the class would be brought to the 
fore.  
The implications of my analysis and comparison of the existential approach to religious 
education I am arguing for here and the conceptual enquiry approach as it stands, is that 
most critically although the conceptual enquiry approach intends to place the child at 
the heart of the enquiry, this intention remains problematic because of the focus on 
plurality in terms of religious difference. This leads to religious matters being the focus 
of the enquiry, and the skills based method for teaching religious education becomes a 
systematic way of bringing the child to engage rationally with the material. Were there 
to be the inclusion of religion conceptualised as faith and an educative discussion 
where the plurality of the children was taken into account then this would open the 
conceptual enquiry approach to reinterpretation in line with the proposal I am making 
here. Communicate and apply already bears some resemblance to what I have termed 
bringing the child to attention, and enquire and contextualise to what I have termed 
bringing the child to intellectual humility. Were religion conceptualised as faith to be 
included into the discussion then the inclusion of the child’s subjectivity becomes 
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possible. A discussion of the subjective becomes possible; a critical aspect of religious 
education so configured. Where religion is conceptualised as faith, the subjective is 
taken seriously, the plurality of the students at the heart of the educative proposal for 
religious education, religious education becomes a place of appearance, where children 
and teachers can be together in a manner of speech and action.   
In concluding this section, in my view the conceptual enquiry approach to religious 
education is the closest to the existential approach I have argued for through my thesis. 
Indeed with some adjustments to the theory underpinning the conceptual enquiry 
approach the two could be well aligned. 
 
6.6 Conclusion. 
At the beginning of my enquiry, I set out to bring greater precision in terms of a 
response to the question Cox (1983) identified in terms of ‘what is religious education 
essentially trying to do at this point in history in the culture in which pupils and 
teachers are living?’ (p.115). I have taken matters a step further however and through 
the investigation which constitutes my thesis, have set out to discover what should be 
the purpose of religious education in the public sphere. I have set about this by 
identifying three research sub questions the first of which was ‘what counts as religion 
in religious education?’ and which I investigated in chapter 4. My second research 
question was ‘what is it that education should do or aim to achieve?’ and I followed a 
line of enquiry with Arendt and Weil in chapter 5. My third research sub-question 
enabled me to bring together the findings from chapters 4 and 5 in order to address my 
overarching enquiry question. In addition to this I have also developed my argument 
through chapters 4 and 5 to be able to present a response to the question ‘what should 
the teacher of religious education do?’  
My investigation in chapters 2 and 3 identified that there have been assumptions lying 
underneath many proposals for religious education around questions of what is meant 
by religion and also by education. In addressing these questions in chapter 4 and 5 I 
have been able to move to make a presentation for a new approach to religious 
education in my closing chapter.  In chapter 4 I developed a reconceptualisation of 
religion through asking not ‘what is religion’ but instead what does it mean to live a 
religious life and, in chapter 5, I developed educational theory to advance my argument 
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in chapter 6 for an existential approach to religious education. Here I have argued that 
religious education should be understood as a ‘place of appearance (Arendt, p. 199), 
and where people are together ‘in the manner of speech and action’ (Arendt 1998, p. 
199) and children brought to action. It is in this way that with Arendt I understand the 
links between religious education and the public sphere and its particular contribution 
to even the possibility of both freedom and the public sphere existing.  
This is important because the public sphere, as discussed in chapter 5, cannot be taken 
for granted to exist ‘wherever men live together in a community’ (Arendt 1998, p. 152). 
Perhaps the most critical point I have to make in my thesis, in addition to the need to 
conceptualise education with Arendt as bringing the child to action, is that religious 
education where religion is understood existentially as faith, rather as only belief or 
practice, has a particularly significant contribution to bring to education as a whole. 
This is because of the way in which religion as existential opens the possibility for an 
exploration of subjectivity in such a way to enable action under the condition of 
plurality. A consequence of this new way of conceptualising religious education, in my 
view, means it could have a particularly important role to play in the existence of 
freedom and the public sphere in just the way Arendt understands.  
In addition to this the teacher’s role also becomes clear in educational terms, and it is 
with Weil that I am able to spell out what it is that the teacher should do in order for 
religious education understood existentially to achieve what it should set out to achieve. 
This is through bringing the child to attention, to intellectual humility and to 
discernment.  Another point I want to make at this juncture however, is that it is not 
that reason is never important in religious education. Rather it is that reasoning is not 
what religious education should aim to achieve as an end in itself. This is because, as 
Arendt has helped me to explain, reason always has another end outside itself. Instead 
my proposal for an existential approach to religious education understands education 
first as bringing the child to action and is open to a conceptualisation of religion as 
existential, as faith, as well as religion as belief and practice. What is at stake here for 
an existential religious education, one which has learned from other approaches to 
religious education, is that it can make the difference between a group of people merely 
being together and the educative possibility of them existing together in human 
togetherness and further make a difference to the possibility of people existing as free 
in the public sphere.  My hope is that the findings of this research opens some new 
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avenues of investigation which others may take up, both in terms of what religious 
education should aim to achieve,  as well as in terms of what the teacher should do and 
hence also for research in teacher education. 
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